Intelligence and surprise attack: failure and success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and beyond
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, DC
Georgetown University Press
[2013]
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | FAW01 FAW02 Volltext |
| Beschreibung: | Print version record |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (x, 277 pages) illustrations |
| ISBN: | 1589016807 1589019989 9781589016804 9781589019980 |
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| 505 | 8 | |a How can the United States avoid a future surprise attack on the scale of 9/11 or Pearl Harbor, in an era when such devastating attacks can come not only from nation states, but also from terrorist groups or cyber enemies? Intelligence and Surprise Attack examines why surprise attacks often succeed even though, in most cases, warnings had been available beforehand. Erik J. Dahl challenges the conventional wisdom about intelligence failure | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Introduction: breaking the first law of intelligence failure -- Why does intelligence fail, and how can it succeed? -- Pearl Harbor: challenging the conventional wisdom -- The Battle of Midway: explaining intelligence success -- Testing the argument: classic cases of surprise attack -- The East Africa embassy bombings: disaster despite warning -- New York City: preventing a day of terror -- The 9/11 attacks: a new explanation -- Testing the argument: why do terrorist plots fail? -- Conclusion: preventing surprise attacks today -- Appendix: Unsuccessful plots and attacks against American targets, 1987-2012 | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Cover; Contents; List of Figures; Acknowledgments; Introduction: Breaking the First Law of Intelligence Failure; 1 Why Does Intelligence Fail, and How Can It Succeed?; PART I: THE PROBLEM OF CONVENTIONAL SURPRISE ATTACK; 2 Pearl Harbor: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom; 3 The Battle of Midway: Explaining Intelligence Success; 4 Testing the Argument: Classic Cases of Surprise Attack; PART II: THE PROBLEM OF TERRORIST SURPRISE ATTACK; 5 The East Africa Embassy Bombings: Disaster Despite Warning; 6 New York City: Preventing a Day of Terror; 7 The 9/11 Attacks: A New Explanation | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 8 Testing the Argument: Why Do Terrorist Plots Fail?Conclusion: Preventing Surprise Attacks Today; Appendix: Unsuccessful Plots and Attacks against American Targets, 1987-2012; Notes; Bibliography; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; R; S; T; U; V; W; Y; Z. | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Dahl, Erik J. |
| author_facet | Dahl, Erik J. |
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| contents | How can the United States avoid a future surprise attack on the scale of 9/11 or Pearl Harbor, in an era when such devastating attacks can come not only from nation states, but also from terrorist groups or cyber enemies? Intelligence and Surprise Attack examines why surprise attacks often succeed even though, in most cases, warnings had been available beforehand. Erik J. Dahl challenges the conventional wisdom about intelligence failure Introduction: breaking the first law of intelligence failure -- Why does intelligence fail, and how can it succeed? -- Pearl Harbor: challenging the conventional wisdom -- The Battle of Midway: explaining intelligence success -- Testing the argument: classic cases of surprise attack -- The East Africa embassy bombings: disaster despite warning -- New York City: preventing a day of terror -- The 9/11 attacks: a new explanation -- Testing the argument: why do terrorist plots fail? -- Conclusion: preventing surprise attacks today -- Appendix: Unsuccessful plots and attacks against American targets, 1987-2012 Cover; Contents; List of Figures; Acknowledgments; Introduction: Breaking the First Law of Intelligence Failure; 1 Why Does Intelligence Fail, and How Can It Succeed?; PART I: THE PROBLEM OF CONVENTIONAL SURPRISE ATTACK; 2 Pearl Harbor: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom; 3 The Battle of Midway: Explaining Intelligence Success; 4 Testing the Argument: Classic Cases of Surprise Attack; PART II: THE PROBLEM OF TERRORIST SURPRISE ATTACK; 5 The East Africa Embassy Bombings: Disaster Despite Warning; 6 New York City: Preventing a Day of Terror; 7 The 9/11 Attacks: A New Explanation 8 Testing the Argument: Why Do Terrorist Plots Fail?Conclusion: Preventing Surprise Attacks Today; Appendix: Unsuccessful Plots and Attacks against American Targets, 1987-2012; Notes; Bibliography; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; R; S; T; U; V; W; Y; Z. |
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| dewey-search | 327.1273 |
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| discipline | Politologie |
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| format | Electronic eBook |
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| spelling | Dahl, Erik J. Verfasser aut Intelligence and surprise attack failure and success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and beyond Erik J. Dahl Washington, DC Georgetown University Press [2013] 1 online resource (x, 277 pages) illustrations txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Print version record How can the United States avoid a future surprise attack on the scale of 9/11 or Pearl Harbor, in an era when such devastating attacks can come not only from nation states, but also from terrorist groups or cyber enemies? Intelligence and Surprise Attack examines why surprise attacks often succeed even though, in most cases, warnings had been available beforehand. Erik J. Dahl challenges the conventional wisdom about intelligence failure Introduction: breaking the first law of intelligence failure -- Why does intelligence fail, and how can it succeed? -- Pearl Harbor: challenging the conventional wisdom -- The Battle of Midway: explaining intelligence success -- Testing the argument: classic cases of surprise attack -- The East Africa embassy bombings: disaster despite warning -- New York City: preventing a day of terror -- The 9/11 attacks: a new explanation -- Testing the argument: why do terrorist plots fail? -- Conclusion: preventing surprise attacks today -- Appendix: Unsuccessful