Evidence and agency: norms of belief for promising and resolving
Concerned with the question of how, as agents, we should take into account evidence when thinking about our future actions. Sometimes we promise and resolve to do things that we have evidence is difficult for us to do. Should we believe that we will follow through, or believe that there is a good ch...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
---|---|
Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
2015
|
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
Zusammenfassung: | Concerned with the question of how, as agents, we should take into account evidence when thinking about our future actions. Sometimes we promise and resolve to do things that we have evidence is difficult for us to do. Should we believe that we will follow through, or believe that there is a good chance that we won't? If we believe the former, we seem to be irrational since we believe against the evidence. yet if we believe the latter, we seem to be insincere since we can't sincerely say that we will follow through. Hence, it seems, our promise or resolution must be improper. To meet this challenge, the author considers and rejects a number of responses, before defending a solution inspired by the Kantian tradition and by Sartre in particular: as agents, we have a distinct view of what we will do. If something is up to us, we can decide what to do, rather than predict what we will do. But the reasons in light of which a decision is rational are not the same as the reasons in light of which a prediction is rational. That is why, provided it is important to us to do something, we can rationally believe that we will do it - even if our belief goes against the evidence |
Beschreibung: | Literaturverzeichnis Seite 215-232 Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke |
Beschreibung: | xi, 239 pages 23 cm |
ISBN: | 9780198714040 0198714041 9780198801368 |
Internformat
MARC
LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
001 | BV043898512 | ||
003 | DE-604 | ||
005 | 20230803 | ||
007 | t | ||
008 | 161124s2015 xxk |||| 00||| eng d | ||
010 | |a 015935926 | ||
020 | |a 9780198714040 |9 978-0-19-871404-0 | ||
020 | |a 0198714041 |9 0-19-871404-1 | ||
020 | |a 9780198801368 |9 978-0-19-880136-8 | ||
035 | |a (OCoLC)929118001 | ||
035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV043898512 | ||
040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
041 | 0 | |a eng | |
044 | |a xxk |c GB | ||
049 | |a DE-29 |a DE-355 |a DE-703 | ||
050 | 0 | |a BC173 | |
082 | 0 | |a 121.65 |2 23 | |
084 | |a CC 3200 |0 (DE-625)17614: |2 rvk | ||
100 | 1 | |a Marušić, Berislav |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)1191202933 |4 aut | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Evidence and agency |b norms of belief for promising and resolving |c Berislav Marušić |
246 | 1 | 3 | |a Evidence & agency |
264 | 1 | |c 2015 | |
300 | |a xi, 239 pages |c 23 cm | ||
336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
500 | |a Literaturverzeichnis Seite 215-232 | ||
500 | |a Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke | ||
520 | |a Concerned with the question of how, as agents, we should take into account evidence when thinking about our future actions. Sometimes we promise and resolve to do things that we have evidence is difficult for us to do. Should we believe that we will follow through, or believe that there is a good chance that we won't? If we believe the former, we seem to be irrational since we believe against the evidence. yet if we believe the latter, we seem to be insincere since we can't sincerely say that we will follow through. Hence, it seems, our promise or resolution must be improper. To meet this challenge, the author considers and rejects a number of responses, before defending a solution inspired by the Kantian tradition and by Sartre in particular: as agents, we have a distinct view of what we will do. If something is up to us, we can decide what to do, rather than predict what we will do. But the reasons in light of which a decision is rational are not the same as the reasons in light of which a prediction is rational. That is why, provided it is important to us to do something, we can rationally believe that we will do it - even if our belief goes against the evidence | ||
650 | 4 | |a Belief and doubt | |
650 | 4 | |a Knowledge, Theory of | |
650 | 4 | |a Act (Philosophy) | |
650 | 4 | |a Commitment (Psychology) | |
650 | 4 | |a Evidence | |
650 | 4 | |a Ethics | |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Versprechen |0 (DE-588)4078852-0 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Handlung |0 (DE-588)4023277-3 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Evidenz |0 (DE-588)4129356-3 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
689 | 0 | 0 | |a Evidenz |0 (DE-588)4129356-3 |D s |
689 | 0 | 1 | |a Versprechen |0 (DE-588)4078852-0 |D s |
689 | 0 | 2 | |a Handlung |0 (DE-588)4023277-3 |D s |
689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
856 | 4 | 2 | |m LoC Fremddatenuebernahme |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=029307823&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029307823 |
Datensatz im Suchindex
_version_ | 1804176800776978432 |
---|---|
adam_text | EVIDENCE AND AGENCY
/ MARUSIICI, BERISLAVYYEAUTHOR
: 2015
TABLE OF CONTENTS / INHALTSVERZEICHNIS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. INTRODUCTION. 1 PROMISING AND RESOLVING AGAINST THE
EVIDENCE : CLARIFYING THE PROBLEMS
THE APPEAL TO TRYING
AN EXPLANATORY TASK: ASYMMETRIES BETWEEN AGENTS, LOVERS, AND OBSERVERS
OUTLOOK
CONCLUSION. 2 SINCERITY AND RATIONALITY : SINCERITY
