You never give me your money?: sovereign debt crises, collective action problems, and IMF lending
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
[Washington, D.C.]
International Monetary Fund
©2013
|
Schriftenreihe: | IMF working paper
WP/13/20 |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Beschreibung: | Title from PDF title page (IMF Web site, viewed Feb. 4, 2013). - "Office of the Executive Director for Albania, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and San Marino"--Page 2 of pdf. - "January 2013"--Page 2 of pdf "We review the impact of the global financial crisis, and its spillovers into the sovereign sector of the euro area, on the international "rules of the game" for dealing with sovereign debt crises. These rules rest on two main pillars. The most important is the IMF's lending framework (policies, financing facilities, and financial resources), which is designed to support macroeconomic adjustment packages based on the key notion of public debt sustainability. The complementary pillar is represented by such contractual provisions as Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in sovereign bonds, which aim to facilitate coordination among private creditors in order to contain the costs of a debt default or restructuring. We analyze the most significant changes (and their consequences) prompted by the recent crises to the Fund's lending framework, not only in terms of additional financial resources, new financing facilities (including precautionary ones), and cooperation with euro-area institutions, but also as regards the criteria governing exceptional access to the Fund's financial resources. We highlight a crucial innovation to these criteria, namely that, for the first time, they now explicitly take account of the risk of international systemic spillovers. Finally, we discuss how the recent crises have provided new political support for a broader dissemination of CACs in euro-area sovereign bonds. Importantly, in the first case involving an advanced economy, CACs were activated in the debt exchange undertaken by Greece in Spring 2012"--Page 2 of pdf Includes bibliographical references (pages 42-49) |
Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (50 pages) |
ISBN: | 9781475528589 1475528582 |
Internformat
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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any_adam_object | |
author | Committeri, Marco |
author_facet | Committeri, Marco |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Committeri, Marco |
author_variant | m c mc |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV042962040 |
collection | ZDB-4-EBU |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)826652711 (DE-599)BVBBV042962040 |
dewey-full | 332.152 |
dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
dewey-ones | 332 - Financial economics |
dewey-raw | 332.152 |
dewey-search | 332.152 |
dewey-sort | 3332.152 |
dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
era | 2008 - 2009 fast |
era_facet | 2008 - 2009 |
format | Electronic eBook |
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language | English |
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spelling | Committeri, Marco Verfasser aut You never give me your money? sovereign debt crises, collective action problems, and IMF lending Marco Committeri, Francesco Spadafora Sovereign debt crises, collective action problems, and IMF lending [Washington, D.C.] International Monetary Fund ©2013 1 Online-Ressource (50 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier IMF working paper WP/13/20 Title from PDF title page (IMF Web site, viewed Feb. 4, 2013). - "Office of the Executive Director for Albania, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and San Marino"--Page 2 of pdf. - "January 2013"--Page 2 of pdf "We review the impact of the global financial crisis, and its spillovers into the sovereign sector of the euro area, on the international "rules of the game" for dealing with sovereign debt crises. These rules rest on two main pillars. The most important is the IMF's lending framework (policies, financing facilities, and financial resources), which is designed to support macroeconomic adjustment packages based on the key notion of public debt sustainability. The complementary pillar is represented by such contractual provisions as Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in sovereign bonds, which aim to facilitate coordination among private creditors in order to contain the costs of a debt default or restructuring. We analyze the most significant changes (and their consequences) prompted by the recent crises to the Fund's lending framework, not only in terms of additional financial resources, new financing facilities (including precautionary ones), and cooperation with euro-area institutions, but also as regards the criteria governing exceptional access to the Fund's financial resources. We highlight a crucial innovation to these criteria, namely that, for the first time, they now explicitly take account of the risk of international systemic spillovers. Finally, we discuss how the recent crises have provided new political support for a broader dissemination of CACs in euro-area sovereign bonds. Importantly, in the first case involving an advanced economy, CACs were activated in the debt exchange undertaken by Greece in Spring 2012"--Page 2 of pdf Includes bibliographical references (pages 42-49) International Monetary Fund fast Global Financial Crisis / (2008-2009) fast International Monetary Fund Europe, Southern Rules and practice 2008 - 2009 fast BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Banks & Banking bisacsh Loans fast Wirtschaft Loans Europe, Southern Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009 Spadafora, Francesco Sonstige oth International Monetary Fund Office of the Executive Director for Albania, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and San Marino Sonstige oth http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=548023 Aggregator Volltext |
spellingShingle | Committeri, Marco You never give me your money? sovereign debt crises, collective action problems, and IMF lending International Monetary Fund fast Global Financial Crisis / (2008-2009) fast International Monetary Fund Europe, Southern Rules and practice BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Banks & Banking bisacsh Loans fast Wirtschaft Loans Europe, Southern Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009 |
title | You never give me your money? sovereign debt crises, collective action problems, and IMF lending |
title_alt | Sovereign debt crises, collective action problems, and IMF lending |
title_auth | You never give me your money? sovereign debt crises, collective action problems, and IMF lending |
title_exact_search | You never give me your money? sovereign debt crises, collective action problems, and IMF lending |
title_full | You never give me your money? sovereign debt crises, collective action problems, and IMF lending Marco Committeri, Francesco Spadafora |
title_fullStr | You never give me your money? sovereign debt crises, collective action problems, and IMF lending Marco Committeri, Francesco Spadafora |
title_full_unstemmed | You never give me your money? sovereign debt crises, collective action problems, and IMF lending Marco Committeri, Francesco Spadafora |
title_short | You never give me your money? |
title_sort | you never give me your money sovereign debt crises collective action problems and imf lending |
title_sub | sovereign debt crises, collective action problems, and IMF lending |
topic | International Monetary Fund fast Global Financial Crisis / (2008-2009) fast International Monetary Fund Europe, Southern Rules and practice BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Banks & Banking bisacsh Loans fast Wirtschaft Loans Europe, Southern Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009 |
topic_facet | International Monetary Fund Global Financial Crisis / (2008-2009) International Monetary Fund Europe, Southern Rules and practice BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Banks & Banking Loans Wirtschaft Loans Europe, Southern Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009 |
url | http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=548023 |
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