Principles of takeover regulation:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford
Oxford University Press
2016
|
| Ausgabe: | First edition |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | xxxvi, 380 Seiten Diagramme |
| ISBN: | 9780199659555 |
Internformat
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Principles of takeover regulation |c David Kershaw, professor of law at the London School of Economics and Political Science |
| 250 | |a First edition | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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|---|---|
| adam_text | SUMMARY CONTENTS
TABLE OF CASES XXIII
TABLE OF LEGISLATION XXIX
I. THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL: VALUE, STAKEHOLDERS,
AND GOVERNANCE 1
II. DEAL STRUCTURES 31
III. ORIGINS: THE CREATION OF THE TAKEOVER CODE 65
IV. THE MODERN TAKEOVER CODE AND TAKEOVER PANEL 112
V. ANNOUNCEMENT AND THE OFFER DANCE 151
VI. THE VOLUNTARY OFFER 184
VII. DEAL RISK: BID CONDITIONALITY AND DEAL PROTECTIONS 209
VIIL THE MANDATORY BID 234
DC REGULATING TIMETABLE AND DISCLOSURE 259
X. REGULATING BOARD DISCRETION: DIRECTORS DUTIES 297
XI. HOSTILE TAKEOVERS AND THE NON-FRUSTRATION RULE 322
INDEX 371
XV
DETAILED CONTENTS
TABLE OF CASES XXIII
TABLE OF LEGISLATION XXIX
I. THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL: VALUE, STAKEHOLDERS,
AND GOVERNANCE
A. INTRODUCTION 1.01
B. CREATING, DESTROYING, AND DISTRIBUTING VALUE THROUGH TAKEOVERS 1.05
1. VALUE CREATION AND DESTRUCTION IN THEORY 1.05
2. VALUE CREATION AND DESTRUCTION IN PRACTICE: THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
1.13
C. STAKEHOLDERS: DISTRIBUTIONAL AND BEHAVIOURAL EFFECTS 1.25
D. INDIRECT EFFECTS: CORPORATE CONTROL AS A GOVERNANCE MECHANISM 1.30
1. THE THEORETICAL CASE 1.30
2. THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 1.42
E. INDIRECT EFFECTS: BUSINESS DECISION MAKING AND THE EXAMPLE
OF SHORT-TERMISM 1.48
II. DEAL STRUCTURES
A. ASSET SALES 2.04
1. THE NATURE OF AN ASSET SALE 2.04
2. THE ASSET SALE AGREEMENT 2.08
3. CORPORATE APPROVALS AND THE ENFORCEABILITY OF THE AGREEMENT 2.12
B. SHARE SALES 2.18
1. THE NATURE OF SHARE SALE AND THE CONTRACTUAL OFFER 2.18
2. THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN BIDDER AND SHAREHOLDER 2.25
3. APPROVALS 2.30
C SCHEMES OF ARRANGEMENT AND MERGERS 2.32
1. THE NATURE OF A SCHEME OF ARRANGEMENT 2.32
2. WHO MAY PROPOSE A SCHEME OF ARRANGEMENT? 2.39
3. WHAT TRANSACTIONS FALL WITHIN THE TERMS COMPROMISE
AND ARRANGEMENT ? 2.42
4. SCHEME PROCESS 2.49
5. RECONSTRUCTIONS AND AMALGAMATIONS 2.64
6. PUBLIC COMPANY MERGERS 2.68
D. CROSS-BORDER MERGERS 2.71
XVN
DETAILED CONTENTS
III. ORIGINS: THE CREATION OF THE TAKEOVER CODE
A. REGULATORY CONTEXT 3.05
1. THE BRITISH REGULATORY STYLE 3-07
2. THE IDEA OF THE CITY OF LONDON 3.11
3. THE RISE OF INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS 3.18
B. HOSTILE TAKEOVERS IN THE 1950S 3.21
C. THE NOTES ON AMALGAMATIONS OF BRITISH BUSINESSES 3.27
1. THE BRITISH ALUMINIUM SAGA 3.27
2. THE NOTES 3.33
3. THE ORIGINS OF THE NON-FRUSTRATION RULE 3.41
4. AMBIGUITY AND ENFORCEMENT 3.44
D. THE TAKEOVER CODE 3.46
1. IGNORING AND REVISING THE NOTES 3.46
2. IGNORING THE NOTES*AGAIN! 3.53
3. CALLS FOR ACTION 3.62
4. THE TAKEOVER CODE AND THE TAKEOVER PANEL 3.66
E. MAKING THE TAKEOVER CODE WORK 3.74
1. ENFORCEMENT, PERSONALITY, AND THE QUARTERBACK 3.74
2. THE COURTS 3.81
3. KEYSTONE RULES 3.87
IV. THE MODERN TAKEOVER CODE AND TAKEOVER PANEL
A. THE STATUS OF THE TAKEOVER PANEL 4.01
B. THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST SELF-
AND MARKET-CONTROLLED REGULATION 4.04
C. THE STRUCTURE AND OPERATION OF THE TAKEOVER PANEL 4.17
1. LEGAL FOUNDATIONS AND AUTHORITY 4.17
