Experimental evidence on tax salience and tax incidence:
While a basic theoretical principle in public economics assumes that individuals’behaviour is fully- optimizer with respect to the introduction of a tax, an increasing body of research is presenting evidence that agents decision-making is often affected by non-negligible cognitive biases , which cou...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Kiel
Kiel Institute for the World Economy
November 2016
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Kiel working paper
no. 2062 |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext https://www.ifw-members.ifw-kiel.de//reference_catalog/lookupObject?uuid=56091120a25dd87239d71811c4e49256 |
| Zusammenfassung: | While a basic theoretical principle in public economics assumes that individuals’behaviour is fully- optimizer with respect to the introduction of a tax, an increasing body of research is presenting evidence that agents decision-making is often affected by non-negligible cognitive biases , which could be responsible for lower market performance as well as for deviations from s tandard theoretical predictions. This paper extends the latter strand of research focusing on two trend topics in public economics: tax salience and tax incidence. While the former refers to the prominence of the tax, the latter places emphasis on the statutory vs. factual division of tax payments. Is market performance affected by the salience of the tax? Is the incidence of a tax independent of which side of the market it is levied on (Liability-Side-Equivalence-Principle, LES)? We address these questions through a laboratory experiment in which one unit of a fictitious good is traded through a double-auction market ins titution. Bas ed on a panel data analys is , our contribution shows that a non-salient tax reduces both the allocational and informational efficiency o f the market with respect to the instance in which the tax is salient. Moreover, we show that the LES does not hold in practice. |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 23 Seiten) |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a2200000 cb4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV043890692 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 00000000000000.0 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 161123s2016 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 020 | |c Online | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)GBV872777685 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-M124 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Morone, Andrea |d 1974- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)128466332 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Experimental evidence on tax salience and tax incidence |c Andrea Morone, Francesco Nemore, Simone Nuzzo |
| 264 | 1 | |a Kiel |b Kiel Institute for the World Economy |c November 2016 | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (circa 23 Seiten) | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a Kiel working paper |v no. 2062 | |
| 520 | 1 | |a While a basic theoretical principle in public economics assumes that individuals’behaviour is fully- optimizer with respect to the introduction of a tax, an increasing body of research is presenting evidence that agents decision-making is often affected by non-negligible cognitive biases , which could be responsible for lower market performance as well as for deviations from s tandard theoretical predictions. This paper extends the latter strand of research focusing on two trend topics in public economics: tax salience and tax incidence. While the former refers to the prominence of the tax, the latter places emphasis on the statutory vs. factual division of tax payments. Is market performance affected by the salience of the tax? Is the incidence of a tax independent of which side of the market it is levied on (Liability-Side-Equivalence-Principle, LES)? We address these questions through a laboratory experiment in which one unit of a fictitious good is traded through a double-auction market ins titution. Bas ed on a panel data analys is , our contribution shows that a non-salient tax reduces both the allocational and informational efficiency o f the market with respect to the instance in which the tax is salient. Moreover, we show that the LES does not hold in practice. | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Nemore, Francesco |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Nuzzo, Simone |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 830 | 0 | |a Kiel working paper |v no. 2062 |w (DE-604)BV019703993 |9 2062 | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u http://hdl.handle.net/10419/148045 |3 Volltext |
| 856 | 4 | |u https://www.ifw-members.ifw-kiel.de//reference_catalog/lookupObject?uuid=56091120a25dd87239d71811c4e49256 | |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029300089 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804176792460722176 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Morone, Andrea 1974- Nemore, Francesco Nuzzo, Simone |
| author_GND | (DE-588)128466332 |
| author_facet | Morone, Andrea 1974- Nemore, Francesco Nuzzo, Simone |
| author_role | aut aut aut |
| author_sort | Morone, Andrea 1974- |
| author_variant | a m am f n fn s n sn |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV043890692 |
