Mechanism design: a linear programming approach
Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design base...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2011
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Econometric Society monographs
47 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 FHN01 UBG01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design |
| Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (x, 172 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9780511835216 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9780511835216 |
Internformat
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Mechanism design |b a linear programming approach |c Rakesh V. Vohra |
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| 505 | 8 | |a Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction; 2. Arrow's theorem and its consequences; 3. Network flow problem; 4. Incentive compatibility; 5. Efficiency; 6. Revenue maximization; 7. Rationalizability | |
| 520 | |a Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Mathematisches Modell | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Decision making / Linear programming | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Organizational behavior / Mathematical models | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Machine theory | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| any_adam_object | |
| author | Vohra, Rakesh V. |
| author_facet | Vohra, Rakesh V. |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Vohra, Rakesh V. |
| author_variant | r v v rv rvv |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV043919063 |
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| contents | Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction; 2. Arrow's theorem and its consequences; 3. Network flow problem; 4. Incentive compatibility; 5. Efficiency; 6. Revenue maximization; 7. Rationalizability |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511835216 (OCoLC)839020479 (DE-599)BVBBV043919063 |
| dewey-full | 658.4/033 |
| dewey-hundreds | 600 - Technology (Applied sciences) |
| dewey-ones | 658 - General management |
| dewey-raw | 658.4/033 |
| dewey-search | 658.4/033 |
| dewey-sort | 3658.4 233 |
| dewey-tens | 650 - Management and auxiliary services |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/CBO9780511835216 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| id | DE-604.BV043919063 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:38:32Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780511835216 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029328143 |
| oclc_num | 839020479 |
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| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-92 |
| physical | 1 online resource (x, 172 pages) |
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| publishDate | 2011 |
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| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
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| series2 | Econometric Society monographs |
| spelling | Vohra, Rakesh V. Verfasser aut Mechanism design a linear programming approach Rakesh V. Vohra Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2011 1 online resource (x, 172 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Econometric Society monographs 47 Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction; 2. Arrow's theorem and its consequences; 3. Network flow problem; 4. Incentive compatibility; 5. Efficiency; 6. Revenue maximization; 7. Rationalizability Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design Mathematisches Modell Decision making / Linear programming Organizational behavior / Mathematical models Machine theory Lineare Optimierung (DE-588)4035816-1 gnd rswk-swf Mechanismus-Design-Theorie (DE-588)7643554-4 gnd rswk-swf Mechanismus-Design-Theorie (DE-588)7643554-4 s Lineare Optimierung (DE-588)4035816-1 s 1\p DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-17946-1 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-1-107-00436-8 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511835216 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Vohra, Rakesh V. Mechanism design a linear programming approach Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction; 2. Arrow's theorem and its consequences; 3. Network flow problem; 4. Incentive compatibility; 5. Efficiency; 6. Revenue maximization; 7. Rationalizability Mathematisches Modell Decision making / Linear programming Organizational behavior / Mathematical models Machine theory Lineare Optimierung (DE-588)4035816-1 gnd Mechanismus-Design-Theorie (DE-588)7643554-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4035816-1 (DE-588)7643554-4 |
| title | Mechanism design a linear programming approach |
| title_auth | Mechanism design a linear programming approach |
| title_exact_search | Mechanism design a linear programming approach |
| title_full | Mechanism design a linear programming approach Rakesh V. Vohra |
| title_fullStr | Mechanism design a linear programming approach Rakesh V. Vohra |
| title_full_unstemmed | Mechanism design a linear programming approach Rakesh V. Vohra |
| title_short | Mechanism design |
| title_sort | mechanism design a linear programming approach |
| title_sub | a linear programming approach |
| topic | Mathematisches Modell Decision making / Linear programming Organizational behavior / Mathematical models Machine theory Lineare Optimierung (DE-588)4035816-1 gnd Mechanismus-Design-Theorie (DE-588)7643554-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Mathematisches Modell Decision making / Linear programming Organizational behavior / Mathematical models Machine theory Lineare Optimierung Mechanismus-Design-Theorie |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511835216 |
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