Infrastructure, incentives and institutions:
Cities generate negative, as well as positive, externalities; addressing those externalities requires both infrastructure and institutions. Providing clean water and removing refuse requires water and sewer pipes, but the urban poor are often unwilling to pay for the costs of that piping. Standard w...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2016
|
| Ausgabe: | January 2016 |
| Schriftenreihe: | NBER working paper series
21910 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Cities generate negative, as well as positive, externalities; addressing those externalities requires both infrastructure and institutions. Providing clean water and removing refuse requires water and sewer pipes, but the urban poor are often unwilling to pay for the costs of that piping. Standard welfare economics teaches us that either subsidies or Pigouvian fines can solve that problem, but both solution are problematic when institutions are weak. Subsidies lead to waste and corruption; fines lead to extortion of the innocent. Zambia has attempted to solve its problem with subsidies alone, but the subsidies have been too small to solve the "last-mile problem" and so most poor households remain unconnected to the water and sewer system. In nineteenth-century New York, subsidies also proved insufficient and were largely replaced by a penalty-based system. We present a model that illustrates the complementarity between infrastructure and institutions and provides conditions for whether fines, subsidies or a combination of both are the optimal response. One point of the model is that the optimal fine is often not a draconian penalty, but a mild charge that is small enough to avoid extortion |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Resource (24 Seiten) Illustrationen |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a2200000 cb4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV043405723 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 00000000000000.0 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 160224s2016 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV043405723 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-M382 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Ashraf, Nava |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)130515140 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Infrastructure, incentives and institutions |c Nava Ashraf, Edward L. Glaeser, Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto |
| 250 | |a January 2016 | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge, Mass. |b National Bureau of Economic Research |c 2016 | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Resource (24 Seiten) |b Illustrationen | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a NBER working paper series |v 21910 | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 19-21) | |
| 520 | |a Cities generate negative, as well as positive, externalities; addressing those externalities requires both infrastructure and institutions. Providing clean water and removing refuse requires water and sewer pipes, but the urban poor are often unwilling to pay for the costs of that piping. Standard welfare economics teaches us that either subsidies or Pigouvian fines can solve that problem, but both solution are problematic when institutions are weak. Subsidies lead to waste and corruption; fines lead to extortion of the innocent. Zambia has attempted to solve its problem with subsidies alone, but the subsidies have been too small to solve the "last-mile problem" and so most poor households remain unconnected to the water and sewer system. In nineteenth-century New York, subsidies also proved insufficient and were largely replaced by a penalty-based system. We present a model that illustrates the complementarity between infrastructure and institutions and provides conditions for whether fines, subsidies or a combination of both are the optimal response. One point of the model is that the optimal fine is often not a draconian penalty, but a mild charge that is small enough to avoid extortion | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Infrastructure (Economics) / Finance / Econometric models | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Urban economics | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Ökonometrisches Modell | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Glaeser, Edward L. |d 1967- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)124526373 |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M. |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)131828150 |4 aut | |
| 710 | 2 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research |e Sonstige |0 (DE-588)39157-8 |4 oth | |
| 830 | 0 | |a NBER working paper series |v 21910 |w (DE-604)BV013267645 |9 21910 | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u http://www.nber.org/papers/w21910.pdf |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ebook | ||
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-028824129 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804175992358436864 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Ashraf, Nava Glaeser, Edward L. 1967- Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M. |
| author_GND | (DE-588)130515140 (DE-588)124526373 (DE-588)131828150 |
| author_facet | Ashraf, Nava Glaeser, Edward L. 1967- Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M. |
| author_role | aut aut aut |
| author_sort | Ashraf, Nava |
| author_variant | n a na e l g el elg g a m p gam gamp |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV043405723 |
| collection | ebook |
| contents | Includes bibliographical references (pages 19-21) |
| ctrlnum | (DE-599)BVBBV043405723 |
| edition | January 2016 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02683nmm a2200385 cb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV043405723</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">160224s2016 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV043405723</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-M382</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Ashraf, Nava</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)130515140</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Infrastructure, incentives and institutions</subfield><subfield code="c">Nava Ashraf, Edward L. Glaeser, Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="250" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">January 2016</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge, Mass.