2. STRUCTURE AND MEMBERSHIP OF THE PANEL 4.20
3. DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS: THE PANEL EXECUTIVE 4.29
4. THE TAKEOVER APPEAL BOARD 4.34
5. THE TAKEOVER PANELS ENFORCEMENT POWERS 4.39
D. THE FORM, STRUCTURE, AND APPLICATION OF THE TAKEOVER CODE 4.50
1. PRINCIPLES, RULES, AND NOTES 4.50
2. THE TAKEOVER CODE, REGULATORY METHOD, AND ITS RELATIONSHIP
TO COMPANY LAW 4.63
3. SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE CODE 4.70
V. ANNOUNCEMENT AND THE OFFER DANCE
A. IDENTIFYING THE BIDDER 5.01
1. THE PROS AND CONS OF PRE-BID DISCLOSURE REGULATION 5.01
2. DISCLOSURE OF SHAREHOLDINGS 5.05
XVUI
DETAILED CONTENTS
B. ANNOUNCING A POSSIBLE OFFER
1. THE TAKEOVER CODES REGULATION OF POSSIBLE
OFFER ANNOUNCEMENTS
2. PRICE POINTS IN POSSIBLE OFFER ANNOUNCEMENTS
3. INSIDE INFORMATION UNDER THE DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY RULES
4. REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING PRIOR TO AN ANNOUNCEMENT
C. REGULATING THE OFFER DANCE
1. STATEMENTS OF INTENTION IN RELATION TO THE BID
2. STATEMENTS OF INTENTION BEYOND THE BID
3. PUT UP OR SHUT UP
4. RE-CHARACTERIZING ANNOUNCEMENT AND OFFER DANCE REGULATION
AS POWER-BALANCING RULES
D. THE 2.7 FIRM OFFER ANNOUNCEMENT
E. SHARE PURCHASE DISCLOSURES DURING THE OFFER PERIOD
VI. THE VOLUNTARY OFFER
A. EQUAL TREATMENT
B. AN OFFER FOR ALL CLASSES OF SHARES
1. COMPARABLE OFFERS FOR DIFFERENT CLASSES OF SHARE
2. APPROPRIATE OFFERS FOR CONVERTIBLES
3. JUSTIFYING THE REQUIREMENT FOR COMPARABLE AND APPROPRIATE OFFERS
C. PRICE AND CONSIDERATION IN A VOLUNTARY OFFER
1. HIGHEST-PRICE RULE FOR THE SAME CLASS OF SHARES DURING THE OFFER
2. PRICE EQUALITY WITH PRE-BID PURCHASES
3. PROHIBITING SPECIAL TREATMENT
4. EQUALITY AND THE FORM OF CONSIDERATION
5. INTERROGATING EQUALITY OF TREATMENT IN PRICING AND CONSIDERATION
D. ACTING IN CONCERT
VII. DEAL RISK: BID CONDITIONALITY AND DEAL PROTECTIONS
A. BID CONDITIONALITY
1. CONDITIONALITY AND PRIVATE CONTRACTING
2. THE TAKEOVER CODES CONDITIONALITY REGULATION
B. DEAL PROTECTIONS
1. THE NATURE OF NON-COMPLETION RISK
2. REGULATING DEAL PROTECTIONS: THE TAKEOVER CODE
3. REGULATING DEAL PROTECTIONS: PRIVATE AND COMPANY LAW
VIII. THE MANDATORY BID
A. THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF THE MANDATORY BID RULE
B. THE MANDATORY BID
1. TRIGGER POINTS
2. INTERESTS IN VOTING SHARES
5.08
5.08
5.19
5.26
5.28
5.31
5.31
5.34
5.44
5.49
5.52
5.57
6.02
6.07
6.09
6.22
6.26
6.27
6.27
6.29
6.32
6.38
6.43
6.50
7.02
7.02
7.08
7.21
7.21
7.28
7.41
8.01
8.05
8.05
8.07
XIX
DETAILED CONTENTS
3. POLICING THE TRIGGER POINTS 8.10
4. CONCERT PARTIES 8.14
5. PARTIAL BLOCK SALES 8.17
6. CHAIN COMPANIES 8.18
C. THE TERMS OF THE MANDATORY BID 8.20
D. ESCAPING FROM THE MANDATORY BID OBLIGATION 8.25
E. JUSTIFYING THE MANDATORY BID RULE 8.28
1. PROTECTING MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 8.28
2. EQUALITY OF TREATMENT 8.33
3. OWNERSHIP OF THE REGULATORY SPACE 8.36
4. EFFICIENT BIDS AND BLOCKHOLDING EFFECTS 8.37
5. SHOULD THE MANDATORY BID RULE BE MANDATORY? 8.42
DC REGULATING TIMETABLE AND DISCLOSURE
A. TIME REGULATION IN UK TAKEOVERS 9.01
1. THE MINIMUM OFFER PERIOD 9.02
2. BID TIMETABLE AFTER THE MINIMUM OFFER PERIOD 9.09
B. DISCLOSURE AND INFORMATION 9.30
1. INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED IN THE OFFER DOCUMENT 9.37
2. TARGET BOARD RECOMMENDATION 9.55
3. NEW INFORMATION AND UPDATING 9.62
4. REGULATING THE ACCURACY AND RELIABILITY OF INFORMATION 9.65
X. REGULATING BOARD DISCRETION: DIRECTORS DUTIES
A. THE DUTY TO PROMOTE THE SUCCESS OF THE COMPANY 10.05
1. THE NATURE OF THE DUTY 10.05
2. TAKEOVERS AND THE DUTY TO PROMOTE THE SUCCESS OF THE COMPANY 10.11
3. TAKEOVERS AND STAKEHOLDERS 10.20
