Fool me twice: intelligence failure and mass casualty terrorism
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Leiden
Martinus Nijhoff
©2007
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | FAW01 FAW02 Volltext |
| Beschreibung: | Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002 Includes bibliographical references (pages 275-288) and index Evaluates whether surprise and intelligence failure leading to mass casualty terrorism are inevitable. This book features a study that explores the extent to which four factors - failures of public policy leadership, analytical challenges, organizational obstacles, and inherent problems of warning information - contribute to intelligence failure Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- About the Author -- List of Abbreviations -- Chapter 1 -- Introduction -- A. Key Concepts: Strategic Surprise and Intelligence Failure -- 1. Strategic Surprise -- 2. Intelligence Failure -- B. The "New Terrorism" -- 1. Qualitative and Quantitative Changes in the Terrorist Threat -- 2. The Challenge to Government -- C. Sources of Intelligence Failure -- 1. Leadership and Policy Failures -- 2. Organizational and Bureaucratic Issues -- 3. Problems with Warning Information -- 4. Analytical Challenges -- D. Understanding Mass Casualty Terrorism, 1993-2001 -- Chapter 2 -- February 26, 1993: The World Trade Center -- A. Introduction -- 1. The Streets ofNew York -- 2. The First Big Surprise -- B. Leadership Failures -- 1. Psychology, Perception and the Threat Environment -- 2. Setting Priorities for Intelligence Collection -- 3. Failures of Public Policy Leadership -- - C. Organizational Obstacles -- 1. Obstacle #1: FBI Culture and Confidential Informants -- 2. Obstacle #2: Federal-State Coordination -- 3. Obstacle #3: FBI-CIA TurfWars -- 4. Obstacle #4: FBI Investigations vs. Intelligence -- 5. Obstacle #5: Executive and Legislative Restrictions -- D. Threat and Warning Information -- 1. Threat Indicators-Hiding in Plain Sight -- 2. Warning Indicators-Signals vs. Noise -- 3. Missed Opportunities -- E. Analytical Challenges -- F. The First Avoidable Surprise? -- G. Conclusion -- Chapter 3 -- April; 19, 1995: Oklahoma City -- A. Introduction -- 1. What Was the Nature of the Surprise? -- B. Leadership Failures -- 1. Psychology, Perception, and the Threat Environment -- 2. The Perceived Threat Environment -- 3. Failures of Public Policy Leadership -- C. Organizational Obstacles -- 1. The First Amendment and Domestic Surveillance -- 2. Law Enforcement Culture and Attitudes -- 3. Law Enforcement Coordination -- D. Threat and Warning Information -- - 1. The Threat from the Far Right -- 2. Specific Warning Indicators -- 3. Possible Indicators from "Others Unknown" -- 4. No Warning -- 5. Failing to Learn -- E. Analytical Challenges -- F. Conclusion -- Chapter 4 -- June 25, 1996: Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia -- A. Introduction -- 1. The U.S. Mission in the Persian Gulf -- 2. The First Signs of Trouble: 1994-95 -- 3. Heightened Security at U.S. Installations -- 4. What Was the Nature of the Surprise at Khobar Towers? -- 5. Competing Judgments on the Failure -- B. Leadership Failures -- 1. The Perceived Threat Environment in Saudi Arabia Prior to -- November 1995 -- 2. Perceptions ofThreat After OPM/SANG -- 3. The Charge of "Mission Creep" -- 4. Efforts to Enhance Force Protection -- 5. Sensitivity to Host Country Concerns -- 6. Failures of Public Policy Leadership -- C. Organizational Obstacles -- 1. For Lack of a SOFA -- 2. Structure of the Military Chain of Command -- 3. Lack of Guidance from DOD -- 4. Money and Manpower -- - 5. Conclusions on Organizational Obstacles -- D. Threat and Warning Information -- 1. Threat Indicators in the Kingdom -- 2. Warning Indicators -- 3. Conclusions on Threat and Warning -- E. Analytical Challenges -- 1. The Lack of Human Intelligence -- F. Conclusion -- 1. The Fina |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (xxv, 292 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9004158456 9047440293 9789004158450 9789047440291 |
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| 500 | |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 275-288) and index | ||
| 500 | |a Evaluates whether surprise and intelligence failure leading to mass casualty terrorism are inevitable. This book features a study that explores the extent to which four factors - failures of public policy leadership, analytical challenges, organizational obstacles, and inherent problems of warning information - contribute to intelligence failure | ||
| 500 | |a Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- About the Author -- List of Abbreviations -- Chapter 1 -- Introduction -- A. Key Concepts: Strategic Surprise and Intelligence Failure -- 1. Strategic Surprise -- 2. Intelligence Failure -- B. The "New Terrorism" -- 1. Qualitative and Quantitative Changes in the Terrorist Threat -- 2. The Challenge to Government -- C. Sources of Intelligence Failure -- 1. Leadership and Policy Failures -- 2. Organizational and Bureaucratic Issues -- 3. Problems with Warning Information -- 4. Analytical Challenges -- D. Understanding Mass Casualty Terrorism, 1993-2001 -- Chapter 2 -- February 26, 1993: The World Trade Center -- A. Introduction -- 1. The Streets ofNew York -- 2. The First Big Surprise -- B. Leadership Failures -- 1. Psychology, Perception and the Threat Environment -- 2. Setting Priorities for Intelligence Collection -- 3. Failures of Public Policy Leadership -- | ||