</subfield><subfield code="b">National Bureau of Economic Research</subfield><subfield code="c">2016</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Resource (24 Seiten)</subfield><subfield code="b">Illustrationen</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">NBER working paper series</subfield><subfield code="v">21910</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Includes bibliographical references (pages 19-21)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Cities generate negative, as well as positive, externalities; addressing those externalities requires both infrastructure and institutions. Providing clean water and removing refuse requires water and sewer pipes, but the urban poor are often unwilling to pay for the costs of that piping. Standard welfare economics teaches us that either subsidies or Pigouvian fines can solve that problem, but both solution are problematic when institutions are weak. Subsidies lead to waste and corruption; fines lead to extortion of the innocent. Zambia has attempted to solve its problem with subsidies alone, but the subsidies have been too small to solve the "last-mile problem" and so most poor households remain unconnected to the water and sewer system. In nineteenth-century New York, subsidies also proved insufficient and were largely replaced by a penalty-based system. We present a model that illustrates the complementarity between infrastructure and institutions and provides conditions for whether fines, subsidies or a combination of both are the optimal response. One point of the model is that the optimal fine is often not a draconian penalty, but a mild charge that is small enough to avoid extortion</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Infrastructure (Economics) / Finance / Econometric models</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Urban economics</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Ökonometrisches Modell</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Glaeser, Edward L.</subfield><subfield code="d">1967-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)124526373</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)131828150</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="710" ind1="2" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">National Bureau of Economic Research</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)39157-8</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="830" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">NBER working paper series</subfield><subfield code="v">21910</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-604)BV013267645</subfield><subfield code="9">21910</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">http://www.nber.org/papers/w21910.pdf</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ebook</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-028824129</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV043405723 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:25:06Z |
| institution | BVB |
| institution_GND | (DE-588)39157-8 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-028824129 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-M382 |
| owner_facet | DE-M382 |
| physical | 1 Online-Resource (24 Seiten) Illustrationen |
| psigel | ebook |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publishDateSearch | 2016 |
| publishDateSort | 2016 |
| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| record_format | marc |
| series | NBER working paper series |
| series2 | NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Ashraf, Nava Verfasser (DE-588)130515140 aut Infrastructure, incentives and institutions Nava Ashraf, Edward L. Glaeser, Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto January 2016 Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2016 1 Online-Resource (24 Seiten) Illustrationen txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier NBER working paper series 21910 Includes bibliographical references (pages 19-21) Cities generate negative, as well as positive, externalities; addressing those externalities requires both infrastructure and institutions. Providing clean water and removing refuse requires water and sewer pipes, but the urban poor are often unwilling to pay for the costs of that piping. Standard welfare economics teaches us that either subsidies or Pigouvian fines can solve that problem, but both solution are problematic when institutions are weak. Subsidies lead to waste and corruption; fines lead to extortion of the innocent. Zambia has attempted to solve its problem with subsidies alone, but the subsidies have been too small to solve the "last-mile problem" and so most poor households remain unconnected to the water and sewer system. In nineteenth-century New York, subsidies also proved insufficient and were largely replaced by a penalty-based system. We present a model that illustrates the complementarity between infrastructure and institutions and provides conditions for whether fines, subsidies or a combination of both are the optimal response. One point of the model is that the optimal fine is often not a draconian penalty, but a mild charge that is small enough to avoid extortion Infrastructure (Economics) / Finance / Econometric models Urban economics Ökonometrisches Modell Glaeser, Edward L. 1967- Verfasser (DE-588)124526373 aut Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M. Verfasser (DE-588)131828150 aut National Bureau of Economic Research Sonstige (DE-588)39157-8 oth NBER working paper series 21910 (DE-604)BV013267645 21910 http://www.nber.org/papers/w21910.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Ashraf, Nava Glaeser, Edward L. 1967- Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M. Infrastructure, incentives and institutions NBER working paper series Includes bibliographical references (pages 19-21) Infrastructure (Economics) / Finance / Econometric models Urban economics Ökonometrisches Modell |
| title | Infrastructure, incentives and institutions |
| title_auth | Infrastructure, incentives and institutions |
| title_exact_search | Infrastructure, incentives and institutions |
| title_full | Infrastructure, incentives and institutions Nava Ashraf, Edward L. Glaeser, Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto |
| title_fullStr | Infrastructure, incentives and institutions Nava Ashraf, Edward L. Glaeser, Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto |
| title_full_unstemmed | Infrastructure, incentives and institutions Nava Ashraf, Edward L. Glaeser, Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto |
| title_short | Infrastructure, incentives and institutions |
| title_sort | infrastructure incentives and institutions |
| topic | Infrastructure (Economics) / Finance / Econometric models Urban economics Ökonometrisches Modell |
| topic_facet | Infrastructure (Economics) / Finance / Econometric models Urban economics Ökonometrisches Modell |
| url | http://www.nber.org/papers/w21910.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV013267645 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT ashrafnava infrastructureincentivesandinstitutions AT glaeseredwardl infrastructureincentivesandinstitutions AT ponzettogiacomoam infrastructureincentivesandinstitutions AT nationalbureauofeconomicresearch infrastructureincentivesandinstitutions |