What minds can do: intentionality in a non-intentional world
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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Jacob, Pierre (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1997
Schriftenreihe:Cambridge studies in philosophy
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:FAW01
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Volltext
Beschreibung:Includes bibliographical references (pages 281-294) and index
Some of a person's mental states have the power to represent real and imagined states of affairs: they have semantic properties. What Minds Can Do has two goals: to find a naturalistic or non-semantic basis for the representational powers of a person's mind, and to show that these semantic properties are involved in the causal explanation of the person's behavior. In the process, the book addresses issues that are central to much contemporary philosophical debate. It will be of interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy of mind and language, cognitive science, and psychology
Introduction -- pt. I. The naturalization of intentionality. What is intentional realism? -- Introduction to informational semantics -- Three problems for informational semantics -- Information and teleology -- pt. II. The causal role of intentionality. The computational representational theory of mind (CRTM) -- Must an intentional realist be a meaning atomist? -- Functionalism and the threat of preemption -- Explaining intentional behavior -- Conclusion: a postlude on semantics and psychology
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource (xii, 299 pages)
ISBN:0511002718
0511583311
9780511002717
9780511583315

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