Managerial Overconfidence: Different Thinking through Different Education
assets at prices exceeding their own valuation which can lead to speculative bubbles. Although the idea that overconfident investors underperform sophisticated investors seems to be prevalent in finance literature, Kyle and Wang (1997) argue that in a theoretical model with risk-neutral investors, o...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Hamburg
Diplomica Verlag
2014
|
| Ausgabe: | 1st ed |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | assets at prices exceeding their own valuation which can lead to speculative bubbles. Although the idea that overconfident investors underperform sophisticated investors seems to be prevalent in finance literature, Kyle and Wang (1997) argue that in a theoretical model with risk-neutral investors, overconfidence can strictly dominate rationality. They regard an agent's trading strategy as a trading-quantity choice in a standard Cournot duopoly. According to the authors, overconfidence serves as a commitment device, giving the overconfident trader a reputation for trading aggressively and making the rational investor trade less. Consequently, overconfident investors facing rational opponents can make more profit than rational ones |
| Beschreibung: | Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (83 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9783954896288 9783954891283 |
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| 520 | |a assets at prices exceeding their own valuation which can lead to speculative bubbles. Although the idea that overconfident investors underperform sophisticated investors seems to be prevalent in finance literature, Kyle and Wang (1997) argue that in a theoretical model with risk-neutral investors, overconfidence can strictly dominate rationality. They regard an agent's trading strategy as a trading-quantity choice in a standard Cournot duopoly. According to the authors, overconfidence serves as a commitment device, giving the overconfident trader a reputation for trading aggressively and making the rational investor trade less. Consequently, overconfident investors facing rational opponents can make more profit than rational ones | ||
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| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:30:51Z |
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| language | English |
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| spelling | Margolin, Maximilian Verfasser aut Managerial Overconfidence Different Thinking through Different Education 1st ed Hamburg Diplomica Verlag 2014 © 2014 1 online resource (83 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources assets at prices exceeding their own valuation which can lead to speculative bubbles. Although the idea that overconfident investors underperform sophisticated investors seems to be prevalent in finance literature, Kyle and Wang (1997) argue that in a theoretical model with risk-neutral investors, overconfidence can strictly dominate rationality. They regard an agent's trading strategy as a trading-quantity choice in a standard Cournot duopoly. According to the authors, overconfidence serves as a commitment device, giving the overconfident trader a reputation for trading aggressively and making the rational investor trade less. Consequently, overconfident investors facing rational opponents can make more profit than rational ones Ökonometrisches Modell Chief financial officers -- Behavior Corporations -- Finance -- Econometric models Financial executives -- Behavior Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Margolin, Maximilian Managerial Overconfidence : Different Thinking through Different Education |
| spellingShingle | Margolin, Maximilian Managerial Overconfidence Different Thinking through Different Education Ökonometrisches Modell Chief financial officers -- Behavior Corporations -- Finance -- Econometric models Financial executives -- Behavior |
| title | Managerial Overconfidence Different Thinking through Different Education |
| title_auth | Managerial Overconfidence Different Thinking through Different Education |
| title_exact_search | Managerial Overconfidence Different Thinking through Different Education |
| title_full | Managerial Overconfidence Different Thinking through Different Education |
| title_fullStr | Managerial Overconfidence Different Thinking through Different Education |
| title_full_unstemmed | Managerial Overconfidence Different Thinking through Different Education |
| title_short | Managerial Overconfidence |
| title_sort | managerial overconfidence different thinking through different education |
| title_sub | Different Thinking through Different Education |
| topic | Ökonometrisches Modell Chief financial officers -- Behavior Corporations -- Finance -- Econometric models Financial executives -- Behavior |
| topic_facet | Ökonometrisches Modell Chief financial officers -- Behavior Corporations -- Finance -- Econometric models Financial executives -- Behavior |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT margolinmaximilian managerialoverconfidencedifferentthinkingthroughdifferenteducation |