Measuring judicial independence: the political economy of judging in Japan
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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Ramseyer, J. Mark (Author)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Chicago University of Chicago Press 2003
Series:Studies in law and economics (Chicago, Ill.)
Subjects:
Online Access:FAW01
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Item Description:Includes bibliographical references (pages 187-196) and index
Preface; Acknowledgments; Introduction: 1968; 1. The Setting; 2. Preliminary Empirics: Methodology and Communist Judges; 3. The Effect of Judicial Decisions: Anti-Government Opinions and Electoral Law Disputes; 4. Political Disputes: Military, Malapportionment, Injunctions, and Constitutional Law; 5. Administrative Disputes: Taxpayers against the Government; 6. Criminal Cases: Suspects against the Government; 7. Toward a Party-Alternation Theory of Comparative Judicial Independence; 8. Conclusions; Appendixes; References; Index
The role of the U.S. Supreme Court in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election raised questions in the minds of many Americans about the relationships between judges and political influence; the following years saw equally heated debates over the appropriate role of political ideology in selecting federal judges. Legal scholars have always debated these questions--asking, in effect, how much judicial systems operate on merit and principle and how much they are shaped by politics. The Japanese Constitution, like many others, requires that all judges be "independent in the exercise of
Physical Description:1 Online-Ressource (xii, 201 pages)
ISBN:0226703878
9780226703879
9780226703886

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