Incentives and political economy:
Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Laffont, Jean-Jacques (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Oxford Oxford University Press 2000
Schriftenreihe:Clarendon lectures in economics
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Beschreibung:Includes bibliographical references (p. [231]-242) and index
1 - Introduction -- - I. - Politicians as Informed Supervisors - 2 - The Complete Contract Approach to Constitutional Design - 3 - An Incentive Theory of the Separation of Powers - 4 - Checks and Balances -- - II. - Flexibility Versus Discretion in Constitutional Design - 5 - Political Economy and Industrial Policy - 6 - Political Economy and the Marginal Cost Pricing Controversy - 7 - Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation -- - III. - Coalition Formation and Constitutional Design - 8 - Optimal Constitutional Response to Coalition Formation - 9 - Collusion and Decentralization - 10 - Concluding Remarks - App.: Translations of Passages Quoted in French
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource (xii, 257 p.)
ISBN:9780191522222
0191522228
0198294247
9780198294245

Es ist kein Print-Exemplar vorhanden.

Fernleihe Bestellen Achtung: Nicht im THWS-Bestand! Volltext öffnen