plots and attacks against American targets, 1987-2012 Cover; Contents; List of Figures; Acknowledgments; Introduction: Breaking the First Law of Intelligence Failure; 1 Why Does Intelligence Fail, and How Can It Succeed?; PART I: THE PROBLEM OF CONVENTIONAL SURPRISE ATTACK; 2 Pearl Harbor: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom; 3 The Battle of Midway: Explaining Intelligence Success; 4 Testing the Argument: Classic Cases of Surprise Attack; PART II: THE PROBLEM OF TERRORIST SURPRISE ATTACK; 5 The East Africa Embassy Bombings: Disaster Despite Warning; 6 New York City: Preventing a Day of Terror; 7 The 9/11 Attacks: A New Explanation 8 Testing the Argument: Why Do Terrorist Plots Fail?Conclusion: Preventing Surprise Attacks Today; Appendix: Unsuccessful Plots and Attacks against American Targets, 1987-2012; Notes; Bibliography; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; R; S; T; U; V; W; Y; Z. Geschichte 1941-2012 gnd rswk-swf POLITICAL SCIENCE / Government / International bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International) bisacsh Intelligence service fast National security fast Intelligence service United States National security United States Sicherheitspolitik (DE-588)4116489-1 gnd rswk-swf Geheimdienst (DE-588)4019737-2 gnd rswk-swf Überraschungsangriff (DE-588)4323258-9 gnd rswk-swf USA USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Geheimdienst (DE-588)4019737-2 s Sicherheitspolitik (DE-588)4116489-1 s Überraschungsangriff (DE-588)4323258-9 s Geschichte 1941-2012 z 1\p DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Dahl, Erik J . Intelligence and surprise attack http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=634902 Aggregator Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Dahl, Erik J. Intelligence and surprise attack failure and success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and beyond How can the United States avoid a future surprise attack on the scale of 9/11 or Pearl Harbor, in an era when such devastating attacks can come not only from nation states, but also from terrorist groups or cyber enemies? Intelligence and Surprise Attack examines why surprise attacks often succeed even though, in most cases, warnings had been available beforehand. Erik J. Dahl challenges the conventional wisdom about intelligence failure Introduction: breaking the first law of intelligence failure -- Why does intelligence fail, and how can it succeed? -- Pearl Harbor: challenging the conventional wisdom -- The Battle of Midway: explaining intelligence success -- Testing the argument: classic cases of surprise attack -- The East Africa embassy bombings: disaster despite warning -- New York City: preventing a day of terror -- The 9/11 attacks: a new explanation -- Testing the argument: why do terrorist plots fail? -- Conclusion: preventing surprise attacks today -- Appendix: Unsuccessful plots and attacks against American targets, 1987-2012 Cover; Contents; List of Figures; Acknowledgments; Introduction: Breaking the First Law of Intelligence Failure; 1 Why Does Intelligence Fail, and How Can It Succeed?; PART I: THE PROBLEM OF CONVENTIONAL SURPRISE ATTACK; 2 Pearl Harbor: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom; 3 The Battle of Midway: Explaining Intelligence Success; 4 Testing the Argument: Classic Cases of Surprise Attack; PART II: THE PROBLEM OF TERRORIST SURPRISE ATTACK; 5 The East Africa Embassy Bombings: Disaster Despite Warning; 6 New York City: Preventing a Day of Terror; 7 The 9/11 Attacks: A New Explanation 8 Testing the Argument: Why Do Terrorist Plots Fail?Conclusion: Preventing Surprise Attacks Today; Appendix: Unsuccessful Plots and Attacks against American Targets, 1987-2012; Notes; Bibliography; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; R; S; T; U; V; W; Y; Z. POLITICAL SCIENCE / Government / International bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International) bisacsh Intelligence service fast National security fast Intelligence service United States National security United States Sicherheitspolitik (DE-588)4116489-1 gnd Geheimdienst (DE-588)4019737-2 gnd Überraschungsangriff (DE-588)4323258-9 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4116489-1 (DE-588)4019737-2 (DE-588)4323258-9 (DE-588)4078704-7 |
| title | Intelligence and surprise attack failure and success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and beyond |
| title_auth | Intelligence and surprise attack failure and success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and beyond |
| title_exact_search | Intelligence and surprise attack failure and success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and beyond |
| title_full | Intelligence and surprise attack failure and success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and beyond Erik J. Dahl |
| title_fullStr | Intelligence and surprise attack failure and success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and beyond Erik J. Dahl |
| title_full_unstemmed | Intelligence and surprise attack failure and success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and beyond Erik J. Dahl |
| title_short | Intelligence and surprise attack |
| title_sort | intelligence and surprise attack failure and success from pearl harbor to 9 11 and beyond |
| title_sub | failure and success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and beyond |
| topic | POLITICAL SCIENCE / Government / International bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International) bisacsh Intelligence service fast National security fast Intelligence service United States National security United States Sicherheitspolitik (DE-588)4116489-1 gnd Geheimdienst (DE-588)4019737-2 gnd Überraschungsangriff (DE-588)4323258-9 gnd |
| topic_facet | POLITICAL SCIENCE / Government / International POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General POLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International) Intelligence service National security Intelligence service United States National security United States Sicherheitspolitik Geheimdienst Überraschungsangriff USA |
| url | http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=634902 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT dahlerikj intelligenceandsurpriseattackfailureandsuccessfrompearlharborto911andbeyond |