RATIONALITY
PROPRIETY
BELIEF
CONCLUSION. 3 THE NON-COGNITIVIST RESPONSE : INTENDING
AIMING
ACCEPTING
THE COMBINED NON-COGNITIVIST RESPONSE
CONCLUSION. 4 THE PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE RESPONSE : PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE
AGAINST THE PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE RESPONSE
AGAINST THE PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE APPROACH
CONCLUSION: PRACTICAL THOUGHT. 5 THE EVIDENTIALIST RESPONSE : THE
EVIDENTIALIST S BRIDGE PRINCIPLES
A DISHEARTENING VIEW
EPISTEMIC EVASION
CONCLUSION. 6 THE SARTREAN RESPONSE : THE AGENT S POINT OF VIEW
WHY BELIEF?
CASE STUDIES
OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES : BELIEF AIMS AT KNOWLEDGE
COORDINATION WITHOUT RECONCILIATION
FOREGOING SELF-KNOWLEDGE
A COMEBACK FOR THE PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE RESPONSE?
THE IDEA OF FREEDOM
PREDICTIVE PROMISES
PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT
BETTING
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PROMISING AND RESOLVING
FREEDOM
ANGUISH
CONCLUSION. 7 TRUSTING AGAINST THE EVIDENCE : THE EVIDENTIALIST RESPONSE
THE CALCULATING RESPONSE
THE TESTIMONIAL KNOWLEDGE RESPONSE
THE STRAWSONIAN RESPONSE
WHY BELIEF?
CONCLUSION. CONCLUSION. POSTSCRIPT. GLOSSARY. REFERENCES. INDEX
DIESES SCHRIFTSTUECK WURDE MASCHINELL ERZEUGT.
|
any_adam_object | 1 |
author | Marušić, Berislav |
author_GND | (DE-588)1191202933 |
author_facet | Marušić, Berislav |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Marušić, Berislav |
author_variant | b m bm |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV043898512 |
callnumber-first | B - Philosophy, Psychology, Religion |
callnumber-label | BC173 |
callnumber-raw | BC173 |
callnumber-search | BC173 |
callnumber-sort | BC 3173 |
callnumber-subject | BC - Logic |
classification_rvk | CC 3200 |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)929118001 (DE-599)BVBBV043898512 |
dewey-full | 121.65 |
dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
dewey-ones | 121 - Epistemology (Theory of knowledge) |
dewey-raw | 121.65 |
dewey-search | 121.65 |
dewey-sort | 3121.65 |
dewey-tens | 120 - Epistemology, causation, humankind |
discipline | Philosophie |
format | Book |
fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>03131nam a2200553 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV043898512</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230803 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">161124s2015 xxk |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="010" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">015935926</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9780198714040</subfield><subfield code="9">978-0-19-871404-0</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">0198714041</subfield><subfield code="9">0-19-871404-1</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9780198801368</subfield><subfield code="9">978-0-19-880136-8</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)929118001</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV043898512</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxk</subfield><subfield code="c">GB</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-29</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-355</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-703</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">BC173</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">121.65</subfield><subfield code="2">23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">CC 3200</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)17614:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Marušić, Berislav</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)1191202933</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Evidence and agency</subfield><subfield code="b">norms of belief for promising and resolving</subfield><subfield code="c">Berislav Marušić</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="246" ind1="1" ind2="3"><subfield code="a">Evidence & agency</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2015</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xi, 239 pages</subfield><subfield code="c">23 cm</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Literaturverzeichnis Seite 215-232</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Concerned with the question of how, as agents, we should take into account evidence when thinking about our future actions. Sometimes we promise and resolve to do things that we have evidence is difficult for us to do. Should we believe that we will follow through, or believe that there is a good chance that we won't? If we believe the former, we seem to be irrational since we believe against the evidence. yet if we believe the latter, we seem to be insincere since we can't sincerely say that we will follow through. Hence, it seems, our promise or resolution must be improper. To meet this challenge, the author considers and rejects a number of responses, before defending a solution inspired by the Kantian tradition and by Sartre in particular: as agents, we have a distinct view of what we will do. If something is up to us, we can decide what to do, rather than predict what we will do. But the reasons in light of which a decision is rational are not the same as the reasons in light of which a prediction is rational. That is why, provided it is important to us to do something, we can rationally believe that we will do it - even if our belief goes against the evidence</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Belief and doubt</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Knowledge, Theory