Quiet politics and business power: corporate control in Europe and Japan
Does democracy control business, or does business control democracy? This study of how companies are bought and sold in four countries - France, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands - explores this fundamental question. It does so by examining variation in the rules of corporate control - specifically...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2011
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Schriftenreihe: | Cambridge studies in comparative politics
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Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | DE-12 DE-473 Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | Does democracy control business, or does business control democracy? This study of how companies are bought and sold in four countries - France, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands - explores this fundamental question. It does so by examining variation in the rules of corporate control - specifically, whether hostile takeovers are allowed. Takeovers have high political stakes: they result in corporate reorganizations, layoffs and the unraveling of compromises between workers and managers. But the public rarely pays attention to issues of corporate control. As a result, political parties and legislatures are largely absent from this domain. Instead, organized managers get to make the rules, quietly drawing on their superior lobbying capacity and the deference of legislators. These tools, not campaign donations, are the true founts of managerial political influence |
Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (xviii, 221 pages) |
ISBN: | 9780511760716 |
DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9780511760716 |
Internformat
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490 | 0 | |a Cambridge studies in comparative politics | |
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505 | 8 | |a Machine generated contents note: 1. Corporate control and political salience; 2. Patient capital and markets for corporate control; 3. The managerial origins of institutional divergence in France and Germany; 4. The Netherlands and the myth of the corporatist coalition; 5. Managers, bureaucrats, and institutional change in Japan; 6. The noisy politics of executive pay; 7. Business power and democratic politics | |
520 | |a Does democracy control business, or does business control democracy? This study of how companies are bought and sold in four countries - France, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands - explores this fundamental question. It does so by examining variation in the rules of corporate control - specifically, whether hostile takeovers are allowed. Takeovers have high political stakes: they result in corporate reorganizations, layoffs and the unraveling of compromises between workers and managers. But the public rarely pays attention to issues of corporate control. As a result, political parties and legislatures are largely absent from this domain. Instead, organized managers get to make the rules, quietly drawing on their superior lobbying capacity and the deference of legislators. These tools, not campaign donations, are the true founts of managerial political influence | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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adam_text | |
any_adam_object | |
author | Culpepper, Pepper D. |
author_facet | Culpepper, Pepper D. |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Culpepper, Pepper D. |
author_variant | p d c pd pdc |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV043918796 |
classification_rvk | MF 2300 QP 341 |
collection | ZDB-20-CBO |
contents | Machine generated contents note: 1. Corporate control and political salience; 2. Patient capital and markets for corporate control; 3. The managerial origins of institutional divergence in France and Germany; 4. The Netherlands and the myth of the corporatist coalition; 5. Managers, bureaucrats, and institutional change in Japan; 6. The noisy politics of executive pay; 7. Business power and democratic politics |
ctrlnum | (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511760716 (OCoLC)967398985 (DE-599)BVBBV043918796 |
dewey-full | 338.6094 |
dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
dewey-ones | 338 - Production |
dewey-raw | 338.6094 |
dewey-search | 338.6094 |
dewey-sort | 3338.6094 |
dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
discipline | Politologie Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
doi_str_mv | 10.1017/CBO9780511760716 |
format | Electronic eBook |
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geographic | Europa Japan (DE-588)4028495-5 gnd |
geographic_facet | Europa Japan |
id | DE-604.BV043918796 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
indexdate | 2025-01-02T13:06:55Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9780511760716 |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029327878 |
oclc_num | 967398985 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG |
owner_facet | DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG |
physical | 1 online resource (xviii, 221 pages) |
psigel | ZDB-20-CBO ZDB-20-CBO BSB_PDA_CBO ZDB-20-CBO UBG_PDA_CBO |
publishDate | 2011 |
publishDateSearch | 2011 |
publishDateSort | 2011 |
publisher | Cambridge University Press |
record_format | marc |
series2 | Cambridge studies in comparative politics |
spelling | Culpepper, Pepper D. Verfasser aut Quiet politics and business power corporate control in Europe and Japan Pepper D. Culpepper Quiet Politics & Business Power Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2011 1 online resource (xviii, 221 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Cambridge studies in comparative politics Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) Machine generated contents note: 1. Corporate control and political salience; 2. Patient capital and markets for corporate control; 3. The managerial origins of institutional divergence in France and Germany; 4. The Netherlands and the myth of the corporatist coalition; 5. Managers, bureaucrats, and institutional change in Japan; 6. The noisy politics of executive pay; 7. Business power and democratic politics Does democracy control business, or does business control democracy? This study of how companies are bought and sold in four countries - France, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands - explores this fundamental question. It does so by examining variation in the rules of corporate control - specifically, whether hostile takeovers are allowed. Takeovers have high political stakes: they result in corporate reorganizations, layoffs and the unraveling of compromises between workers and managers. But the public rarely pays attention to issues of corporate control. As a result, political parties and legislatures are largely absent from this domain. Instead, organized managers get to make the rules, quietly drawing on their superior lobbying capacity and the deference of legislators. These tools, not campaign donations, are the true founts of managerial political influence Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd rswk-swf Corporate governance / Europe Corporate governance / Japan Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 gnd rswk-swf Europa Japan (DE-588)4028495-5 gnd rswk-swf Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 b Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 s Japan (DE-588)4028495-5 g 1\p DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-11859-0 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-13413-2 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511760716 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
spellingShingle | Culpepper, Pepper D. Quiet politics and business power corporate control in Europe and Japan Machine generated contents note: 1. Corporate control and political salience; 2. Patient capital and markets for corporate control; 3. The managerial origins of institutional divergence in France and Germany; 4. The Netherlands and the myth of the corporatist coalition; 5. Managers, bureaucrats, and institutional change in Japan; 6. The noisy politics of executive pay; 7. Business power and democratic politics Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd Corporate governance / Europe Corporate governance / Japan Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)5098525-5 (DE-588)4419850-4 (DE-588)4028495-5 |
title | Quiet politics and business power corporate control in Europe and Japan |
title_alt | Quiet Politics & Business Power |
title_auth | Quiet politics and business power corporate control in Europe and Japan |
title_exact_search | Quiet politics and business power corporate control in Europe and Japan |
title_full | Quiet politics and business power corporate control in Europe and Japan Pepper D. Culpepper |
title_fullStr | Quiet politics and business power corporate control in Europe and Japan Pepper D. Culpepper |
title_full_unstemmed | Quiet politics and business power corporate control in Europe and Japan Pepper D. Culpepper |
title_short | Quiet politics and business power |
title_sort | quiet politics and business power corporate control in europe and japan |
title_sub | corporate control in Europe and Japan |
topic | Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd Corporate governance / Europe Corporate governance / Japan Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 gnd |
topic_facet | Europäische Union Corporate governance / Europe Corporate governance / Japan Corporate Governance Europa Japan |
url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511760716 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT culpepperpepperd quietpoliticsandbusinesspowercorporatecontrolineuropeandjapan AT culpepperpepperd quietpoliticsbusinesspower |