Monitoring democracy: when international election observation works, and why it often fails
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Princeton
Princeton University Press
2012
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | FAW01 FAW02 Volltext |
| Beschreibung: | Print version record |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (359 pages) |
| ISBN: | 1400842522 9781400842520 |
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| 505 | 8 | |a Cover; Contents; Illustrations; Tables; Preface; Abbreviations; PART I; CHAPTER 1: Introduction; Two Questions; Methods of Analysis; CHAPTER 2: The Rise of a New Norm; The Changing Normative Environment; Contestation; Increased Supply and Demand; The Popularization of Monitoring; Monitoring Today: Organizational Variation; Summary; CHAPTER 3: The Shadow Market; Disagreements about Contested Elections; Who Invites Whom?; Discussion; CHAPTER 4: What Influences Monitors' Assessments?; Analyzing Summary Monitor Assessments; Five Types of Bias; Discussion | |
| 505 | 8 | |a CHAPTER 5: Do Politicians Change Tactics to Evade Criticism?What Constitutes Evidence of a Monitor-Induced Shift?; What Are the Safer Forms of Cheating?; Data: The Varieties of Irregularities; The Record; Discussion; PART II; CHAPTER 6: International Monitors as Reinforcement; Altering Incentives to Cheat; Altering Domestic Conditions; If It Works, When Should It Work?; Summary; CHAPTER 7: Are Monitored Elections Better?; Measures of Election Quality; An Overview of the Record; Statistical Analysis; Discussion; CHAPTER 8: Long-Term Effects; Selection of Countries and Method of Analysis | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Do International Monitors Improve Elections Over Time?When Do Countries Follow the Recommendations of International Monitors?; Discussion; CONCLUSION: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly; Do Monitors Assess Elections Accurately and Objectively?; Do Monitors Improve the Quality of Elections?; Closing Thoughts; Appendix A: Data Description; Two Datasets; Variables; Appendix B: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 3; Appendix C: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 4; Dependent Variable; Analysis; Appendix D: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 7; Additional Description of Matching Process | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Appendix E: Case SummariesAlbania: The Importance of Leverage; Armenia: Paper Compliance; Bangladesh: Slowly but Surely?; Bulgaria: Motivated but Slow; El Salvador: International Meddling for Both Good and Bad; Georgia: Not So Rosy; Guyana: Uphill Battle; Indonesia: A Sluggish Behemoth; Kenya: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back; Lesotho: Deadlock; Mexico: Constructive Engagement; Nicaragua: Excessive Meddling and Deal Making; Panama: Both a Will and a Way; Russia: Goliath Beats David; South Africa: Remarkably Unremarkable; Notes; References; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P. | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Qr; s; t; u; v; w; y; z | |
| 505 | 8 | |a In recent decades, governments and NGOs--in an effort to promote democracy, freedom, fairness, and stability throughout the world--have organized teams of observers to monitor elections in a variety of countries. But when more organizations join the practice without uniform standards, are assessments reliable? When politicians nonetheless cheat and monitors must return to countries even after two decades of engagement, what is accomplished? Monitoring Democracy argues that the practice of international election monitoring is broken, but still worth fixing. By analyzing the evolving interaction | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Democracy | |
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| 650 | 4 | |a Election monitoring | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Election monitoring |v Case studies | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Kelley, Judith G. |
| author_facet | Kelley, Judith G. |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Kelley, Judith G. |
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| contents | Cover; Contents; Illustrations; Tables; Preface; Abbreviations; PART I; CHAPTER 1: Introduction; Two Questions; Methods of Analysis; CHAPTER 2: The Rise of a New Norm; The Changing Normative Environment; Contestation; Increased Supply and Demand; The Popularization of Monitoring; Monitoring Today: Organizational Variation; Summary; CHAPTER 3: The Shadow Market; Disagreements about Contested Elections; Who Invites Whom?; Discussion; CHAPTER 4: What Influences Monitors' Assessments?; Analyzing Summary Monitor Assessments; Five Types of Bias; Discussion CHAPTER 5: Do Politicians Change Tactics to Evade Criticism?What Constitutes Evidence of a Monitor-Induced Shift?; What Are the Safer Forms of Cheating?; Data: The Varieties of Irregularities; The Record; Discussion; PART II; CHAPTER 6: International Monitors as Reinforcement; Altering Incentives to Cheat; Altering Domestic Conditions; If It Works, When Should It Work?; Summary; CHAPTER 7: Are Monitored Elections Better?; Measures of Election Quality; An Overview of the Record; Statistical Analysis; Discussion; CHAPTER 8: Long-Term Effects; Selection of Countries and Method of Analysis Do International Monitors Improve Elections Over Time?When Do Countries Follow the Recommendations of International Monitors?; Discussion; CONCLUSION: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly; Do Monitors Assess Elections Accurately and Objectively?; Do