Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Princeton
Princeton University Press
2014
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Princeton legacy library
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | FAW01 FAW02 |
| Beschreibung: | Cover; Contents If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod--Steve Weber argues that although nations employ many different types of strategies broadly consistent with game theory's ""tit for tat, "" only strategies based on an ideal type of ""enhanced contingent restraint"" promoted cooperation in U.S.-Soviet arms control. As a theoretical analysis of the |
| Beschreibung: | 342 pages |
| ISBN: | 9781400862436 1400862434 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a2200000zc 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV043778163 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 00000000000000.0 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 160920s2014 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 9781400862436 |9 978-1-4008-6243-6 | ||
| 020 | |a 1400862434 |9 1-4008-6243-4 | ||
| 035 | |a (ZDB-4-EBA)ocn884012921 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)884012921 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV043778163 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e aacr | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-1046 |a DE-1047 | ||
| 082 | 0 | |a 327.1/74 |2 20 | |
| 100 | 1 | |a Weber, Steve |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control |
| 264 | 1 | |a Princeton |b Princeton University Press |c 2014 | |
| 300 | |a 342 pages | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a Princeton legacy library | |
| 500 | |a Cover; Contents | ||
| 500 | |a If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod--Steve Weber argues that although nations employ many different types of strategies broadly consistent with game theory's ""tit for tat, "" only strategies based on an ideal type of ""enhanced contingent restraint"" promoted cooperation in U.S.-Soviet arms control. As a theoretical analysis of the | ||
| 650 | 7 | |a POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a POLITICAL SCIENCE / Government / International |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Game theory |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Nuclear arms control |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Strategic forces |2 fast | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Nuclear arms control |z United States | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Nuclear arms control |z Soviet Union | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Strategic forces |z United States | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Strategic forces |z Soviet Union | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Game theory | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Internationale Kooperation |0 (DE-588)4120503-0 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Internationaler Konflikt |0 (DE-588)4162071-9 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Rüstungsbegrenzung |0 (DE-588)4115804-0 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 651 | 4 | |a Sowjetunion | |
| 651 | 4 | |a USA | |
| 651 | 7 | |a USA |0 (DE-588)4078704-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 651 | 7 | |a Sowjetunion |0 (DE-588)4077548-3 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Sowjetunion |0 (DE-588)4077548-3 |D g |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Rüstungsbegrenzung |0 (DE-588)4115804-0 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 2 | |a USA |0 (DE-588)4078704-7 |D g |
| 689 | 0 | |8 1\p |5 DE-604 | |
| 689 | 1 | 0 | |a Internationaler Konflikt |0 (DE-588)4162071-9 |D s |
| 689 | 1 | |8 2\p |5 DE-604 | |
| 689 | 2 | 0 | |a Internationale Kooperation |0 (DE-588)4120503-0 |D s |
| 689 | 2 | |8 3\p |5 DE-604 | |
| 912 | |a ZDB-4-EBA | ||
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029189223 | ||
| 883 | 1 | |8 1\p |a cgwrk |d 20201028 |q DE-101 |u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk | |
| 883 | 1 | |8 2\p |a cgwrk |d 20201028 |q DE-101 |u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk | |
| 883 | 1 | |8 3\p |a cgwrk |d 20201028 |q DE-101 |u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk | |
| 966 | e | |u http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=791024 |l FAW01 |p ZDB-4-EBA |q FAW_PDA_EBA |x Aggregator |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=791024 |l FAW02 |p ZDB-4-EBA |q FAW_PDA_EBA |x Aggregator |3 Volltext | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804176606141349888 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Weber, Steve |
| author_facet | Weber, Steve |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Weber, Steve |
| author_variant | s w sw |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV043778163 |
| collection | ZDB-4-EBA |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-4-EBA)ocn884012921 (OCoLC)884012921 (DE-599)BVBBV043778163 |
| dewey-full | 327.1/74 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 327 - International relations |
| dewey-raw | 327.1/74 |
| dewey-search | 327.1/74 |
| dewey-sort | 3327.1 274 |
| dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
| discipline | Politologie |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>03353nmm a2200697zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV043778163</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">160920s2014 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781400862436</subfield><subfield code="9">978-1-4008-6243-6</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1400862434</subfield><subfield code="9">1-4008-6243-4</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-4-EBA)ocn884012921</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)884012921</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV043778163</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">aacr</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-1046</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1047</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">327.1/74</subfield><subfield code="2">20</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Weber, Steve</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Princeton</subfield><subfield code="b">Princeton University Press</subfield><subfield code="c">2014</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">342 pages</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Princeton legacy library</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Cover; Contents</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod--Steve Weber argues that although nations employ many different types of strategies broadly consistent with game theory's ""tit for tat, "" only strategies based on an ideal type of ""enhanced contingent restraint"" promoted cooperation in U.S.