The limits of institutional reform in development: changing rules for realistic solutions

Developing countries commonly adopt reforms to improve their governments yet they usually fail to produce more functional and effective governments. Andrews argues that reforms often fail to make governments better because they are introduced as signals to gain short-term support. These signals intr...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Andrews, Matt 1972- (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2013
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Zusammenfassung:Developing countries commonly adopt reforms to improve their governments yet they usually fail to produce more functional and effective governments. Andrews argues that reforms often fail to make governments better because they are introduced as signals to gain short-term support. These signals introduce unrealistic best practices that do not fit developing country contexts and are not considered relevant by implementing agents. The result is a set of new forms that do not function. However, there are realistic solutions emerging from institutional reforms in some developing countries. Lessons from these experiences suggest that reform limits, although challenging to adopt, can be overcome by focusing change on problem solving through an incremental process that involves multiple agents
Beschreibung:Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
Beschreibung:1 online resource (xii, 254 pages)
ISBN:9781139060974
DOI:10.1017/CBO9781139060974

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