Monitors Improve the Quality of Elections?; Closing Thoughts; Appendix A: Data Description; Two Datasets; Variables; Appendix B: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 3; Appendix C: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 4; Dependent Variable; Analysis; Appendix D: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 7; Additional Description of Matching Process Appendix E: Case SummariesAlbania: The Importance of Leverage; Armenia: Paper Compliance; Bangladesh: Slowly but Surely?; Bulgaria: Motivated but Slow; El Salvador: International Meddling for Both Good and Bad; Georgia: Not So Rosy; Guyana: Uphill Battle; Indonesia: A Sluggish Behemoth; Kenya: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back; Lesotho: Deadlock; Mexico: Constructive Engagement; Nicaragua: Excessive Meddling and Deal Making; Panama: Both a Will and a Way; Russia: Goliath Beats David; South Africa: Remarkably Unremarkable; Notes; References; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P. Qr; s; t; u; v; w; y; z In recent decades, governments and NGOs--in an effort to promote democracy, freedom, fairness, and stability throughout the world--have organized teams of observers to monitor elections in a variety of countries. But when more organizations join the practice without uniform standards, are assessments reliable? When politicians nonetheless cheat and monitors must return to countries even after two decades of engagement, what is accomplished? Monitoring Democracy argues that the practice of international election monitoring is broken, but still worth fixing. By analyzing the evolving interaction |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)779828034 (DE-599)BVBBV043033302 |
| dewey-full | 324.65 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 324 - The political process |
| dewey-raw | 324.65 |
| dewey-search | 324.65 |
| dewey-sort | 3324.65 |
| dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
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| spelling | Kelley, Judith G. Verfasser aut Monitoring democracy when international election observation works, and why it often fails Judith G. Kelley Princeton Princeton University Press 2012 1 online resource (359 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Print version record Cover; Contents; Illustrations; Tables; Preface; Abbreviations; PART I; CHAPTER 1: Introduction; Two Questions; Methods of Analysis; CHAPTER 2: The Rise of a New Norm; The Changing Normative Environment; Contestation; Increased Supply and Demand; The Popularization of Monitoring; Monitoring Today: Organizational Variation; Summary; CHAPTER 3: The Shadow Market; Disagreements about Contested Elections; Who Invites Whom?; Discussion; CHAPTER 4: What Influences Monitors' Assessments?; Analyzing Summary Monitor Assessments; Five Types of Bias; Discussion CHAPTER 5: Do Politicians Change Tactics to Evade Criticism?What Constitutes Evidence of a Monitor-Induced Shift?; What Are the Safer Forms of Cheating?; Data: The Varieties of Irregularities; The Record; Discussion; PART II; CHAPTER 6: International Monitors as Reinforcement; Altering Incentives to Cheat; Altering Domestic Conditions; If It Works, When Should It Work?; Summary; CHAPTER 7: Are Monitored Elections Better?; Measures of Election Quality; An Overview of the Record; Statistical Analysis; Discussion; CHAPTER 8: Long-Term Effects; Selection of Countries and Method of Analysis Do International Monitors Improve Elections Over Time?When Do Countries Follow the Recommendations of International Monitors?; Discussion; CONCLUSION: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly; Do Monitors Assess Elections Accurately and Objectively?; Do Monitors Improve the Quality of Elections?; Closing Thoughts; Appendix A: Data Description; Two Datasets; Variables; Appendix B: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 3; Appendix C: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 4; Dependent Variable; Analysis; Appendix D: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 7; Additional Description of Matching Process Appendix E: Case SummariesAlbania: The Importance of Leverage; Armenia: Paper Compliance; Bangladesh: Slowly but Surely?; Bulgaria: Motivated but Slow; El Salvador: International Meddling for Both Good and Bad; Georgia: Not So Rosy; Guyana: Uphill Battle; Indonesia: A Sluggish Behemoth; Kenya: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back; Lesotho: Deadlock; Mexico: Constructive Engagement; Nicaragua: Excessive Meddling and Deal Making; Panama: Both a Will and a Way; Russia: Goliath Beats David; South Africa: Remarkably Unremarkable; Notes; References; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P. Qr; s; t; u; v; w; y; z In recent decades, governments and NGOs--in an effort to promote democracy, freedom, fairness, and stability throughout the world--have organized teams of observers to monitor elections in a variety of countries. But when more organizations join the practice without uniform standards, are assessments reliable? When politicians nonetheless cheat and monitors must return to countries even after two decades of engagement, what is accomplished? Monitoring Democracy argues that the practice of international election monitoring is broken, but still worth fixing. By analyzing the evolving interaction Democracy Political Science POLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Process / Elections bisacsh Election monitoring fast Election monitoring Election monitoring Case studies Internationaler Vergleich (DE-588)4120509-1 gnd rswk-swf Wahlbeobachtung (DE-588)4445925-7 