Toward deeper reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New York
Council on Foreign Relations
2010
|
| Schriftenreihe: | CSR (New York, N.Y.)
no. 57 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | FAW01 FAW02 Volltext |
| Beschreibung: | Mode of access: Internet from Council on Foreign Relations web site. Adobe Acrobat Reader required. - Title from PDF title page (viewed on November 9, 2010). - "November 2010." The New START Treaty, signed by presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev in April 2010, was an important achievement. A follow-on to the 1991 START treaty, New START commits both countries to substantial reductions in their nuclear arsenals. Pending ratification, New START limits both countries to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, far below the Cold War peak of 31,000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in the United States alone. Moreover, the New START treaty furthers Obama's goal of "resetting" U.S.-Russia relations. In just the past two years, the former adversaries also finalized an agreement on plutonium disposition, imposed UN sanctions against Iran in reaction to its nuclear program, and enhanced security for non-deployed tactical nuclear weapons. Despite these signs of progress, it is unwise to be complacent. Even after the implementation of the New START Treaty, Obama's goal of a "world free of nuclear weapons" will remain elusive: the United States and Russia will still command enough nuclear weapons to annihilate each other several times over. In this report, the author argues that reducing nuclear weapons stockpiles even further than New START treaty levels -- to one thousand warheads, including tactical nuclear weapons -- would be both strategically and politically advantageous. It would decrease the risk of nuclear weapons theft and nuclear attack and increase international political support for future U.S. initiatives to reduce or control nuclear warheads, all while maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent. To achieve such a significant reduction in a follow-on to the New START treaty, the United States and Russia would need to reach agreement on three long-standing and contentious issues. Tactical nuclear weapons deployments will be the most difficult of these challenges, since Russia has a much larger arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons than does the United States and will therefore bear the brunt of the tactical nuclear weapons cuts. Missile defense is the second obstacle toward further significant nuclear reductions. Much work remains to secure Moscow's cooperation on, or acceptance of, the project. Finally, the United States and Russia must reach agreement on the use of nuclear vehicles for conventional weapons. It is difficult to overstate the potential danger if either country mistook a conventional missile for a nuclear one Includes bibliographical references Introduction -- Moving toward one thousand -- Nuclear forces after the New START treaty -- Tactical nuclear weapons -- Missile threats and missile defenses -- Conventional weapons on nuclear-capable delivery systems -- Conclusion and recommendations |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource |
| ISBN: | 0876094825 0876094981 9780876094822 9780876094983 |
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| 500 | |a The New START Treaty, signed by presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev in April 2010, was an important achievement. A follow-on to the 1991 START treaty, New START commits both countries to substantial reductions in their nuclear arsenals. Pending ratification, New START limits both countries to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, far below the Cold War peak of 31,000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in the United States alone. Moreover, the New START treaty furthers Obama's goal of "resetting" U.S.-Russia relations. In just the past two years, the former adversaries also finalized an agreement on plutonium disposition, imposed UN sanctions against Iran in reaction to its nuclear program, and enhanced security for non-deployed tactical nuclear weapons. Despite these signs of progress, it is unwise to be complacent. | ||
| 500 | |a Even after the implementation of the New START Treaty, Obama's goal of a "world free of nuclear weapons" will remain elusive: the United States and Russia will still command enough nuclear weapons to annihilate each other several times over. In this report, the author argues that reducing nuclear weapons stockpiles even further than New START treaty levels -- to one thousand warheads, including tactical nuclear weapons -- | ||
| 500 | |a would be both strategically and politically advantageous. It would decrease the risk of nuclear weapons theft and nuclear attack and increase international political support for future U.S. initiatives to reduce or control nuclear warheads, all while maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent. To achieve such a significant reduction in a follow-on to the New START treaty, the United States and Russia would need to reach agreement on three long-standing and contentious issues. Tactical nuclear weapons deployments will be the most difficult of these challenges, since Russia has a much larger arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons than does the United States and will therefore bear the brunt of the tactical nuclear weapons cuts. Missile defense is the second obstacle toward further significant nuclear reductions. Much work remains to secure Moscow's cooperation on, or acceptance of, the project. | ||
| 500 | |a Finally, the United States and Russia must reach agreement on the use of nuclear vehicles for conventional weapons. It is difficult to overstate the potential danger if either country mistook a conventional missile for a nuclear one | ||
| 500 | |a Includes bibliographical references | ||
