The two selves: their metaphysical commitments and functional independence
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford
Oxford University Press
[2013]
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | FAW01 FAW02 Volltext |
| Beschreibung: | Print version record |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource |
| ISBN: | 0199349967 0199349975 0199349983 9780199349968 9780199349975 9780199349982 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The two selves |b their metaphysical commitments and functional independence |c Stanley B. Klein |
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| 505 | 8 | |a Introductory remarks about the problem of the self -- The epistemological self : the self of neural instantiation -- The ontological self : the self of first-person subjectivity -- The epistemological and ontological selves : a brief "summing up" -- Empirical evidence and the ontological and epistemological selves -- Some final thoughts | |
| 505 | 8 | |a The Two Selves takes the position that the self is not a ""thing"" easily reduced to an object of scientific analysis. Rather, the self consists in a multiplicity of aspects, some of which have a neuro-cognitive basis (and thus are amenable to scientific inquiry) while other aspects are best construed as first-person subjectivity, lacking material instantiation. As a consequence of its potential immateriality, the subjective aspect of self cannot be taken as an object and therefore is not easily amenable to treatment by current scientific methods. Klein argues that to fully appreciate the self | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Knowledge, Theory of | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Metaphysics | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Self-consciousness (Awareness) | |
| 650 | 7 | |a PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a PSYCHOLOGY / Personality |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Knowledge, Theory of |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Metaphysics |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Self-consciousness (Awareness) |2 fast | |
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| 650 | 4 | |a Knowledge, Theory of | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Metaphysics | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druck-Ausgabe |a Klein, Stanley B |t . Two selves |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| any_adam_object | |
| author | Klein, Stanley B. |
| author_facet | Klein, Stanley B. |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Klein, Stanley B. |
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| bvnumber | BV043027516 |
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| contents | Introductory remarks about the problem of the self -- The epistemological self : the self of neural instantiation -- The ontological self : the self of first-person subjectivity -- The epistemological and ontological selves : a brief "summing up" -- Empirical evidence and the ontological and epistemological selves -- Some final thoughts The Two Selves takes the position that the self is not a ""thing"" easily reduced to an object of scientific analysis. Rather, the self consists in a multiplicity of aspects, some of which have a neuro-cognitive basis (and thus are amenable to scientific inquiry) while other aspects are best construed as first-person subjectivity, lacking material instantiation. As a consequence of its potential immateriality, the subjective aspect of self cannot be taken as an object and therefore is not easily amenable to treatment by current scientific methods. Klein argues that to fully appreciate the self |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)867049828 (DE-599)BVBBV043027516 |
| dewey-full | 126 |
| dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| dewey-ones | 126 - The self |
| dewey-raw | 126 |
| dewey-search | 126 |
| dewey-sort | 3126 |
| dewey-tens | 120 - Epistemology, causation, humankind |
| discipline | Philosophie |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:15:23Z |
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| isbn | 0199349967 0199349975 0199349983 9780199349968 9780199349975 9780199349982 |
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| spelling | Klein, Stanley B. Verfasser aut The two selves their metaphysical commitments and functional independence Stanley B. Klein Oxford Oxford University Press [2013] 1 online resource txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Print version record Introductory remarks about the problem of the self -- The epistemological self : the self of neural instantiation -- The ontological self : the self of first-person subjectivity -- The epistemological and ontological selves : a brief "summing up" -- Empirical evidence and the ontological and epistemological selves -- Some final thoughts The Two Selves takes the position that the self is not a ""thing"" easily reduced to an object of scientific analysis. Rather, the self consists in a multiplicity of aspects, some of which have a neuro-cognitive basis (and thus are amenable to scientific inquiry) while other aspects are best construed as first-person subjectivity, lacking material instantiation. As a consequence of its potential immateriality, the subjective aspect of self cannot be taken as an object and therefore is not easily amenable to treatment by current scientific methods. Klein argues that to fully appreciate the self Knowledge, Theory of Metaphysics Self-consciousness (Awareness) PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body bisacsh PSYCHOLOGY / Personality bisacsh Knowledge, Theory of fast Metaphysics fast Self-consciousness (Awareness) fast Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Klein, Stanley B . Two selves http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=678290 Aggregator Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Klein, Stanley B. The two selves their metaphysical commitments and functional independence Introductory remarks about the problem of the self -- The epistemological self : the self of neural instantiation -- The ontological self : the self of first-person subjectivity -- The epistemological and ontological selves : a brief "summing up" -- Empirical evidence and the ontological and epistemological selves -- Some final thoughts The Two Selves takes the position that the self is not a ""thing"" easily reduced to an object of scientific analysis. Rather, the self consists in a multiplicity of aspects, some of which have a neuro-cognitive basis (and thus are amenable to scientific inquiry) while other aspects are best construed as first-person subjectivity, lacking material instantiation. As a consequence of its potential immateriality, the subjective aspect of self cannot be taken as an object and therefore is not easily amenable to treatment by current scientific methods. Klein argues that to fully appreciate the self Knowledge, Theory of Metaphysics Self-consciousness (Awareness) PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body bisacsh PSYCHOLOGY / Personality bisacsh Knowledge, Theory of fast Metaphysics fast Self-consciousness (Awareness) fast |
| title | The two selves their metaphysical commitments and functional independence |
| title_auth | The two selves their metaphysical commitments and functional independence |
| title_exact_search | The two selves their metaphysical commitments and functional independence |
| title_full | The two selves their metaphysical commitments and functional independence Stanley B. Klein |
| title_fullStr | The two selves their metaphysical commitments and functional independence Stanley B. Klein |
| title_full_unstemmed | The two selves their metaphysical commitments and functional independence Stanley B. Klein |
| title_short | The two selves |
| title_sort | the two selves their metaphysical commitments and functional independence |
| title_sub | their metaphysical commitments and functional independence |
| topic | Knowledge, Theory of Metaphysics Self-consciousness (Awareness) PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body bisacsh PSYCHOLOGY / Personality bisacsh Knowledge, Theory of fast Metaphysics fast Self-consciousness (Awareness) fast |
| topic_facet | Knowledge, Theory of Metaphysics Self-consciousness (Awareness) PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body PSYCHOLOGY / Personality |
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