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4522595-3 Fallstudiensammlung gnd-content Wahlbeobachtung (DE-588)4445925-7 s Internationaler Vergleich (DE-588)4120509-1 s 1\p DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Kelley, Judith G . Monitoring Democracy : When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=439322 Aggregator Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Kelley, Judith G. Monitoring democracy when international election observation works, and why it often fails Cover; Contents; Illustrations; Tables; Preface; Abbreviations; PART I; CHAPTER 1: Introduction; Two Questions; Methods of Analysis; CHAPTER 2: The Rise of a New Norm; The Changing Normative Environment; Contestation; Increased Supply and Demand; The Popularization of Monitoring; Monitoring Today: Organizational Variation; Summary; CHAPTER 3: The Shadow Market; Disagreements about Contested Elections; Who Invites Whom?; Discussion; CHAPTER 4: What Influences Monitors' Assessments?; Analyzing Summary Monitor Assessments; Five Types of Bias; Discussion CHAPTER 5: Do Politicians Change Tactics to Evade Criticism?What Constitutes Evidence of a Monitor-Induced Shift?; What Are the Safer Forms of Cheating?; Data: The Varieties of Irregularities; The Record; Discussion; PART II; CHAPTER 6: International Monitors as Reinforcement; Altering Incentives to Cheat; Altering Domestic Conditions; If It Works, When Should It Work?; Summary; CHAPTER 7: Are Monitored Elections Better?; Measures of Election Quality; An Overview of the Record; Statistical Analysis; Discussion; CHAPTER 8: Long-Term Effects; Selection of Countries and Method of Analysis Do International Monitors Improve Elections Over Time?When Do Countries Follow the Recommendations of International Monitors?; Discussion; CONCLUSION: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly; Do Monitors Assess Elections Accurately and Objectively?; Do Monitors Improve the Quality of Elections?; Closing Thoughts; Appendix A: Data Description; Two Datasets; Variables; Appendix B: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 3; Appendix C: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 4; Dependent Variable; Analysis; Appendix D: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 7; Additional Description of Matching Process Appendix E: Case SummariesAlbania: The Importance of Leverage; Armenia: Paper Compliance; Bangladesh: Slowly but Surely?; Bulgaria: Motivated but Slow; El Salvador: International Meddling for Both Good and Bad; Georgia: Not So Rosy; Guyana: Uphill Battle; Indonesia: A Sluggish Behemoth; Kenya: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back; Lesotho: Deadlock; Mexico: Constructive Engagement; Nicaragua: Excessive Meddling and Deal Making; Panama: Both a Will and a Way; Russia: Goliath Beats David; South Africa: Remarkably Unremarkable; Notes; References; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P. Qr; s; t; u; v; w; y; z In recent decades, governments and NGOs--in an effort to promote democracy, freedom, fairness, and stability throughout the world--have organized teams of observers to monitor elections in a variety of countries. But when more organizations join the practice without uniform standards, are assessments reliable? When politicians nonetheless cheat and monitors must return to countries even after two decades of engagement, what is accomplished? Monitoring Democracy argues that the practice of international election monitoring is broken, but still worth fixing. By analyzing the evolving interaction Democracy Political Science POLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Process / Elections bisacsh Election monitoring fast Election monitoring Election monitoring Case studies Internationaler Vergleich (DE-588)4120509-1 gnd Wahlbeobachtung (DE-588)4445925-7 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4120509-1 (DE-588)4445925-7 (DE-588)4522595-3 |
| title | Monitoring democracy when international election observation works, and why it often fails |
| title_auth | Monitoring democracy when international election observation works, and why it often fails |
| title_exact_search | Monitoring democracy when international election observation works, and why it often fails |
| title_full | Monitoring democracy when international election observation works, and why it often fails Judith G. Kelley |
| title_fullStr | Monitoring democracy when international election observation works, and why it often fails Judith G. Kelley |
| title_full_unstemmed | Monitoring democracy when international election observation works, and why it often fails Judith G. Kelley |
| title_short | Monitoring democracy |
| title_sort | monitoring democracy when international election observation works and why it often fails |
| title_sub | when international election observation works, and why it often fails |
| topic | Democracy Political Science POLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Process / Elections bisacsh Election monitoring fast Election monitoring Election monitoring Case studies Internationaler Vergleich (DE-588)4120509-1 gnd Wahlbeobachtung (DE-588)4445925-7 gnd |
| topic_facet | Democracy Political Science POLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Process / Elections Election monitoring Election monitoring Case studies Internationaler Vergleich Wahlbeobachtung Fallstudiensammlung |
| url | http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=439322 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT kelleyjudithg monitoringdemocracywheninternationalelectionobservationworksandwhyitoftenfails |