B. DUTY TO USE POWERS FOR THE PURPOSES FOR
WHICH THEY ARE CONFERRED 10.23
C. THE DUTY OF CARE 10.36
XI. HOSTILE TAKEOVERS AND THE NON-FRUSTRATION RULE
A. THE NON-FRUSTRATION RULE 11.01
1. THE NATURE OF THE NON-FRUSTRATION PROHIBITION 11.01
2. GENERAL MEETING APPROVAL AND PANEL DISPENSATION 11.10
B. EXPLORING THE OPTIMALITY OF THE NON-FRUSTRATION RULE 11.12
1. FRAMING THE ROLE OF THE TARGET BOARD IN CONTRACTUAL OFFERS 11.16
2. THE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY OF UK COMPANIES 11.25
3. THE PROS AND CONS OF TAKEOVER DEFENCES IN THE UK CONTEXT 11.32
XX
DETAILED CONTENTS
C. THE OPTIONS FOR REFORM 11.57
1. ABOLISHING THE NON-FRUSTRATION RULE 11.59
2. THE ACCEPTANCE THRESHOLD 11.64
3. DISENFRANCHISING SHAREHOLDERS 11.73
4. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN STRATEGIC INDUSTRIES 11.77
D. CONCLUSION 11.87
INDEX 371
XXI
|
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| author | Kershaw, David ca. 20./21. Jh |
| author_GND | (DE-588)139327649 |
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| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:34:07Z |
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| isbn | 9780199659555 |
| language | English |
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| publisher | Oxford University Press |
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| spelling | Kershaw, David ca. 20./21. Jh. (DE-588)139327649 aut Principles of takeover regulation David Kershaw, professor of law at the London School of Economics and Political Science First edition Oxford Oxford University Press 2016 xxxvi, 380 Seiten Diagramme txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Takeover (DE-588)4213995-8 gnd rswk-swf Übernahmeangebot (DE-588)4186613-7 gnd rswk-swf Kapitalmarktrecht (DE-588)7573652-4 gnd rswk-swf Großbritannien (DE-588)4022153-2 gnd rswk-swf Großbritannien (DE-588)4022153-2 g Übernahmeangebot (DE-588)4186613-7 s Takeover (DE-588)4213995-8 s Kapitalmarktrecht (DE-588)7573652-4 s DE-604 V:DE-576;B:DE-B212 application/pdf http://swbplus.bsz-bw.de/bsz443075603inh.htm Inhaltsverzeichnis SWB Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=029162228&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Kershaw, David ca. 20./21. Jh Principles of takeover regulation Takeover (DE-588)4213995-8 gnd Übernahmeangebot (DE-588)4186613-7 gnd Kapitalmarktrecht (DE-588)7573652-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4213995-8 (DE-588)4186613-7 (DE-588)7573652-4 (DE-588)4022153-2 |
| title | Principles of takeover regulation |
| title_auth | Principles of takeover regulation |
| title_exact_search | Principles of takeover regulation |
| title_full | Principles of takeover regulation David Kershaw, professor of law at the London School of Economics and Political Science |
| title_fullStr | Principles of takeover regulation David Kershaw, professor of law at the London School of Economics and Political Science |
| title_full_unstemmed | Principles of takeover regulation David Kershaw, professor of law at the London School of Economics and Political Science |
| title_short | Principles of takeover regulation |
| title_sort | principles of takeover regulation |
| topic | Takeover (DE-588)4213995-8 gnd Übernahmeangebot (DE-588)4186613-7 gnd Kapitalmarktrecht (DE-588)7573652-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Takeover Übernahmeangebot Kapitalmarktrecht Großbritannien |
| url | http://swbplus.bsz-bw.de/bsz443075603inh.htm http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=029162228&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT kershawdavid principlesoftakeoverregulation |
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