How insurgencies end:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Santa Monica, CA
RAND
c2010
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Rand Corporation monograph series
MG-965-MCIA. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | FAW01 FAW02 Volltext |
| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references (p. 223-244) "This study tested conventional wisdom about how insurgencies end against the evidence from 89 insurgencies. It compares a quantitative and qualitative analysis of 89 insurgency case studies with lessons from insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) literature. While no two insurgencies are the same, the authors find that modern insurgencies last about ten years and that a government's chances of winning may increase slightly over time. Insurgencies are suited to hierarchical organization and rural terrain, and sanctuary is vital to insurgents. Insurgent use of terrorism often backfires, and withdrawal of state sponsorship can cripple an insurgency, typically leading to its defeat. Inconsistent support to either side generally presages defeat for that side, although weak insurgencies can still win. Anocracies (pseudodemocracies) rarely succeed against insurgencies. Historically derived force ratios are neither accurate nor predictive, and civil defense forces are very useful for both sides. Key indicators of possible trends and tipping points in an insurgency include changes in desertions, defections, and the flow of information to the COIN effort. The more parties in an insurgency, the more likely it is to have a complex and protracted ending. There are no COIN shortcuts."--Rand web site Introduction -- Classifying outcomes and selecting cases -- Assessments of insurgency endings: time and external factors -- Assessments of insurgency endings: internal factors -- Assessments of insurgency endings: other factors -- Conclusions -- Appendix A: Case studies: methodology -- Appendix B: Supplemental findings -- Appendix C: Multivariate regression analysis -- Appendix D: Insurgencies not examined for this publication -- Appendix E: Categories used for the spring 2006 survey -- Appendix F: Unavoidable ambiguities -- Appendix G: Questions used for the autumn 2006 survey |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (xxiv, 244 p.) |
| ISBN: | 0833049526 0833049836 9780833049834 |
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| 500 | |a Includes bibliographical references (p. 223-244) | ||
| 500 | |a "This study tested conventional wisdom about how insurgencies end against the evidence from 89 insurgencies. It compares a quantitative and qualitative analysis of 89 insurgency case studies with lessons from insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) literature. While no two insurgencies are the same, the authors find that modern insurgencies last about ten years and that a government's chances of winning may increase slightly over time. Insurgencies are suited to hierarchical organization and rural terrain, and sanctuary is vital to insurgents. Insurgent use of terrorism often backfires, and withdrawal of state sponsorship can cripple an insurgency, typically leading to its defeat. Inconsistent support to either side generally presages defeat for that side, although weak insurgencies can still win. Anocracies (pseudodemocracies) rarely succeed against insurgencies. Historically derived force ratios are neither accurate nor predictive, and civil defense forces are very useful for both sides. Key indicators of possible trends and tipping points in an insurgency include changes in desertions, defections, and the flow of information to the COIN effort. The more parties in an insurgency, the more likely it is to have a complex and protracted ending. There are no COIN shortcuts."--Rand web site | ||
| 500 | |a Introduction -- Classifying outcomes and selecting cases -- Assessments of insurgency endings: time and external factors -- Assessments of insurgency endings: internal factors -- Assessments of insurgency endings: other factors -- Conclusions -- Appendix A: Case studies: methodology -- Appendix B: Supplemental findings -- Appendix C: Multivariate regression analysis -- Appendix D: Insurgencies not examined for this publication -- Appendix E: Categories used for the spring 2006 survey -- Appendix F: Unavoidable ambiguities -- Appendix G: Questions used for the autumn 2006 survey | ||
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| 700 | 1 | |a Libicki, Martin C. |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Connable, Ben |
| author_facet | Connable, Ben |
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| author_sort | Connable, Ben |
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| dewey-ones | 355 - Military science |
| dewey-raw | 355.02/18 |
| dewey-search | 355.02/18 |
| dewey-sort | 3355.02 218 |
| dewey-tens | 350 - Public administration and military science |
| discipline | Militärwissenschaft |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| spelling | Connable, Ben Verfasser aut How insurgencies end Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki Santa Monica, CA RAND c2010 1 Online-Ressource (xxiv, 244 p.) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Rand Corporation monograph series MG-965-MCIA. Includes bibliographical references (p. 223-244) "This study tested conventional wisdom about how insurgencies end against the evidence from 89 insurgencies. It compares a quantitative and qualitative analysis of 89 insurgency case studies with lessons from insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) literature. While no two insurgencies are the same, the authors find that modern insurgencies last about ten years and that a government's chances of winning may increase slightly over time. Insurgencies are suited to hierarchical organization and rural terrain, and sanctuary is vital to insurgents. Insurgent use of terrorism often backfires, and withdrawal of state sponsorship can cripple an insurgency, typically leading to its defeat. Inconsistent support to either side generally presages defeat for that side, although weak insurgencies can still win. Anocracies (pseudodemocracies) rarely succeed against insurgencies. Historically derived force ratios are neither accurate nor predictive, and civil defense forces are very useful for both sides. Key indicators of possible trends and tipping points in an insurgency include changes in desertions, defections, and the flow of information to the COIN effort. The more parties in an insurgency, the more likely it is to have a complex and protracted ending. There are no COIN shortcuts."--Rand web site Introduction -- Classifying outcomes and selecting cases -- Assessments of insurgency endings: time and external factors -- Assessments of insurgency endings: internal factors -- Assessments of insurgency endings: other factors -- Conclusions -- Appendix A: Case studies: methodology -- Appendix B: Supplemental findings -- Appendix C: Multivariate regression analysis -- Appendix D: Insurgencies not examined for this publication -- Appendix E: Categories used for the spring 2006 survey -- Appendix F: Unavoidable ambiguities -- Appendix G: Questions used for the autumn 2006 survey TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING / Military Science bisacsh HISTORY / Military / Other bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International) bisacsh Counterinsurgency fast Insurgency fast Insurgency Case studies Counterinsurgency Case studies (DE-588)4522595-3 Fallstudiensammlung gnd-content Libicki, Martin C. Sonstige oth Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe, Paperback 978-0-8330-4952-0 http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=331832 Aggregator Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Connable, Ben How insurgencies end TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING / Military Science bisacsh HISTORY / Military / Other bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International) bisacsh Counterinsurgency fast Insurgency fast Insurgency Case studies Counterinsurgency Case studies |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4522595-3 |
| title | How insurgencies end |
| title_auth | How insurgencies end |
| title_exact_search | How insurgencies end |
| title_full | How insurgencies end Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki |
| title_fullStr | How insurgencies end Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki |
| title_full_unstemmed | How insurgencies end Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki |
| title_short | How insurgencies end |
| title_sort | how insurgencies end |
| topic | TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING / Military Science bisacsh HISTORY / Military / Other bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International) bisacsh Counterinsurgency fast Insurgency fast Insurgency Case studies Counterinsurgency Case studies |
| topic_facet | TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING / Military Science HISTORY / Military / Other POLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International) Counterinsurgency Insurgency Insurgency Case studies Counterinsurgency Case studies Fallstudiensammlung |
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