-Soviet arms control. As a theoretical analysis of the</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General</subfield><subfield code="2">bisacsh</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">POLITICAL SCIENCE / Government / International</subfield><subfield code="2">bisacsh</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Game theory</subfield><subfield code="2">fast</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Nuclear arms control</subfield><subfield code="2">fast</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Strategic forces</subfield><subfield code="2">fast</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Nuclear arms control</subfield><subfield code="z">United States</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Nuclear arms control</subfield><subfield code="z">Soviet Union</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Strategic forces</subfield><subfield code="z">United States</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Strategic forces</subfield><subfield code="z">Soviet Union</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Game theory</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Internationale Kooperation</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4120503-0</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Internationaler Konflikt</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4162071-9</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Rüstungsbegrenzung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4115804-0</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Sowjetunion</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">USA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">USA</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4078704-7</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Sowjetunion</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4077548-3</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Sowjetunion</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4077548-3</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Rüstungsbegrenzung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4115804-0</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">USA</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4078704-7</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Internationaler Konflikt</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4162071-9</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">2\p</subfield><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="2" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Internationale Kooperation</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4120503-0</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="2" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">3\p</subfield><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-4-EBA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029189223</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="883" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="a">cgwrk</subfield><subfield code="d">20201028</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-101</subfield><subfield code="u">https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="883" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">2\p</subfield><subfield code="a">cgwrk</subfield><subfield code="d">20201028</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-101</subfield><subfield code="u">https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="883" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">3\p</subfield><subfield code="a">cgwrk</subfield><subfield code="d">20201028</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-101</subfield><subfield code="u">https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=791024</subfield><subfield code="l">FAW01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-4-EBA</subfield><subfield code="q">FAW_PDA_EBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Aggregator</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=791024</subfield><subfield code="l">FAW02</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-4-EBA</subfield><subfield code="q">FAW_PDA_EBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Aggregator</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| geographic | Sowjetunion USA USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd Sowjetunion (DE-588)4077548-3 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Sowjetunion USA |
| id | DE-604.BV043778163 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:34:51Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781400862436 1400862434 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029189223 |
| oclc_num | 884012921 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-1046 DE-1047 |
| owner_facet | DE-1046 DE-1047 |
| physical | 342 pages |
| psigel | ZDB-4-EBA ZDB-4-EBA FAW_PDA_EBA |
| publishDate | 2014 |
| publishDateSearch | 2014 |
| publishDateSort | 2014 |
| publisher | Princeton University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Princeton legacy library |
| spelling | Weber, Steve Verfasser aut Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Princeton Princeton University Press 2014 342 pages txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Princeton legacy library Cover; Contents If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod--Steve Weber argues that although nations employ many different types of strategies broadly consistent with game theory's ""tit for tat, "" only strategies based on an ideal type of ""enhanced contingent restraint"" promoted cooperation in U.S.-Soviet arms control. As a theoretical analysis of the POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE / Government / International bisacsh Game theory fast Nuclear arms control fast Strategic forces fast Nuclear arms control United States Nuclear arms control Soviet Union Strategic forces United States Strategic forces Soviet Union Game theory Internationale Kooperation (DE-588)4120503-0 gnd rswk-swf Internationaler Konflikt (DE-588)4162071-9 gnd rswk-swf Rüstungsbegrenzung (DE-588)4115804-0 gnd rswk-swf Sowjetunion USA USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf Sowjetunion (DE-588)4077548-3 gnd rswk-swf Sowjetunion (DE-588)4077548-3 g Rüstungsbegrenzung (DE-588)4115804-0 s USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g 1\p DE-604 Internationaler Konflikt (DE-588)4162071-9 s 2\p DE-604 Internationale Kooperation (DE-588)4120503-0 s 3\p DE-604 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 3\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Weber, Steve Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE / Government / International bisacsh Game theory fast Nuclear arms control fast Strategic forces fast Nuclear arms control United States Nuclear arms control Soviet Union Strategic forces United States Strategic forces Soviet Union Game theory Internationale Kooperation (DE-588)4120503-0 gnd Internationaler Konflikt (DE-588)4162071-9 gnd Rüstungsbegrenzung (DE-588)4115804-0 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4120503-0 (DE-588)4162071-9 (DE-588)4115804-0 (DE-588)4078704-7 (DE-588)4077548-3 |
| title | Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control |
| title_auth | Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control |
| title_exact_search | Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control |
| title_full | Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control |
| title_fullStr | Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control |
| title_full_unstemmed | Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control |
| title_short | Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control |
| title_sort | cooperation and discord in u s soviet arms control |
| topic | POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE / Government / International bisacsh Game theory fast Nuclear arms control fast Strategic forces fast Nuclear arms control United States Nuclear arms control Soviet Union Strategic forces United States Strategic forces Soviet Union Game theory Internationale Kooperation (DE-588)4120503-0 gnd Internationaler Konflikt (DE-588)4162071-9 gnd Rüstungsbegrenzung (DE-588)4115804-0 gnd |
| topic_facet | POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General POLITICAL SCIENCE / Government / International Game theory Nuclear arms control Strategic forces Nuclear arms control United States Nuclear arms control Soviet Union Strategic forces United States Strategic forces Soviet Union Internationale Kooperation Internationaler Konflikt Rüstungsbegrenzung Sowjetunion USA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT webersteve cooperationanddiscordinussovietarmscontrol |