The calculus of selfishness:
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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Sigmund, Karl (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Princeton Princeton University Press ©2010
Schriftenreihe:Princeton series in theoretical and computational biology
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:FAW01
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Beschreibung:Includes bibliographical references (pages 155-168) and index
Introduction : social traps and simple games -- Game dynamics and social learning -- Direct reciprocity : the role of repetition -- Indirect reciprocity : the role of reputation -- Fairness and trust : the power of incentives -- Public goods and joint efforts : between freedom and enforcement -- Cooperation in structured populations
"How does cooperation emerge among selfish individuals? When do people share resources, punish those they consider unfair, and engage in joint enterprises? These questions fascinate philosophers, biologists, and economists alike, for the "invisible hand" that should turn selfish efforts into public benefit is not always at work. The Calculus of Selfishness looks at social dilemmas where cooperative motivations are subverted and self-interest becomes self-defeating. Karl Sigmund, a pioneer in evolutionary game theory, uses simple and well-known game theory models to examine the foundations of collective action and the effects of reciprocity and reputation." "Focusing on some of the best-known social and economic experiments, including games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, Trust, Ultimatum, Snowdrift, and Public Good, Sigmund explores the conditions leading to cooperative strategies. His approach is based on evolutionary game dynamics, applied to deterministic and probabilistic models of economic interactions." "Exploring basic strategic Interactions among individuals guided by self-interest and caught in social traps, The Calculus of Selfishness analyzes to what extent one key facet of human nature - selfishness - can lead to cooperation."--Jacket
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource (viii, 173 pages)
ISBN:0691142750
1282458809
140083225X
9781282458802
9781400832255

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