Smart Security Council? Analyzing the effectiveness of targeted sanctions:
In 2004 the United Nations Security Council initiated a "Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions" in order to increase the Council's effectiveness in terms of sanctions implementation. With this reform, the Council reacted to the harsh criticism from the UN against the convention...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Hamburg
Diplomica Verlag
2014
|
| Ausgabe: | 1st ed |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | In 2004 the United Nations Security Council initiated a "Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions" in order to increase the Council's effectiveness in terms of sanctions implementation. With this reform, the Council reacted to the harsh criticism from the UN against the conventional sanctions practice. It was the Security Council's latest endeavor to make ratified sanctions more punitive, coercive, and thus effective as far as causing compliance within its judicial framework is concerned. Summarized under the term "smart sanctions", the Security Council tries to be more accurate in addressing sanctions thereby seeking not only to increase political effectiveness, but also to reduce unintended humanitarian suffering. While conventional sanctions are comprehensive and comprised of a variety of measures, such as trade boycotts and embargoes against the entire country, smart or targeted sanctions (as they are also termed) are selective, targeting only at certain areas or individuals. Consequently, sanctions are the practical expression of the Council's sovereignty. The Council "lives and breathes" through the ratification of sanctions, so their corroboration and proper enforcement reflect the organization's vitality. In short, if sanctions fail, the Council fails. So far scholars have accentuated technical questions in their research, such as how to engage in a successful bargaining process and how to imply isolation. They further focused on examining the compliance rate of targeted states. What has been slightly ignored is a potentially poor commitment by states to enforce sanctions in the first place. Quite possibly, the Security Council lacks ratification (what I term input legitimacy) and enforcement (what I term output legitimacy) of smart sanctions. Consequently, the "effectiveness" of smart sanctions does not necessarily have to be linked to the compliance rate of the targeted state [...]. |
| Beschreibung: | Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (150 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9783954895212 9783954890217 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Friedrichs, Gordon 1984- |
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| discipline | Rechtswissenschaft |
| edition | 1st ed |
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| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:30:51Z |
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| isbn | 9783954895212 9783954890217 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Friedrichs, Gordon 1984- Verfasser (DE-588)1137218754 aut Smart Security Council? Analyzing the effectiveness of targeted sanctions 1st ed Hamburg Diplomica Verlag 2014 © 2014 1 online resource (150 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources In 2004 the United Nations Security Council initiated a "Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions" in order to increase the Council's effectiveness in terms of sanctions implementation. With this reform, the Council reacted to the harsh criticism from the UN against the conventional sanctions practice. It was the Security Council's latest endeavor to make ratified sanctions more punitive, coercive, and thus effective as far as causing compliance within its judicial framework is concerned. Summarized under the term "smart sanctions", the Security Council tries to be more accurate in addressing sanctions thereby seeking not only to increase political effectiveness, but also to reduce unintended humanitarian suffering. While conventional sanctions are comprehensive and comprised of a variety of measures, such as trade boycotts and embargoes against the entire country, smart or targeted sanctions (as they are also termed) are selective, targeting only at certain areas or individuals. Consequently, sanctions are the practical expression of the Council's sovereignty. The Council "lives and breathes" through the ratification of sanctions, so their corroboration and proper enforcement reflect the organization's vitality. In short, if sanctions fail, the Council fails. So far scholars have accentuated technical questions in their research, such as how to engage in a successful bargaining process and how to imply isolation. They further focused on examining the compliance rate of targeted states. What has been slightly ignored is a potentially poor commitment by states to enforce sanctions in the first place. Quite possibly, the Security Council lacks ratification (what I term input legitimacy) and enforcement (what I term output legitimacy) of smart sanctions. Consequently, the "effectiveness" of smart sanctions does not necessarily have to be linked to the compliance rate of the targeted state [...]. Vereinte Nationen Sanctions (International law) Security, International United Nations -- Sanctions Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Friedrichs, Gordon Smart Security Council? Analyzing the effectiveness of targeted sanctions |
| spellingShingle | Friedrichs, Gordon 1984- Smart Security Council? Analyzing the effectiveness of targeted sanctions Vereinte Nationen Sanctions (International law) Security, International United Nations -- Sanctions |
| title | Smart Security Council? Analyzing the effectiveness of targeted sanctions |
| title_auth | Smart Security Council? Analyzing the effectiveness of targeted sanctions |
| title_exact_search | Smart Security Council? Analyzing the effectiveness of targeted sanctions |
| title_full | Smart Security Council? Analyzing the effectiveness of targeted sanctions |
| title_fullStr | Smart Security Council? Analyzing the effectiveness of targeted sanctions |
| title_full_unstemmed | Smart Security Council? Analyzing the effectiveness of targeted sanctions |
| title_short | Smart Security Council? Analyzing the effectiveness of targeted sanctions |
| title_sort | smart security council analyzing the effectiveness of targeted sanctions |
| topic | Vereinte Nationen Sanctions (International law) Security, International United Nations -- Sanctions |
| topic_facet | Vereinte Nationen Sanctions (International law) Security, International United Nations -- Sanctions |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT friedrichsgordon smartsecuritycouncilanalyzingtheeffectivenessoftargetedsanctions |