What minds can do: intentionality in a non-intentional world

Some of a person's mental states have the power to represent real and imagined states of affairs: they have semantic properties. What Minds Can Do has two goals: to find a naturalistic or non-semantic basis for the representational powers of a person's mind, and to show that these semantic...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Jacob, Pierre 1949- (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1997
Schriftenreihe:Cambridge studies in philosophy
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Zusammenfassung:Some of a person's mental states have the power to represent real and imagined states of affairs: they have semantic properties. What Minds Can Do has two goals: to find a naturalistic or non-semantic basis for the representational powers of a person's mind, and to show that these semantic properties are involved in the causal explanation of the person's behaviour. In the process, this 1997 book addresses issues that are central to much contemporary philosophical debate. It will be of interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy of mind and of language, cognitive science, and psychology
Beschreibung:Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
Beschreibung:1 online resource (xii, 299 pages)
ISBN:9780511583315
DOI:10.1017/CBO9780511583315

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