| 500 | |a - C. Organizational Obstacles -- 1. Obstacle #1: FBI Culture and Confidential Informants -- 2. Obstacle #2: Federal-State Coordination -- 3. Obstacle #3: FBI-CIA TurfWars -- 4. Obstacle #4: FBI Investigations vs. Intelligence -- 5. Obstacle #5: Executive and Legislative Restrictions -- D. Threat and Warning Information -- 1. Threat Indicators-Hiding in Plain Sight -- 2. Warning Indicators-Signals vs. Noise -- 3. Missed Opportunities -- E. Analytical Challenges -- F. The First Avoidable Surprise? -- G. Conclusion -- Chapter 3 -- April; 19, 1995: Oklahoma City -- A. Introduction -- 1. What Was the Nature of the Surprise? -- B. Leadership Failures -- 1. Psychology, Perception, and the Threat Environment -- 2. The Perceived Threat Environment -- 3. Failures of Public Policy Leadership -- C. Organizational Obstacles -- 1. The First Amendment and Domestic Surveillance -- 2. Law Enforcement Culture and Attitudes -- 3. Law Enforcement Coordination -- D. Threat and Warning Information -- | ||
| 500 | |a - 1. The Threat from the Far Right -- 2. Specific Warning Indicators -- 3. Possible Indicators from "Others Unknown" -- 4. No Warning -- 5. Failing to Learn -- E. Analytical Challenges -- F. Conclusion -- Chapter 4 -- June 25, 1996: Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia -- A. Introduction -- 1. The U.S. Mission in the Persian Gulf -- 2. The First Signs of Trouble: 1994-95 -- 3. Heightened Security at U.S. Installations -- 4. What Was the Nature of the Surprise at Khobar Towers? -- 5. Competing Judgments on the Failure -- B. Leadership Failures -- 1. The Perceived Threat Environment in Saudi Arabia Prior to -- November 1995 -- 2. Perceptions ofThreat After OPM/SANG -- 3. The Charge of "Mission Creep" -- 4. Efforts to Enhance Force Protection -- 5. Sensitivity to Host Country Concerns -- 6. Failures of Public Policy Leadership -- C. Organizational Obstacles -- 1. For Lack of a SOFA -- 2. Structure of the Military Chain of Command -- 3. Lack of Guidance from DOD -- 4. Money and Manpower -- | ||
| 500 | |a - 5. Conclusions on Organizational Obstacles -- D. Threat and Warning Information -- 1. Threat Indicators in the Kingdom -- 2. Warning Indicators -- 3. Conclusions on Threat and Warning -- E. Analytical Challenges -- 1. The Lack of Human Intelligence -- F. Conclusion -- 1. The Fina | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Copeland, Thomas E. |
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| discipline | Soziologie |
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| publisher | Martinus Nijhoff |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Copeland, Thomas E. Verfasser aut Fool me twice intelligence failure and mass casualty terrorism Thomas E. Copeland Leiden Martinus Nijhoff ©2007 1 Online-Ressource (xxv, 292 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002 Includes bibliographical references (pages 275-288) and index Evaluates whether surprise and intelligence failure leading to mass casualty terrorism are inevitable. This book features a study that explores the extent to which four factors - failures of public policy leadership, analytical challenges, organizational obstacles, and inherent problems of warning information - contribute to intelligence failure Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- About the Author -- List of Abbreviations -- Chapter 1 -- Introduction -- A. Key Concepts: Strategic Surprise and Intelligence Failure -- 1. Strategic Surprise -- 2. Intelligence Failure -- B. The "New Terrorism" -- 1. Qualitative and Quantitative Changes in the Terrorist Threat -- 2. The Challenge to Government -- C. Sources of Intelligence Failure -- 1. Leadership and Policy Failures -- 2. Organizational and Bureaucratic Issues -- 3. Problems with Warning Information -- 4. Analytical Challenges -- D. Understanding Mass Casualty Terrorism, 1993-2001 -- Chapter 2 -- February 26, 1993: The World Trade Center -- A. Introduction -- 1. The Streets ofNew York -- 2. The First Big Surprise -- B. Leadership Failures -- 1. Psychology, Perception and the Threat Environment -- 2. Setting Priorities for Intelligence Collection -- 3. Failures of Public Policy Leadership -- - C. Organizational Obstacles -- 1. Obstacle #1: FBI Culture and Confidential Informants -- 2. Obstacle #2: Federal-State Coordination -- 3. Obstacle #3: FBI-CIA TurfWars -- 4. Obstacle #4: FBI Investigations vs. Intelligence -- 5. Obstacle #5: Executive and Legislative Restrictions -- D. Threat and Warning Information -- 1. Threat Indicators-Hiding in Plain Sight -- 2. Warning Indicators-Signals vs. Noise -- 3. Missed Opportunities -- E. Analytical Challenges -- F. The First