Perfect deterrence:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, UK
Cambridge University Press
©2000
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Cambridge studies in international relations
72 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | FAW01 FAW02 Volltext |
| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references Classical deterrence theory -- Rationality and deterrence -- Credibility and deterrence -- Uncertainty and mutual deterrence -- Unilateral deterrence -- Modeling extended deterrence -- Modeling massive retaliation -- Modeling flexible response -- Limited war, crisis escalation, and extended deterrence -- Perfect deterrence theory An important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct-deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. The authors focus on the relationship among capabilities, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. Some surprising conclusions emerge, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. With the application of deterrence theory in diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome new examination of the subject |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (xxii, 414 pages) |
| ISBN: | 0511016743 0511030843 0511491786 0521781744 0521787130 9780511016745 9780511030840 9780511491788 9780521781749 9780521787130 |
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| 500 | |a An important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct-deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. The authors focus on the relationship among capabilities, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. Some surprising conclusions emerge, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. With the application of deterrence theory in diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome new examination of the subject | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| any_adam_object | |
| author | Zagare, Frank C. |
| author_facet | Zagare, Frank C. |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Zagare, Frank C. |
| author_variant | f c z fc fcz |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV043071455 |
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| dewey-full | 355.02/17 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 355 - Military science |
| dewey-raw | 355.02/17 |
| dewey-search | 355.02/17 |
| dewey-sort | 3355.02 217 |
| dewey-tens | 350 - Public administration and military science |
| discipline | Militärwissenschaft |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| id | DE-604.BV043071455 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:16:33Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0511016743 0511030843 0511491786 0521781744 0521787130 9780511016745 9780511030840 9780511491788 9780521781749 9780521787130 |
| language | English |
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| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (xxii, 414 pages) |
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| spelling | Zagare, Frank C. Verfasser aut Perfect deterrence Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour Cambridge, UK Cambridge University Press ©2000 1 Online-Ressource (xxii, 414 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Cambridge studies in international relations 72 Includes bibliographical references Classical deterrence theory -- Rationality and deterrence -- Credibility and deterrence -- Uncertainty and mutual deterrence -- Unilateral deterrence -- Modeling extended deterrence -- Modeling massive retaliation -- Modeling flexible response -- Limited war, crisis escalation, and extended deterrence -- Perfect deterrence theory An important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct-deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. The authors focus on the relationship among capabilities, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. Some surprising conclusions emerge, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. With the application of deterrence theory in diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome new examination of the subject Dissuasion (Stratégie) HISTORY / Military / Nuclear Warfare bisacsh Deterrence (Strategy) fast Afschrikking (polemologie) gtt Abschreckung swd Deterrence (Strategy) Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd rswk-swf Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 s 1\p DE-604 Kilgour, D. Marc Sonstige oth http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=77693 Aggregator Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Zagare, Frank C. Perfect deterrence Dissuasion (Stratégie) HISTORY / Military / Nuclear Warfare bisacsh Deterrence (Strategy) fast Afschrikking (polemologie) gtt Abschreckung swd Deterrence (Strategy) Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4000230-5 |
| title | Perfect deterrence |
| title_auth | Perfect deterrence |
| title_exact_search | Perfect deterrence |
| title_full | Perfect deterrence Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour |
| title_fullStr | Perfect deterrence Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour |
| title_full_unstemmed | Perfect deterrence Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour |
| title_short | Perfect deterrence |
| title_sort | perfect deterrence |
| topic | Dissuasion (Stratégie) HISTORY / Military / Nuclear Warfare bisacsh Deterrence (Strategy) fast Afschrikking (polemologie) gtt Abschreckung swd Deterrence (Strategy) Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd |
| topic_facet | Dissuasion (Stratégie) HISTORY / Military / Nuclear Warfare Deterrence (Strategy) Afschrikking (polemologie) Abschreckung |
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