Managerial Overconfidence: Different Thinking through Different Education

assets at prices exceeding their own valuation which can lead to speculative bubbles. Although the idea that overconfident investors underperform sophisticated investors seems to be prevalent in finance literature, Kyle and Wang (1997) argue that in a theoretical model with risk-neutral investors, o...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Margolin, Maximilian (Author)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Hamburg Diplomica Verlag 2014
Edition:1st ed
Subjects:
Summary:assets at prices exceeding their own valuation which can lead to speculative bubbles. Although the idea that overconfident investors underperform sophisticated investors seems to be prevalent in finance literature, Kyle and Wang (1997) argue that in a theoretical model with risk-neutral investors, overconfidence can strictly dominate rationality. They regard an agent's trading strategy as a trading-quantity choice in a standard Cournot duopoly. According to the authors, overconfidence serves as a commitment device, giving the overconfident trader a reputation for trading aggressively and making the rational investor trade less. Consequently, overconfident investors facing rational opponents can make more profit than rational ones
Item Description:Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources
Physical Description:1 online resource (83 pages)
ISBN:9783954896288
9783954891283

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