Avoidable Surprise? -- G. Conclusion -- Chapter 3 -- April; 19, 1995: Oklahoma City -- A. Introduction -- 1. What Was the Nature of the Surprise? -- B. Leadership Failures -- 1. Psychology, Perception, and the Threat Environment -- 2. The Perceived Threat Environment -- 3. Failures of Public Policy Leadership -- C. Organizational Obstacles -- 1. The First Amendment and Domestic Surveillance -- 2. Law Enforcement Culture and Attitudes -- 3. Law Enforcement Coordination -- D. Threat and Warning Information -- - 1. The Threat from the Far Right -- 2. Specific Warning Indicators -- 3. Possible Indicators from "Others Unknown" -- 4. No Warning -- 5. Failing to Learn -- E. Analytical Challenges -- F. Conclusion -- Chapter 4 -- June 25, 1996: Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia -- A. Introduction -- 1. The U.S. Mission in the Persian Gulf -- 2. The First Signs of Trouble: 1994-95 -- 3. Heightened Security at U.S. Installations -- 4. What Was the Nature of the Surprise at Khobar Towers? -- 5. Competing Judgments on the Failure -- B. Leadership Failures -- 1. The Perceived Threat Environment in Saudi Arabia Prior to -- November 1995 -- 2. Perceptions ofThreat After OPM/SANG -- 3. The Charge of "Mission Creep" -- 4. Efforts to Enhance Force Protection -- 5. Sensitivity to Host Country Concerns -- 6. Failures of Public Policy Leadership -- C. Organizational Obstacles -- 1. For Lack of a SOFA -- 2. Structure of the Military Chain of Command -- 3. Lack of Guidance from DOD -- 4. Money and Manpower -- - 5. Conclusions on Organizational Obstacles -- D. Threat and Warning Information -- 1. Threat Indicators in the Kingdom -- 2. Warning Indicators -- 3. Conclusions on Threat and Warning -- E. Analytical Challenges -- 1. The Lack of Human Intelligence -- F. Conclusion -- 1. The Fina Geschichte 1993-2001 swd Geschichte 1993-2001 gnd rswk-swf Social Science Service des renseignements / États-Unis / Évaluation Terrorisme / Prévention Attentats à la bombe POLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Freedom & Security / Terrorism bisacsh Bombings fast Intelligence service / Evaluation fast Terrorism / Prevention fast Geheimdienst swd Terrorismus swd Terrorismus Intelligence service United States Evaluation Terrorism Prevention Bombings Terrorismus (DE-588)4059534-1 gnd rswk-swf Geheimdienst (DE-588)4019737-2 gnd rswk-swf USA USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Geheimdienst (DE-588)4019737-2 s Terrorismus (DE-588)4059534-1 s Geschichte 1993-2001 z 1\p DE-604 http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=312599 Aggregator Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Copeland, Thomas E. Fool me twice intelligence failure and mass casualty terrorism Social Science Service des renseignements / États-Unis / Évaluation Terrorisme / Prévention Attentats à la bombe POLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Freedom & Security / Terrorism bisacsh Bombings fast Intelligence service / Evaluation fast Terrorism / Prevention fast Geheimdienst swd Terrorismus swd Terrorismus Intelligence service United States Evaluation Terrorism Prevention Bombings Terrorismus (DE-588)4059534-1 gnd Geheimdienst (DE-588)4019737-2 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4059534-1 (DE-588)4019737-2 (DE-588)4078704-7 |
| title | Fool me twice intelligence failure and mass casualty terrorism |
| title_auth | Fool me twice intelligence failure and mass casualty terrorism |
| title_exact_search | Fool me twice intelligence failure and mass casualty terrorism |
| title_full | Fool me twice intelligence failure and mass casualty terrorism Thomas E. Copeland |
| title_fullStr | Fool me twice intelligence failure and mass casualty terrorism Thomas E. Copeland |
| title_full_unstemmed | Fool me twice intelligence failure and mass casualty terrorism Thomas E. Copeland |
| title_short | Fool me twice |
| title_sort | fool me twice intelligence failure and mass casualty terrorism |
| title_sub | intelligence failure and mass casualty terrorism |
| topic | Social Science Service des renseignements / États-Unis / Évaluation Terrorisme / Prévention Attentats à la bombe POLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Freedom & Security / Terrorism bisacsh Bombings fast Intelligence service / Evaluation fast Terrorism / Prevention fast Geheimdienst swd Terrorismus swd Terrorismus Intelligence service United States Evaluation Terrorism Prevention Bombings Terrorismus (DE-588)4059534-1 gnd Geheimdienst (DE-588)4019737-2 gnd |
| topic_facet | Social Science Service des renseignements / États-Unis / Évaluation Terrorisme / Prévention Attentats à la bombe POLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Freedom & Security / Terrorism Bombings Intelligence service / Evaluation Terrorism / Prevention Geheimdienst Terrorismus Intelligence service United States Evaluation Terrorism Prevention USA |
| url | http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=312599 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT copelandthomase foolmetwiceintelligencefailureandmasscasualtyterrorism |