Above politics: bureaucratic discretion and credible commitment
"Economic development requires secure contract enforcement and stable property rights. Normal majority-rule politics, such as bargaining over distributive and monetary policies, generate instability and frequently undermine economic development. Above Politics argues that bureaucracies can cont...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New York, NY
Cambridge University Press
2016
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Political economy of institutions and decisions
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Cover image Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | "Economic development requires secure contract enforcement and stable property rights. Normal majority-rule politics, such as bargaining over distributive and monetary policies, generate instability and frequently undermine economic development. Above Politics argues that bureaucracies can contribute to stability and economic development, but only if they are insulated from unstable politics. A separation-of-powers stalemate creates the conditions for bureaucratic autonomy. But what keeps delegated bureaucrats from being more abusive as they become more autonomous? One answer is the negotiation of long-term, cooperative relationships - that (when successful) typically bind subordinates to provide more effort in exchange for autonomy. Even more compelling is professionalism, which embeds its professional practitioners in professional norms and culture, and incidentally mitigates corruption. Financial examples are provided throughout the book, which ends with an analysis of the role played by professionalized bureaucracies during the Great Recession"... |
| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Beschreibung: | xii, 271 Seiten Diagramme |
| ISBN: | 9781107008755 9781107401310 |
Internformat
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804176240890871808 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | ABOVE POLITICS
/ MILLER, GARY J. [AUTHOR]
: 2016
TABLE OF CONTENTS / INHALTSVERZEICHNIS
1. INTRODUCTION; 2. THE MORAL HAZARD OF BUREAUCRATS AND POLITICIANS; 3.
POLITICAL MORAL HAZARD AND CREDIBLE COMMITMENT; 4. POLITICAL MORAL
HAZARD AND BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY; 5. ABOVE POLITICS : THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS AND BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY; 6. THE CONTROL PARADOX, TRUST, AND
LEADERSHIP; 7. PROFESSIONALISM AND CREDIBLE COMMITMENT; 8. THE
POLITICIZATION OF FINANCIAL REGULATION; 9. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND
REREGULATION; 10. CONCLUSION
DIESES SCHRIFTSTUECK WURDE MASCHINELL ERZEUGT.
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Miller, Gary J. 1949- Whitford, Andrew ca. 20./21. Jh |
| author_GND | (DE-588)124088961 (DE-588)171911547 |
| author_facet | Miller, Gary J. 1949- Whitford, Andrew ca. 20./21. Jh |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Miller, Gary J. 1949- |
| author_variant | g j m gj gjm a w aw |
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| bvnumber | BV043567296 |
| callnumber-first | J - Political Science |
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| dewey-full | 352.20973 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 352 - General considerations of public administration |
| dewey-raw | 352.20973 |
| dewey-search | 352.20973 |
| dewey-sort | 3352.20973 |
| dewey-tens | 350 - Public administration and military science |
| discipline | Politologie |
| format | Book |
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| spelling | Miller, Gary J. 1949- Verfasser (DE-588)124088961 aut Above politics bureaucratic discretion and credible commitment Gary J. Miller (Washington University in St. Louis), (Andrew B. Whitford, University of Georgia) New York, NY Cambridge University Press 2016 xii, 271 Seiten Diagramme txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Political economy of institutions and decisions Includes bibliographical references and index "Economic development requires secure contract enforcement and stable property rights. Normal majority-rule politics, such as bargaining over distributive and monetary policies, generate instability and frequently undermine economic development. Above Politics argues that bureaucracies can contribute to stability and economic development, but only if they are insulated from unstable politics. A separation-of-powers stalemate creates the conditions for bureaucratic autonomy. But what keeps delegated bureaucrats from being more abusive as they become more autonomous? One answer is the negotiation of long-term, cooperative relationships - that (when successful) typically bind subordinates to provide more effort in exchange for autonomy. Even more compelling is professionalism, which embeds its professional practitioners in professional norms and culture, and incidentally mitigates corruption. Financial examples are provided throughout the book, which ends with an analysis of the role played by professionalized bureaucracies during the Great Recession"... POLITICAL SCIENCE / History & Theory bisacsh Ethik Wirtschaftspolitik Administrative agencies United States Executive departments United States Bureaucracy United States Separation of powers United States Civil service ethics United States POLITICAL SCIENCE / History & Theory Politische Kontrolle (DE-588)4197602-2 gnd rswk-swf Verwaltung (DE-588)4063317-2 gnd rswk-swf Gewaltenteilung (DE-588)4071817-7 gnd rswk-swf USA Public administration Moral and ethical aspects United States Economic policy USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Verwaltung (DE-588)4063317-2 s Politische Kontrolle (DE-588)4197602-2 s Gewaltenteilung (DE-588)4071817-7 s DE-604 Whitford, Andrew ca. 20./21. Jh. Verfasser (DE-588)171911547 aut http://assets.cambridge.org/97811070/08755/cover/9781107008755.jpg Cover image LoC Fremddatenuebernahme application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=028982254&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Miller, Gary J. 1949- Whitford, Andrew ca. 20./21. Jh Above politics bureaucratic discretion and credible commitment POLITICAL SCIENCE / History & Theory bisacsh Ethik Wirtschaftspolitik Administrative agencies United States Executive departments United States Bureaucracy United States Separation of powers United States Civil service ethics United States POLITICAL SCIENCE / History & Theory Politische Kontrolle (DE-588)4197602-2 gnd Verwaltung (DE-588)4063317-2 gnd Gewaltenteilung (DE-588)4071817-7 gnd |
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| title | Above politics bureaucratic discretion and credible commitment |
| title_auth | Above politics bureaucratic discretion and credible commitment |
| title_exact_search | Above politics bureaucratic discretion and credible commitment |
| title_full | Above politics bureaucratic discretion and credible commitment Gary J. Miller (Washington University in St. Louis), (Andrew B. Whitford, University of Georgia) |
| title_fullStr | Above politics bureaucratic discretion and credible commitment Gary J. Miller (Washington University in St. Louis), (Andrew B. Whitford, University of Georgia) |
| title_full_unstemmed | Above politics bureaucratic discretion and credible commitment Gary J. Miller (Washington University in St. Louis), (Andrew B. Whitford, University of Georgia) |
| title_short | Above politics |
| title_sort | above politics bureaucratic discretion and credible commitment |
| title_sub | bureaucratic discretion and credible commitment |
| topic | POLITICAL SCIENCE / History & Theory bisacsh Ethik Wirtschaftspolitik Administrative agencies United States Executive departments United States Bureaucracy United States Separation of powers United States Civil service ethics United States POLITICAL SCIENCE / History & Theory Politische Kontrolle (DE-588)4197602-2 gnd Verwaltung (DE-588)4063317-2 gnd Gewaltenteilung (DE-588)4071817-7 gnd |
| topic_facet | POLITICAL SCIENCE / History & Theory Ethik Wirtschaftspolitik Administrative agencies United States Executive departments United States Bureaucracy United States Separation of powers United States Civil service ethics United States Politische Kontrolle Verwaltung Gewaltenteilung USA Public administration Moral and ethical aspects United States Economic policy |
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