The robust federation: principles of design
The Robust Federation offers a comprehensive approach to the study of federalism. Jenna Bednar demonstrates how complementary institutions maintain and adjust the distribution of authority between national and state governments. These authority boundaries matter - for defense, economic growth, and a...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2009
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Schriftenreihe: | Political economy of institutions and decisions
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Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | BSB01 UBG01 Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | The Robust Federation offers a comprehensive approach to the study of federalism. Jenna Bednar demonstrates how complementary institutions maintain and adjust the distribution of authority between national and state governments. These authority boundaries matter - for defense, economic growth, and adequate political representation - and must be defended from opportunistic transgression. From Montesquieu to Madison, the legacy of early institutional analysis focuses attention on the value of competition between institutions, such as the policy moderation produced through separated powers. Bednar offers a reciprocal theory: in an effective constitutional system, institutions complement one another; each makes the others more powerful. Diverse but complementary safeguards - including the courts, political parties, and the people - cover different transgressions, punish to different extents, and fail under different circumstances. The analysis moves beyond equilibrium conceptions and explains how the rules that allocate authority are not fixed but shift gradually. Bednar's rich theoretical characterization of complementary institutions provides the first holistic account of federal robustness |
Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (xii, 242 pages) |
ISBN: | 9780511819445 |
DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9780511819445 |
Internformat
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505 | 8 | |a Constituting the robust federation -- Federal structure and potential -- The federal problem -- The safeguards of federalism -- Coverage -- Complementarity -- Redundancy -- Tying the Gordian knot | |
520 | |a The Robust Federation offers a comprehensive approach to the study of federalism. Jenna Bednar demonstrates how complementary institutions maintain and adjust the distribution of authority between national and state governments. These authority boundaries matter - for defense, economic growth, and adequate political representation - and must be defended from opportunistic transgression. From Montesquieu to Madison, the legacy of early institutional analysis focuses attention on the value of competition between institutions, such as the policy moderation produced through separated powers. Bednar offers a reciprocal theory: in an effective constitutional system, institutions complement one another; each makes the others more powerful. Diverse but complementary safeguards - including the courts, political parties, and the people - cover different transgressions, punish to different extents, and fail under different circumstances. The analysis moves beyond equilibrium conceptions and explains how the rules that allocate authority are not fixed but shift gradually. Bednar's rich theoretical characterization of complementary institutions provides the first holistic account of federal robustness | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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any_adam_object | |
author | Bednar, Jenna |
author_facet | Bednar, Jenna |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Bednar, Jenna |
author_variant | j b jb |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV043918566 |
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collection | ZDB-20-CBO |
contents | Constituting the robust federation -- Federal structure and potential -- The federal problem -- The safeguards of federalism -- Coverage -- Complementarity -- Redundancy -- Tying the Gordian knot |
ctrlnum | (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511819445 (OCoLC)967398217 (DE-599)BVBBV043918566 |
dewey-full | 320.4/049 |
dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
dewey-ones | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
dewey-raw | 320.4/049 |
dewey-search | 320.4/049 |
dewey-sort | 3320.4 249 |
dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
discipline | Politologie |
doi_str_mv | 10.1017/CBO9780511819445 |
format | Electronic eBook |
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isbn | 9780511819445 |
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spelling | Bednar, Jenna Verfasser aut The robust federation principles of design Jenna Bednar Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2009 1 online resource (xii, 242 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Political economy of institutions and decisions Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) Constituting the robust federation -- Federal structure and potential -- The federal problem -- The safeguards of federalism -- Coverage -- Complementarity -- Redundancy -- Tying the Gordian knot The Robust Federation offers a comprehensive approach to the study of federalism. Jenna Bednar demonstrates how complementary institutions maintain and adjust the distribution of authority between national and state governments. These authority boundaries matter - for defense, economic growth, and adequate political representation - and must be defended from opportunistic transgression. From Montesquieu to Madison, the legacy of early institutional analysis focuses attention on the value of competition between institutions, such as the policy moderation produced through separated powers. Bednar offers a reciprocal theory: in an effective constitutional system, institutions complement one another; each makes the others more powerful. Diverse but complementary safeguards - including the courts, political parties, and the people - cover different transgressions, punish to different extents, and fail under different circumstances. The analysis moves beyond equilibrium conceptions and explains how the rules that allocate authority are not fixed but shift gradually. Bednar's rich theoretical characterization of complementary institutions provides the first holistic account of federal robustness Federal government Federal government / United States Föderalismus (DE-588)4017754-3 gnd rswk-swf USA USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Föderalismus (DE-588)4017754-3 s 1\p DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-70396-3 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-87899-9 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511819445 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
spellingShingle | Bednar, Jenna The robust federation principles of design Constituting the robust federation -- Federal structure and potential -- The federal problem -- The safeguards of federalism -- Coverage -- Complementarity -- Redundancy -- Tying the Gordian knot Federal government Federal government / United States Föderalismus (DE-588)4017754-3 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4017754-3 (DE-588)4078704-7 |
title | The robust federation principles of design |
title_auth | The robust federation principles of design |
title_exact_search | The robust federation principles of design |
title_full | The robust federation principles of design Jenna Bednar |
title_fullStr | The robust federation principles of design Jenna Bednar |
title_full_unstemmed | The robust federation principles of design Jenna Bednar |
title_short | The robust federation |
title_sort | the robust federation principles of design |
title_sub | principles of design |
topic | Federal government Federal government / United States Föderalismus (DE-588)4017754-3 gnd |
topic_facet | Federal government Federal government / United States Föderalismus USA |
url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511819445 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT bednarjenna therobustfederationprinciplesofdesign |