Epistemic justification:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford
Clarendon Press
2001
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | FAW01 FAW02 Volltext |
| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references and index Modern disputes about what makes a belief epistemically justified or rational are flawed through failing to recognize that there are different kinds of justifications that are in different ways indicative that the belief is true. I distinguish synchronic justification (the belief being a justified response to the believer's situation at the time) from diachronic justification (the belief constituting a justified response to adequate investigation over time); and, for each of these kinds, internalist justification (justification by introspectible factors) from externalist justification (justification by factors not necessarily accessible to the believer). A belief is internally synchronically justified if it is rendered inductively probable by the believer's basic beliefs; but 'inductively probable' may mean probable by true a priori standards (logically probable), by true standards to the best of the believer's ability to discover this (epistemically probable), or simply by the believer's own standards (subjectively probable). External synchronic justification is normally a matter of being produced by a reliable process, and there are many different ways of spelling that out. A belief is diachronically justified to the extent to which it results from adequate investigation. This depends (positively) on how probable it was that investigation would lead to evidence that would make a difference to the original probability of the belief; how probable it was that the issue was important; and (negatively) on how probable it was that investigation would cost much time and money. But all these 'probabilities' can be spelled out in different internalist and externalist ways. Almost all these kinds of justification are worth having, because it is logically probable that a belief justified in almost all these ways will be true. This account of justification is extended to give an account of different kinds of knowledge, all of which are worth having Theories of synchronic justification -- Belief -- Probability -- The criteria of logical probability -- Basicality -- The value of synchronic justification -- The value of diachronic justification -- Knowledge |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (vi, 262 p.) |
| ISBN: | 019152946X 9780191529467 |
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| 500 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index | ||
| 500 | |a Modern disputes about what makes a belief epistemically justified or rational are flawed through failing to recognize that there are different kinds of justifications that are in different ways indicative that the belief is true. I distinguish synchronic justification (the belief being a justified response to the believer's situation at the time) from diachronic justification (the belief constituting a justified response to adequate investigation over time); and, for each of these kinds, internalist justification (justification by introspectible factors) from externalist justification (justification by factors not necessarily accessible to the believer). A belief is internally synchronically justified if it is rendered inductively probable by the believer's basic beliefs; but 'inductively probable' may mean probable by true a priori standards (logically probable), by true standards to the best of the believer's ability to discover this (epistemically probable), or simply by the believer's own standards (subjectively probable). External synchronic justification is normally a matter of being produced by a reliable process, and there are many different ways of spelling that out. A belief is diachronically justified to the extent to which it results from adequate investigation. This depends (positively) on how probable it was that investigation would lead to evidence that would make a difference to the original probability of the belief; how probable it was that the issue was important; and (negatively) on how probable it was that investigation would cost much time and money. But all these 'probabilities' can be spelled out in different internalist and externalist ways. Almost all these kinds of justification are worth having, because it is logically probable that a belief justified in almost all these ways will be true. This account of justification is extended to give an account of different kinds of knowledge, all of which are worth having | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804175474252840960 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Swinburne, Richard |
| author_facet | Swinburne, Richard |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Swinburne, Richard |
| author_variant | r s rs |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV043081626 |
| classification_rvk | CC 3200 CC 7600 CI 6310 |
| collection | ZDB-4-EBA |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)123129628 (DE-599)BVBBV043081626 |
| dewey-full | 121 |
| dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| dewey-ones | 121 - Epistemology (Theory of knowledge) |
| dewey-raw | 121 |
| dewey-search | 121 |
| dewey-sort | 3121 |
| dewey-tens | 120 - Epistemology, causation, humankind |
| discipline | Philosophie |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| id | DE-604.BV043081626 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:16:52Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 019152946X 9780191529467 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-028505818 |
| oclc_num | 123129628 |
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| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (vi, 262 p.) |
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| publishDate | 2001 |
| publishDateSearch | 2001 |
| publishDateSort | 2001 |
| publisher | Clarendon Press |
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| spelling | Swinburne, Richard Verfasser aut Epistemic justification Richard Swinburne Oxford Clarendon Press 2001 1 Online-Ressource (vi, 262 p.) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Includes bibliographical references and index Modern disputes about what makes a belief epistemically justified or rational are flawed through failing to recognize that there are different kinds of justifications that are in different ways indicative that the belief is true. I distinguish synchronic justification (the belief being a justified response to the believer's situation at the time) from diachronic justification (the belief constituting a justified response to adequate investigation over time); and, for each of these kinds, internalist justification (justification by introspectible factors) from externalist justification (justification by factors not necessarily accessible to the believer). A belief is internally synchronically justified if it is rendered inductively probable by the believer's basic beliefs; but 'inductively probable' may mean probable by true a priori standards (logically probable), by true standards to the best of the believer's ability to discover this (epistemically probable), or simply by the believer's own standards (subjectively probable). External synchronic justification is normally a matter of being produced by a reliable process, and there are many different ways of spelling that out. A belief is diachronically justified to the extent to which it results from adequate investigation. This depends (positively) on how probable it was that investigation would lead to evidence that would make a difference to the original probability of the belief; how probable it was that the issue was important; and (negatively) on how probable it was that investigation would cost much time and money. But all these 'probabilities' can be spelled out in different internalist and externalist ways. Almost all these kinds of justification are worth having, because it is logically probable that a belief justified in almost all these ways will be true. This account of justification is extended to give an account of different kinds of knowledge, all of which are worth having Theories of synchronic justification -- Belief -- Probability -- The criteria of logical probability -- Basicality -- The value of synchronic justification -- The value of diachronic justification -- Knowledge Justification (Théorie de la connaissance) PHILOSOPHY / Epistemology bisacsh Kennistheorie gtt Rechtvaardiging gtt Justification (Theory of knowledge) fast Erkenntnistheorie Justification (Theory of knowledge) Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd rswk-swf Rechtfertigung (DE-588)4048748-9 gnd rswk-swf Rechtfertigung (DE-588)4048748-9 s Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 s 1\p DE-604 Oxford University Press Sonstige oth Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe, Paperback 0-19-924378-6 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe, Paperback 0-19-924379-4 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe, Paperback 978-0-19-924378-5 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe, Paperback 978-0-19-924379-2 http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=260436 Aggregator Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Swinburne, Richard Epistemic justification Justification (Théorie de la connaissance) PHILOSOPHY / Epistemology bisacsh Kennistheorie gtt Rechtvaardiging gtt Justification (Theory of knowledge) fast Erkenntnistheorie Justification (Theory of knowledge) Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Rechtfertigung (DE-588)4048748-9 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4070914-0 (DE-588)4048748-9 |
| title | Epistemic justification |
| title_auth | Epistemic justification |
| title_exact_search | Epistemic justification |
| title_full | Epistemic justification Richard Swinburne |
| title_fullStr | Epistemic justification Richard Swinburne |
| title_full_unstemmed | Epistemic justification Richard Swinburne |
| title_short | Epistemic justification |
| title_sort | epistemic justification |
| topic | Justification (Théorie de la connaissance) PHILOSOPHY / Epistemology bisacsh Kennistheorie gtt Rechtvaardiging gtt Justification (Theory of knowledge) fast Erkenntnistheorie Justification (Theory of knowledge) Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Rechtfertigung (DE-588)4048748-9 gnd |
| topic_facet | Justification (Théorie de la connaissance) PHILOSOPHY / Epistemology Kennistheorie Rechtvaardiging Justification (Theory of knowledge) Erkenntnistheorie Rechtfertigung |
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| work_keys_str_mv | AT swinburnerichard epistemicjustification AT oxforduniversitypress epistemicjustification |