Rules and restraint: government spending and the design of institutions
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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Primo, David M. (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Chicago University of Chicago Press 2007
Schriftenreihe:American politics and political economy
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Online-Zugang:FAW01
FAW02
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Beschreibung:Includes bibliographical references (p. [175]-188) and index
List of Illustrations; Acknowledgments; 1 : Introduction; 2 : Rule Design and Enforcement; 3 : External Enforcement; 4 : Internal Enforcement; 5 : The U.S. States; 6 : The Federal Government; 7 : Conclusion; Appendix A. Technical Material for Chapter 3; Appendix B. Technical Material for Chapter 4; Appendix C. Technical Material for Chapter 5; Appendix D. Technical Material for Chapter 6; Notes; References; Index
Government spending has increased dramatically in the United States since World War II despite the many rules intended to rein in the insatiable appetite for tax revenue most politicians seem to share. Drawing on examples from the federal and state governments, Rules and Restraint explains in lucid, nontechnical prose why these budget rules tend to fail, and proposes original alternatives for imposing much-needed fiscal discipline on our legislators. One reason budget rules are ineffective, David Primo shows, is that politicians often create and preserve loopholes to protect programs that bene
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource (xiii, 203 p.)
ISBN:0226682617
9780226682617

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