Incentives and political economy:
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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Laffont, Jean-Jacques (Author)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford Oxford University Press 2000
Series:Clarendon lectures in economics
Subjects:
Online Access:Volltext
Item Description:Includes bibliographical references (p. [231]-242) and index
1 - Introduction -- - I. - Politicians as Informed Supervisors - 2 - The Complete Contract Approach to Constitutional Design - 3 - An Incentive Theory of the Separation of Powers - 4 - Checks and Balances -- - II. - Flexibility Versus Discretion in Constitutional Design - 5 - Political Economy and Industrial Policy - 6 - Political Economy and the Marginal Cost Pricing Controversy - 7 - Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation -- - III. - Coalition Formation and Constitutional Design - 8 - Optimal Constitutional Response to Coalition Formation - 9 - Collusion and Decentralization - 10 - Concluding Remarks - App.: Translations of Passages Quoted in French
Physical Description:1 Online-Ressource (xii, 257 p.)
ISBN:9780191522222
0191522228
0198294247
9780198294245

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