| ctrlnum | (DE-599)GBV872777685 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02483nmm a2200325 cb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV043890692</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">161123s2016 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="c">Online</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBV872777685</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-M124</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Morone, Andrea</subfield><subfield code="d">1974-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)128466332</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Experimental evidence on tax salience and tax incidence</subfield><subfield code="c">Andrea Morone, Francesco Nemore, Simone Nuzzo</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Kiel</subfield><subfield code="b">Kiel Institute for the World Economy</subfield><subfield code="c">November 2016</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (circa 23 Seiten)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Kiel working paper</subfield><subfield code="v">no. 2062</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">While a basic theoretical principle in public economics assumes that individuals’behaviour is fully- optimizer with respect to the introduction of a tax, an increasing body of research is presenting evidence that agents decision-making is often affected by non-negligible cognitive biases , which could be responsible for lower market performance as well as for deviations from s tandard theoretical predictions. This paper extends the latter strand of research focusing on two trend topics in public economics: tax salience and tax incidence. While the former refers to the prominence of the tax, the latter places emphasis on the statutory vs. factual division of tax payments. Is market performance affected by the salience of the tax? Is the incidence of a tax independent of which side of the market it is levied on (Liability-Side-Equivalence-Principle, LES)? We address these questions through a laboratory experiment in which one unit of a fictitious good is traded through a double-auction market ins titution. Bas ed on a panel data analys is , our contribution shows that a non-salient tax reduces both the allocational and informational efficiency o f the market with respect to the instance in which the tax is salient. Moreover, we show that the LES does not hold in practice.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Nemore, Francesco</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Nuzzo, Simone</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="830" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Kiel working paper</subfield><subfield code="v">no. 2062</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-604)BV019703993</subfield><subfield code="9">2062</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">http://hdl.handle.net/10419/148045</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://www.ifw-members.ifw-kiel.de//reference_catalog/lookupObject?uuid=56091120a25dd87239d71811c4e49256</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029300089</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV043890692 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:37:49Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029300089 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-M124 |
| owner_facet | DE-M124 |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 23 Seiten) |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publishDateSearch | 2016 |
| publishDateSort | 2016 |
| publisher | Kiel Institute for the World Economy |
| record_format | marc |
| series | Kiel working paper |
| series2 | Kiel working paper |
| spelling | Morone, Andrea 1974- Verfasser (DE-588)128466332 aut Experimental evidence on tax salience and tax incidence Andrea Morone, Francesco Nemore, Simone Nuzzo Kiel Kiel Institute for the World Economy November 2016 1 Online-Ressource (circa 23 Seiten) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Kiel working paper no. 2062 While a basic theoretical principle in public economics assumes that individuals’behaviour is fully- optimizer with respect to the introduction of a tax, an increasing body of research is presenting evidence that agents decision-making is often affected by non-negligible cognitive biases , which could be responsible for lower market performance as well as for deviations from s tandard theoretical predictions. This paper extends the latter strand of research focusing on two trend topics in public economics: tax salience and tax incidence. While the former refers to the prominence of the tax, the latter places emphasis on the statutory vs. factual division of tax payments. Is market performance affected by the salience of the tax? Is the incidence of a tax independent of which side of the market it is levied on (Liability-Side-Equivalence-Principle, LES)? We address these questions through a laboratory experiment in which one unit of a fictitious good is traded through a double-auction market ins titution. Bas ed on a panel data analys is , our contribution shows that a non-salient tax reduces both the allocational and informational efficiency o f the market with respect to the instance in which the tax is salient. Moreover, we show that the LES does not hold in practice. Nemore, Francesco Verfasser aut Nuzzo, Simone Verfasser aut Kiel working paper no. 2062 (DE-604)BV019703993 2062 http://hdl.handle.net/10419/148045 Volltext https://www.ifw-members.ifw-kiel.de//reference_catalog/lookupObject?uuid=56091120a25dd87239d71811c4e49256 |
| spellingShingle | Morone, Andrea 1974- Nemore, Francesco Nuzzo, Simone Experimental evidence on tax salience and tax incidence Kiel working paper |
| title | Experimental evidence on tax salience and tax incidence |
| title_auth | Experimental evidence on tax salience and tax incidence |
| title_exact_search | Experimental evidence on tax salience and tax incidence |
| title_full | Experimental evidence on tax salience and tax incidence Andrea Morone, Francesco Nemore, Simone Nuzzo |
| title_fullStr | Experimental evidence on tax salience and tax incidence Andrea Morone, Francesco Nemore, Simone Nuzzo |
| title_full_unstemmed | Experimental evidence on tax salience and tax incidence Andrea Morone, Francesco Nemore, Simone Nuzzo |
| title_short | Experimental evidence on tax salience and tax incidence |
| title_sort | experimental evidence on tax salience and tax incidence |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/148045 https://www.ifw-members.ifw-kiel.de//reference_catalog/lookupObject?uuid=56091120a25dd87239d71811c4e49256 |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV019703993 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT moroneandrea experimentalevidenceontaxsalienceandtaxincidence AT nemorefrancesco experimentalevidenceontaxsalienceandtaxincidence AT nuzzosimone experimentalevidenceontaxsalienceandtaxincidence |