Domain conditions in social choice theory:
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2001
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Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | FAW01 FAW02 Volltext |
Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 131-145) and index 1 - Introduction -- - 2 - Notation, definitions, and two fundamental theorems -- - 3 - The existence of collective choice rules under exclusion conditions for finite sets of discrete alternatives -- - 4 - Arrovian social welfare functions, nonmanipulable voting procedures and stable group decision functions -- - 5 - Restrictions on the distribution of individuals' preferences -- - 6 - The existence of social choice rules in n-dimensional continuous space -- - 7 - Concluding remarks "Wulf Gaertner provides a comprehensive account of an important and complex issue within social choice theory: how to establish a social welfare function while restricting the spectrum of individual preferences in a sensible way. Gaertner's starting point is K.J. Arrow's famous 'Impossibility Theorem', which showed that no welfare function could exist if an unrestricted domain of preferences is to be satisfied, together with some other appealing conditions. A number of leading economists have tried to provide avenues out of this 'impossibility' by restricting the variety of preferences: here, Gaertner provides a clear and detailed account, using standardized mathematical notation, of well over 40 theorems associated with domain conditions." "Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory will be an essential addition to the library of social choice theory for scholars and their advanced graduate students."--Jacket |
Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (ix, 153 pages) |
ISBN: | 0511016239 0511118988 0511492308 0521791022 9780511016233 9780511118982 9780511492303 9780521791021 |
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500 | |a "Wulf Gaertner provides a comprehensive account of an important and complex issue within social choice theory: how to establish a social welfare function while restricting the spectrum of individual preferences in a sensible way. Gaertner's starting point is K.J. Arrow's famous 'Impossibility Theorem', which showed that no welfare function could exist if an unrestricted domain of preferences is to be satisfied, together with some other appealing conditions. A number of leading economists have tried to provide avenues out of this 'impossibility' by restricting the variety of preferences: here, Gaertner provides a clear and detailed account, using standardized mathematical notation, of well over 40 theorems associated with domain conditions." | ||
500 | |a "Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory will be an essential addition to the library of social choice theory for scholars and their advanced graduate students."--Jacket | ||
650 | 7 | |a PSYCHOLOGY / Social Psychology |2 bisacsh | |
650 | 7 | |a Social choice |2 gtt | |
650 | 7 | |a Voorkeur |2 gtt | |
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650 | 7 | |a Existentie van oplossingen |2 gtt | |
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650 | 7 | |a Social choice / Mathematical models |2 fast | |
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650 | 4 | |a Decision making |x Mathematical models | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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any_adam_object | |
author | Gaertner, Wulf |
author_facet | Gaertner, Wulf |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Gaertner, Wulf |
author_variant | w g wg |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV043130175 |
collection | ZDB-4-EBA |
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dewey-full | 302/.13 |
dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
dewey-ones | 302 - Social interaction |
dewey-raw | 302/.13 |
dewey-search | 302/.13 |
dewey-sort | 3302 213 |
dewey-tens | 300 - Social sciences |
discipline | Soziologie |
format | Electronic eBook |
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id | DE-604.BV043130175 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:18:22Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 0511016239 0511118988 0511492308 0521791022 9780511016233 9780511118982 9780511492303 9780521791021 |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-028554366 |
oclc_num | 51202951 |
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owner | DE-1046 DE-1047 |
owner_facet | DE-1046 DE-1047 |
physical | 1 Online-Ressource (ix, 153 pages) |
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publishDate | 2001 |
publishDateSearch | 2001 |
publishDateSort | 2001 |
publisher | Cambridge University Press |
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spelling | Gaertner, Wulf Verfasser aut Domain conditions in social choice theory Wulf Gaertner Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2001 1 Online-Ressource (ix, 153 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Includes bibliographical references (pages 131-145) and index 1 - Introduction -- - 2 - Notation, definitions, and two fundamental theorems -- - 3 - The existence of collective choice rules under exclusion conditions for finite sets of discrete alternatives -- - 4 - Arrovian social welfare functions, nonmanipulable voting procedures and stable group decision functions -- - 5 - Restrictions on the distribution of individuals' preferences -- - 6 - The existence of social choice rules in n-dimensional continuous space -- - 7 - Concluding remarks "Wulf Gaertner provides a comprehensive account of an important and complex issue within social choice theory: how to establish a social welfare function while restricting the spectrum of individual preferences in a sensible way. Gaertner's starting point is K.J. Arrow's famous 'Impossibility Theorem', which showed that no welfare function could exist if an unrestricted domain of preferences is to be satisfied, together with some other appealing conditions. A number of leading economists have tried to provide avenues out of this 'impossibility' by restricting the variety of preferences: here, Gaertner provides a clear and detailed account, using standardized mathematical notation, of well over 40 theorems associated with domain conditions." "Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory will be an essential addition to the library of social choice theory for scholars and their advanced graduate students."--Jacket PSYCHOLOGY / Social Psychology bisacsh Social choice gtt Voorkeur gtt Wiskundige modellen gtt Besliskunde gtt Domein (wiskunde) gtt Existentie van oplossingen gtt Kollektiventscheidung swd Mathematisches Modell swd Decision making / Mathematical models fast Social choice / Mathematical models fast Mathematisches Modell Social choice Mathematical models Decision making Mathematical models Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 gnd rswk-swf Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd rswk-swf Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 s Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 s 1\p DE-604 http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=73926 Aggregator Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
spellingShingle | Gaertner, Wulf Domain conditions in social choice theory PSYCHOLOGY / Social Psychology bisacsh Social choice gtt Voorkeur gtt Wiskundige modellen gtt Besliskunde gtt Domein (wiskunde) gtt Existentie van oplossingen gtt Kollektiventscheidung swd Mathematisches Modell swd Decision making / Mathematical models fast Social choice / Mathematical models fast Mathematisches Modell Social choice Mathematical models Decision making Mathematical models Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 gnd Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4022393-0 (DE-588)4114528-8 |
title | Domain conditions in social choice theory |
title_auth | Domain conditions in social choice theory |
title_exact_search | Domain conditions in social choice theory |
title_full | Domain conditions in social choice theory Wulf Gaertner |
title_fullStr | Domain conditions in social choice theory Wulf Gaertner |
title_full_unstemmed | Domain conditions in social choice theory Wulf Gaertner |
title_short | Domain conditions in social choice theory |
title_sort | domain conditions in social choice theory |
topic | PSYCHOLOGY / Social Psychology bisacsh Social choice gtt Voorkeur gtt Wiskundige modellen gtt Besliskunde gtt Domein (wiskunde) gtt Existentie van oplossingen gtt Kollektiventscheidung swd Mathematisches Modell swd Decision making / Mathematical models fast Social choice / Mathematical models fast Mathematisches Modell Social choice Mathematical models Decision making Mathematical models Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 gnd Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd |
topic_facet | PSYCHOLOGY / Social Psychology Social choice Voorkeur Wiskundige modellen Besliskunde Domein (wiskunde) Existentie van oplossingen Kollektiventscheidung Mathematisches Modell Decision making / Mathematical models Social choice / Mathematical models Social choice Mathematical models Decision making Mathematical models |
url | http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=73926 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT gaertnerwulf domainconditionsinsocialchoicetheory |