The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency: Strategic Problems, Puzzles, and Paradoxes
Gespeichert in:
Hauptverfasser: | , |
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
New York, NY
Columbia University Press
[2015]
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Schriftenreihe: | Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare
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Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | FAB01 FAW01 FCO01 FHA01 FKE01 FLA01 UBG01 UPA01 Volltext |
Beschreibung: | Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher’s Web site, viewed September 10 2015) |
Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (272 pages) illustrations |
ISBN: | 9780231539128 |
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505 | 8 | |a The counterinsurgency (COIN) paradigm dominates military and political conduct in contemporary Western strategic thought. It assumes future wars will unfold as "low intensity" conflicts within rather than between states, requiring specialized military training and techniques. COIN is understood as a logical, effective, and democratically palatable method for confronting insurgency--a discrete set of practices that, through the actions of knowledgeable soldiers and under the guidance of an expert elite, creates lasting results.Through an extensive investigation into COIN's theories, methods, and outcomes, this book undermines enduring claims about COIN's success while revealing its hidden meanings and effects. Interrogating the relationship between counterinsurgency and war, the authors question the supposed uniqueness of COIN's attributes and try to resolve the puzzle of its intellectual identity. Is COIN a strategy, a doctrine, a theory, a military practice, or something else? Their analysis ultimately exposes a critical paradox within COIN: while it ignores the vital political dimensions of war, it is nevertheless the product of a misplaced ideological faith in modernization | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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any_adam_object | |
author | Smith, M.L.R Jones, David Martin |
author_facet | Smith, M.L.R Jones, David Martin |
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contents | The counterinsurgency (COIN) paradigm dominates military and political conduct in contemporary Western strategic thought. It assumes future wars will unfold as "low intensity" conflicts within rather than between states, requiring specialized military training and techniques. COIN is understood as a logical, effective, and democratically palatable method for confronting insurgency--a discrete set of practices that, through the actions of knowledgeable soldiers and under the guidance of an expert elite, creates lasting results.Through an extensive investigation into COIN's theories, methods, and outcomes, this book undermines enduring claims about COIN's success while revealing its hidden meanings and effects. Interrogating the relationship between counterinsurgency and war, the authors question the supposed uniqueness of COIN's attributes and try to resolve the puzzle of its intellectual identity. Is COIN a strategy, a doctrine, a theory, a military practice, or something else? Their analysis ultimately exposes a critical paradox within COIN: while it ignores the vital political dimensions of war, it is nevertheless the product of a misplaced ideological faith in modernization |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)908091712 (DE-599)BVBBV043016291 |
dewey-full | 355.02/18 |
dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
dewey-ones | 355 - Military science |
dewey-raw | 355.02/18 |
dewey-search | 355.02/18 |
dewey-sort | 3355.02 218 |
dewey-tens | 350 - Public administration and military science |
discipline | Militärwissenschaft |
format | Electronic eBook |
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isbn | 9780231539128 |
language | English |
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spelling | Smith, M.L.R. aut The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency Strategic Problems, Puzzles, and Paradoxes M.L.R. Smith, David Martin Jones New York, NY Columbia University Press [2015] © 2015 1 online resource (272 pages) illustrations txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher’s Web site, viewed September 10 2015) The counterinsurgency (COIN) paradigm dominates military and political conduct in contemporary Western strategic thought. It assumes future wars will unfold as "low intensity" conflicts within rather than between states, requiring specialized military training and techniques. COIN is understood as a logical, effective, and democratically palatable method for confronting insurgency--a discrete set of practices that, through the actions of knowledgeable soldiers and under the guidance of an expert elite, creates lasting results.Through an extensive investigation into COIN's theories, methods, and outcomes, this book undermines enduring claims about COIN's success while revealing its hidden meanings and effects. Interrogating the relationship between counterinsurgency and war, the authors question the supposed uniqueness of COIN's attributes and try to resolve the puzzle of its intellectual identity. Is COIN a strategy, a doctrine, a theory, a military practice, or something else? Their analysis ultimately exposes a critical paradox within COIN: while it ignores the vital political dimensions of war, it is nevertheless the product of a misplaced ideological faith in modernization In English Militär HISTORY / Military / Afghan War (2001-) bisacsh Geschichte Terrorismus Counterinsurgency History 21st century Terrorism History 21st century Aufstand (DE-588)4003554-2 gnd rswk-swf Bekämpfung (DE-588)4112701-8 gnd rswk-swf Aufstand (DE-588)4003554-2 s Bekämpfung (DE-588)4112701-8 s 1\p DE-604 Jones, David Martin aut http://www.degruyter.com/doi/book/10.7312/smit17000 Verlag Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
spellingShingle | Smith, M.L.R Jones, David Martin The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency Strategic Problems, Puzzles, and Paradoxes The counterinsurgency (COIN) paradigm dominates military and political conduct in contemporary Western strategic thought. It assumes future wars will unfold as "low intensity" conflicts within rather than between states, requiring specialized military training and techniques. COIN is understood as a logical, effective, and democratically palatable method for confronting insurgency--a discrete set of practices that, through the actions of knowledgeable soldiers and under the guidance of an expert elite, creates lasting results.Through an extensive investigation into COIN's theories, methods, and outcomes, this book undermines enduring claims about COIN's success while revealing its hidden meanings and effects. Interrogating the relationship between counterinsurgency and war, the authors question the supposed uniqueness of COIN's attributes and try to resolve the puzzle of its intellectual identity. Is COIN a strategy, a doctrine, a theory, a military practice, or something else? Their analysis ultimately exposes a critical paradox within COIN: while it ignores the vital political dimensions of war, it is nevertheless the product of a misplaced ideological faith in modernization Militär HISTORY / Military / Afghan War (2001-) bisacsh Geschichte Terrorismus Counterinsurgency History 21st century Terrorism History 21st century Aufstand (DE-588)4003554-2 gnd Bekämpfung (DE-588)4112701-8 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4003554-2 (DE-588)4112701-8 |
title | The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency Strategic Problems, Puzzles, and Paradoxes |
title_auth | The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency Strategic Problems, Puzzles, and Paradoxes |
title_exact_search | The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency Strategic Problems, Puzzles, and Paradoxes |
title_full | The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency Strategic Problems, Puzzles, and Paradoxes M.L.R. Smith, David Martin Jones |
title_fullStr | The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency Strategic Problems, Puzzles, and Paradoxes M.L.R. Smith, David Martin Jones |
title_full_unstemmed | The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency Strategic Problems, Puzzles, and Paradoxes M.L.R. Smith, David Martin Jones |
title_short | The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency |
title_sort | the political impossibility of modern counterinsurgency strategic problems puzzles and paradoxes |
title_sub | Strategic Problems, Puzzles, and Paradoxes |
topic | Militär HISTORY / Military / Afghan War (2001-) bisacsh Geschichte Terrorismus Counterinsurgency History 21st century Terrorism History 21st century Aufstand (DE-588)4003554-2 gnd Bekämpfung (DE-588)4112701-8 gnd |
topic_facet | Militär HISTORY / Military / Afghan War (2001-) Geschichte Terrorismus Counterinsurgency History 21st century Terrorism History 21st century Aufstand Bekämpfung |
url | http://www.degruyter.com/doi/book/10.7312/smit17000 |
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