Moral Hazard in Health Insurance:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New York, NY
Columbia University Press
[2014]
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Kenneth J. Arrow Lecture Series
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | DE-1043 DE-1046 DE-858 DE-859 DE-860 DE-473 DE-739 Volltext |
| Beschreibung: | Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher’s Web site, viewed September 10 2015) |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (160 pages) illustrations |
| ISBN: | 9780231538688 |
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| 505 | 8 | |a Moral hazard--the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others--is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow's seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein--recognized as one of the world's foremost experts on the topic--here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| contents | Moral hazard--the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others--is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow's seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein--recognized as one of the world's foremost experts on the topic--here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1165518079 (DE-599)BVBBV043016269 |
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| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 368 - Insurance |
| dewey-raw | 368.38/2 |
| dewey-search | 368.38/2 |
| dewey-sort | 3368.38 12 |
| dewey-tens | 360 - Social problems and services; associations |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| id | DE-604.BV043016269 |
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| isbn | 9780231538688 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Finkelstein, Amy aut Moral Hazard in Health Insurance Amy Finkelstein New York, NY Columbia University Press [2014] © 2014 1 online resource (160 pages) illustrations txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Kenneth J. Arrow Lecture Series Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher’s Web site, viewed September 10 2015) Moral hazard--the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others--is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow's seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein--recognized as one of the world's foremost experts on the topic--here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow In English Health insurance Moral hazard Risk (Insurance) Soziale Probleme, Sozialdienste, Versicherungen BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Insurance / Risk Assessment & Management bisacsh Wirtschaft Moral Hazard (DE-588)4322425-8 gnd rswk-swf Gesundheitsökonomie (DE-588)4130935-2 gnd rswk-swf Krankenversicherung (DE-588)4032836-3 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Krankenversicherung (DE-588)4032836-3 s Moral Hazard (DE-588)4322425-8 s Gesundheitsökonomie (DE-588)4130935-2 s 1\p DE-604 http://www.degruyter.com/doi/book/10.7312/fink16380 Verlag Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Finkelstein, Amy Moral Hazard in Health Insurance Moral hazard--the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others--is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow's seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein--recognized as one of the world's foremost experts on the topic--here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow Health insurance Moral hazard Risk (Insurance) Soziale Probleme, Sozialdienste, Versicherungen BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Insurance / Risk Assessment & Management bisacsh Wirtschaft Moral Hazard (DE-588)4322425-8 gnd Gesundheitsökonomie (DE-588)4130935-2 gnd Krankenversicherung (DE-588)4032836-3 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4322425-8 (DE-588)4130935-2 (DE-588)4032836-3 (DE-588)4078704-7 |
| title | Moral Hazard in Health Insurance |
| title_auth | Moral Hazard in Health Insurance |
| title_exact_search | Moral Hazard in Health Insurance |
| title_full | Moral Hazard in Health Insurance Amy Finkelstein |
| title_fullStr | Moral Hazard in Health Insurance Amy Finkelstein |
| title_full_unstemmed | Moral Hazard in Health Insurance Amy Finkelstein |
| title_short | Moral Hazard in Health Insurance |
| title_sort | moral hazard in health insurance |
| topic | Health insurance Moral hazard Risk (Insurance) Soziale Probleme, Sozialdienste, Versicherungen BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Insurance / Risk Assessment & Management bisacsh Wirtschaft Moral Hazard (DE-588)4322425-8 gnd Gesundheitsökonomie (DE-588)4130935-2 gnd Krankenversicherung (DE-588)4032836-3 gnd |
| topic_facet | Health insurance Moral hazard Risk (Insurance) Soziale Probleme, Sozialdienste, Versicherungen BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Insurance / Risk Assessment & Management Wirtschaft Moral Hazard Gesundheitsökonomie Krankenversicherung USA |
| url | http://www.degruyter.com/doi/book/10.7312/fink16380 |
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