| 500 | |a Introduction -- Moving toward one thousand -- Nuclear forces after the New START treaty -- Tactical nuclear weapons -- Missile threats and missile defenses -- Conventional weapons on nuclear-capable delivery systems -- Conclusion and recommendations | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| spelling | Zenko, Micah Verfasser aut Toward deeper reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons Micah Zenko Toward deeper reductions in US and Russian nuclear weapons Toward deeper reductions in United States and Russian nuclear weapons New York Council on Foreign Relations 2010 1 Online-Ressource txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier CSR (New York, N.Y.) no. 57 Mode of access: Internet from Council on Foreign Relations web site. Adobe Acrobat Reader required. - Title from PDF title page (viewed on November 9, 2010). - "November 2010." The New START Treaty, signed by presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev in April 2010, was an important achievement. A follow-on to the 1991 START treaty, New START commits both countries to substantial reductions in their nuclear arsenals. Pending ratification, New START limits both countries to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, far below the Cold War peak of 31,000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in the United States alone. Moreover, the New START treaty furthers Obama's goal of "resetting" U.S.-Russia relations. In just the past two years, the former adversaries also finalized an agreement on plutonium disposition, imposed UN sanctions against Iran in reaction to its nuclear program, and enhanced security for non-deployed tactical nuclear weapons. Despite these signs of progress, it is unwise to be complacent. Even after the implementation of the New START Treaty, Obama's goal of a "world free of nuclear weapons" will remain elusive: the United States and Russia will still command enough nuclear weapons to annihilate each other several times over. In this report, the author argues that reducing nuclear weapons stockpiles even further than New START treaty levels -- to one thousand warheads, including tactical nuclear weapons -- would be both strategically and politically advantageous. It would decrease the risk of nuclear weapons theft and nuclear attack and increase international political support for future U.S. initiatives to reduce or control nuclear warheads, all while maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent. To achieve such a significant reduction in a follow-on to the New START treaty, the United States and Russia would need to reach agreement on three long-standing and contentious issues. Tactical nuclear weapons deployments will be the most difficult of these challenges, since Russia has a much larger arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons than does the United States and will therefore bear the brunt of the tactical nuclear weapons cuts. Missile defense is the second obstacle toward further significant nuclear reductions. Much work remains to secure Moscow's cooperation on, or acceptance of, the project. Finally, the United States and Russia must reach agreement on the use of nuclear vehicles for conventional weapons. It is difficult to overstate the potential danger if either country mistook a conventional missile for a nuclear one Includes bibliographical references Introduction -- Moving toward one thousand -- Nuclear forces after the New START treaty -- Tactical nuclear weapons -- Missile threats and missile defenses -- Conventional weapons on nuclear-capable delivery systems -- Conclusion and recommendations Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (2010 April 8) Geschichte 1991-2010 gnd rswk-swf POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / Arms Control bisacsh Treaties, etc. (Russia (Federation) and United States : 2010 April 8) fast Nuclear arms control fast Nuclear disarmament fast Nuclear weapons fast Nuclear arms control Russia (Federation) Nuclear arms control United States Nuclear disarmament Russia (Federation) Nuclear disarmament United States Nuclear weapons Russia (Federation) Nuclear weapons United States Atomare Abrüstung (DE-588)4332988-3 gnd rswk-swf USA USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 g Atomare Abrüstung (DE-588)4332988-3 s Geschichte 1991-2010 z 1\p DE-604 Council on Foreign Relations Sonstige oth http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=448145 Aggregator Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Zenko, Micah Toward deeper reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (2010 April 8) POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / Arms Control bisacsh Treaties, etc. (Russia (Federation) and United States : 2010 April 8) fast Nuclear arms control fast Nuclear disarmament fast Nuclear weapons fast Nuclear arms control Russia (Federation) Nuclear arms control United States Nuclear disarmament Russia (Federation) Nuclear disarmament United States Nuclear weapons Russia (Federation) Nuclear weapons United States Atomare Abrüstung (DE-588)4332988-3 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4332988-3 (DE-588)4078704-7 (DE-588)4076899-5 |
| title | Toward deeper reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons |
| title_alt | Toward deeper reductions in US and Russian nuclear weapons Toward deeper reductions in United States and Russian nuclear weapons |
| title_auth | Toward deeper reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons |
| title_exact_search | Toward deeper reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons |
| title_full | Toward deeper reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons Micah Zenko |
| title_fullStr | Toward deeper reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons Micah Zenko |
| title_full_unstemmed | Toward deeper reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons Micah Zenko |
| title_short | Toward deeper reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons |
| title_sort | toward deeper reductions in u s and russian nuclear weapons |
| topic | Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (2010 April 8) POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / Arms Control bisacsh Treaties, etc. (Russia (Federation) and United States : 2010 April 8) fast Nuclear arms control fast Nuclear disarmament fast Nuclear weapons fast Nuclear arms control Russia (Federation) Nuclear arms control United States Nuclear disarmament Russia (Federation) Nuclear disarmament United States Nuclear weapons Russia (Federation) Nuclear weapons United States Atomare Abrüstung (DE-588)4332988-3 gnd |
| topic_facet | Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (2010 April 8) POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / Arms Control Treaties, etc. (Russia (Federation) and United States : 2010 April 8) Nuclear arms control Nuclear disarmament Nuclear weapons Nuclear arms control Russia (Federation) Nuclear arms control United States Nuclear disarmament Russia (Federation) Nuclear disarmament United States Nuclear weapons Russia (Federation) Nuclear weapons United States Atomare Abrüstung USA Russland |
| url | http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=448145 |
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