Prosecutors in the boardroom: using criminal law to regulate corporate conduct
Gespeichert in:
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
|---|---|
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New York
New York University Press
© 2011
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references and index Introduction / Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow -- The causes of corporate crime : an economic perspective / Cindy R. Alexander and Mark A. Cohen -- Deferred prosecution agreements on trial : lessons from the law of unconstitutional conditions / Richard A. Epstein -- Removing prosecutors from the boardroom : limiting prosecutorial discretion to impose structural reforms / Jennifer Arlen -- Potentially perverse effects of corporate civil liability / Samuel W. Buell -- Inside-out enforcement / Lisa Kern Griffin -- The institutional logic of preventive crime / Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar -- Collaborative organizational prosecution / Brandon L. Garrett -- The prosecutor as regulatory agency / Rachel E. Barkow -- What are the rules if everybody wants to play? Multiple federal and state prosecutors (acting) as regulators / Sara Sun Beale -- Reforming the corporate monitor? / Vikramaditya Khanna -- Conclusion / Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow Who should police corporate misconduct and how should it be policed? In recent years, the Department of Justice has resolved investigations of dozens of Fortune 500 companies via deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements, where, instead of facing criminal charges, these companies become regulated by outside agencies. Increasingly, the threat of prosecution and such prosecution agreements is being used to regulate corporate behavior. This practice has been sharply criticized on numerous fronts: agreements are too lenient, there is too little oversight of these agreements, a |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (x, 277 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9780814709375 0814709370 9780814723142 0814723144 9780814787038 0814787037 |
Internformat
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| 500 | |a Who should police corporate misconduct and how should it be policed? In recent years, the Department of Justice has resolved investigations of dozens of Fortune 500 companies via deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements, where, instead of facing criminal charges, these companies become regulated by outside agencies. Increasingly, the threat of prosecution and such prosecution agreements is being used to regulate corporate behavior. This practice has been sharply criticized on numerous fronts: agreements are too lenient, there is too little oversight of these agreements, a | ||
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| id | DE-604.BV042965072 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
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| isbn | 9780814709375 0814709370 9780814723142 0814723144 9780814787038 0814787037 |
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| spelling | Prosecutors in the boardroom using criminal law to regulate corporate conduct edited by Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow New York New York University Press © 2011 1 Online-Ressource (x, 277 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Includes bibliographical references and index Introduction / Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow -- The causes of corporate crime : an economic perspective / Cindy R. Alexander and Mark A. Cohen -- Deferred prosecution agreements on trial : lessons from the law of unconstitutional conditions / Richard A. Epstein -- Removing prosecutors from the boardroom : limiting prosecutorial discretion to impose structural reforms / Jennifer Arlen -- Potentially perverse effects of corporate civil liability / Samuel W. Buell -- Inside-out enforcement / Lisa Kern Griffin -- The institutional logic of preventive crime / Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar -- Collaborative organizational prosecution / Brandon L. Garrett -- The prosecutor as regulatory agency / Rachel E. Barkow -- What are the rules if everybody wants to play? Multiple federal and state prosecutors (acting) as regulators / Sara Sun Beale -- Reforming the corporate monitor? / Vikramaditya Khanna -- Conclusion / Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow Who should police corporate misconduct and how should it be policed? In recent years, the Department of Justice has resolved investigations of dozens of Fortune 500 companies via deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements, where, instead of facing criminal charges, these companies become regulated by outside agencies. Increasingly, the threat of prosecution and such prosecution agreements is being used to regulate corporate behavior. This practice has been sharply criticized on numerous fronts: agreements are too lenient, there is too little oversight of these agreements, a LAW / Criminal Law / General bisacsh Corporation law / Criminal provisions fast Prosecution fast Corporation law United States Criminal provisions Prosecution United States USA Barkow, Anthony S. Sonstige oth Barkow, Rachel E. Sonstige oth http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=368439 Aggregator Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Prosecutors in the boardroom using criminal law to regulate corporate conduct LAW / Criminal Law / General bisacsh Corporation law / Criminal provisions fast Prosecution fast Corporation law United States Criminal provisions Prosecution United States |
| title | Prosecutors in the boardroom using criminal law to regulate corporate conduct |
| title_auth | Prosecutors in the boardroom using criminal law to regulate corporate conduct |
| title_exact_search | Prosecutors in the boardroom using criminal law to regulate corporate conduct |
| title_full | Prosecutors in the boardroom using criminal law to regulate corporate conduct edited by Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow |
| title_fullStr | Prosecutors in the boardroom using criminal law to regulate corporate conduct edited by Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow |
| title_full_unstemmed | Prosecutors in the boardroom using criminal law to regulate corporate conduct edited by Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow |
| title_short | Prosecutors in the boardroom |
| title_sort | prosecutors in the boardroom using criminal law to regulate corporate conduct |
| title_sub | using criminal law to regulate corporate conduct |
| topic | LAW / Criminal Law / General bisacsh Corporation law / Criminal provisions fast Prosecution fast Corporation law United States Criminal provisions Prosecution United States |
| topic_facet | LAW / Criminal Law / General Corporation law / Criminal provisions Prosecution Corporation law United States Criminal provisions Prosecution United States USA |
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