of</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Act (Philosophy)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Commitment (Psychology)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Evidence</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Ethics</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Versprechen</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4078852-0</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Handlung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4023277-3</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Evidenz</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4129356-3</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Evidenz</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4129356-3</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Versprechen</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4078852-0</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Handlung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4023277-3</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">LoC Fremddatenuebernahme</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=029307823&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Inhaltsverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029307823</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
id | DE-604.BV043898512 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:37:57Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9780198714040 0198714041 9780198801368 |
language | English |
lccn | 015935926 |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029307823 |
oclc_num | 929118001 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-29 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-703 |
owner_facet | DE-29 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-703 |
physical | xi, 239 pages 23 cm |
publishDate | 2015 |
publishDateSearch | 2015 |
publishDateSort | 2015 |
record_format | marc |
spelling | Marušić, Berislav Verfasser (DE-588)1191202933 aut Evidence and agency norms of belief for promising and resolving Berislav Marušić Evidence & agency 2015 xi, 239 pages 23 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Literaturverzeichnis Seite 215-232 Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke Concerned with the question of how, as agents, we should take into account evidence when thinking about our future actions. Sometimes we promise and resolve to do things that we have evidence is difficult for us to do. Should we believe that we will follow through, or believe that there is a good chance that we won't? If we believe the former, we seem to be irrational since we believe against the evidence. yet if we believe the latter, we seem to be insincere since we can't sincerely say that we will follow through. Hence, it seems, our promise or resolution must be improper. To meet this challenge, the author considers and rejects a number of responses, before defending a solution inspired by the Kantian tradition and by Sartre in particular: as agents, we have a distinct view of what we will do. If something is up to us, we can decide what to do, rather than predict what we will do. But the reasons in light of which a decision is rational are not the same as the reasons in light of which a prediction is rational. That is why, provided it is important to us to do something, we can rationally believe that we will do it - even if our belief goes against the evidence Belief and doubt Knowledge, Theory of Act (Philosophy) Commitment (Psychology) Evidence Ethics Versprechen (DE-588)4078852-0 gnd rswk-swf Handlung (DE-588)4023277-3 gnd rswk-swf Evidenz (DE-588)4129356-3 gnd rswk-swf Evidenz (DE-588)4129356-3 s Versprechen (DE-588)4078852-0 s Handlung (DE-588)4023277-3 s DE-604 LoC Fremddatenuebernahme application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=029307823&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
spellingShingle | Marušić, Berislav Evidence and agency norms of belief for promising and resolving Belief and doubt Knowledge, Theory of Act (Philosophy) Commitment (Psychology) Evidence Ethics Versprechen (DE-588)4078852-0 gnd Handlung (DE-588)4023277-3 gnd Evidenz (DE-588)4129356-3 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4078852-0 (DE-588)4023277-3 (DE-588)4129356-3 |
title | Evidence and agency norms of belief for promising and resolving |
title_alt | Evidence & agency |
title_auth | Evidence and agency norms of belief for promising and resolving |
title_exact_search | Evidence and agency norms of belief for promising and resolving |
title_full | Evidence and agency norms of belief for promising and resolving Berislav Marušić |
title_fullStr | Evidence and agency norms of belief for promising and resolving Berislav Marušić |
title_full_unstemmed | Evidence and agency norms of belief for promising and resolving Berislav Marušić |
title_short | Evidence and agency |
title_sort | evidence and agency norms of belief for promising and resolving |
title_sub | norms of belief for promising and resolving |
topic | Belief and doubt Knowledge, Theory of Act (Philosophy) Commitment (Psychology) Evidence Ethics Versprechen (DE-588)4078852-0 gnd Handlung (DE-588)4023277-3 gnd Evidenz (DE-588)4129356-3 gnd |
topic_facet | Belief and doubt Knowledge, Theory of Act (Philosophy) Commitment (Psychology) Evidence Ethics Versprechen Handlung Evidenz |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=029307823&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
work_keys_str_mv | AT marusicberislav evidenceandagencynormsofbeliefforpromisingandresolving AT marusicberislav evidenceagency |