The epistemic significance of disagreement:
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Basingstoke ; New York
Palgrave Macmillan
2015
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Schriftenreihe: | Palgrave innovations in philosophy
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Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Klappentext Inhaltsverzeichnis |
Beschreibung: | Literaturverzeichnis Seite 178-187 |
Beschreibung: | xii, 190 Seiten 23 cm |
ISBN: | 9781137400895 |
Internformat
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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adam_text | Discovering that someone disagrees with you is a common occurrence, but
how does discovering that another person disagrees with you about something
affect the rationality of your beliefs on that topic? This is the question of the
epistemic significance of disagreement, which Matheson seeks to answer
here. Beginning with a survey of the literature on this issue, Matheson maps
out the conceptual space, presents the central examples, and explains the key
arguments. At the same time, he develops and defends a particular account
of the epistemic significance of disagreement - a version of the Equal Weight
View. Compared to previous discussions of the epistemic significance of
disagreement, this book extends beyond idealized cases of peer disagreement
to real-life cases of disagreement and in so doing offers the reader a more
complete view of the topic.
Jonathan Matheson is Assistant Professor of philosophy at the University
of North Florida, USA. He works mainly in epistemology and has published
articles in journals including Philosophical Studies, Episteme, and Social
Epistemology. He is also the co-editor (with Rico Vitz) of The Ethics of Belief:
Individual and Social.
Contents
Series Editors Preface x
Acknowledgments xi
1 Introduction 1
1.1 An early challenge: relativism and anti-realism 2
1.2 Terminology and assumptions 6
1.2.1 Doxastic attitudes 6
1.2.2 Epistemic justification 8
1.2.3 Defeaters 11
1.3 Overview 13
2 Idealized Disagreement 19
2.1 Epistemic peers and idealized disagreement 21
2.2 Symmetry and idealized disagreements 25
2.3 idealized disagreement and defeat 30
2.4 Why care about idealized cases? 33
3 Steadfast Views of Disagreement 35
3.1 Higher-order evidence and first-order evidence 36
3.2 Private evidence 41
3.3 Self-trust and the first-person perspective 42
3.4 How things seem 47
3.5 General outlooks and error theories 49
3.6 Evidential underdetermination and denying
rational uniqueness 52
3.6.1 Reasonable disagreement 54
3.6.2 A challenge from vagueness 55
3.6.3 Epistemic principles 56
3.6.4 Questioning the connection 59
3.7 Merely possible disagreements 61
3.8 Summary 64
4 Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and the
Equal Weight View 65
4.1 The case for Conciliatory Views 66
4.1.1 Theoretical motivation 66
vil
68
70
71
74
77
78
78
79
79
80
82
83
84
84
85
87
88
89
91
93
95
97
98
101
102
104
106
107
112
113
113
114
115
123
124
125
128
132
viii Contents
4.1.2 Paradigm cases
4.1.3 An analogy
4.2 From conciliation to equal weight
4.3 From equal weight to splitting the difference
4.3.1 Theoretical motivation
4.3.2 Paradigm cases
4.3.3 An analogy
4.4 The Equal Weight View and defeat
4.4.1 Uniqueness again
4.4.2 Relativism again
4.4.3 Defeat and independence
4.5 Summary
5 Objections to the Equal Weight View
5.1 First-order evidence and the Total Evidence View
5.1.1 The canceling-out argument again
5.1.2 First-order evidence and the Total Evidence View
5.1.2.1 Interpersonal and intrapersonal conflicts
5.1.2.2 Implausibly easy bootstrapping
5.1.2.3 Even easier and more implausible
bootstrapping
5.1.2.4 Litmus paper objection
5.1.3 Challenges to Independence
5.2 Extreme disagreements and the Justificationist View
5.2.1 Why might the content matter?
5.2.2 Lackey s Justificationist View
5.2.2.1 Personal information
5.2.2.2 Demoting peers
5.2.2.3 Direct acquaintance and just seeing
5.3 Taking the edge off
5.4 Summary
6 Everyday Disagreements
6.1 Revisiting the idealizations
6.2 Stripping off the idealizations
6.2.1 Epistemic peers
6.2.2 Interpersonal access
6.2.3 A worry
6.2.4 Multi-party disagreements
6.3 The move toward skepticism
6.3.1 Some initial objections
Contents ix
6.4 An additional skeptical concern 133
6.5 Summary 135
7 Objections 136
7.1 The problem of easy justification 136
7.2 The problem of skepticism 139
7.2.1 Spinelessness 140
7.2.2 A Moorean objection 140
7.2.3 Softening the skepticism 144
7.2.4 Philosophy and progress 147
7.3 The problem of self-defeat 149
7.3.1 Self-defeat and truth 149
7.3.2 Self-defeat and incoherence 153
7.3.3 What now? 157
7.4 Summary 158
8 Conclusion 160
8.1 Review 160
8.2 New directions 162
8.3 Non-epistemic applications 163
8.4 Summary 166
Notes 167
Bibliography 178
Index 189
|
any_adam_object | 1 |
author | Matheson, Jonathan 1977- |
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dewey-search | 121/.6 |
dewey-sort | 3121 16 |
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spelling | Matheson, Jonathan 1977- Verfasser (DE-588)1059406578 aut The epistemic significance of disagreement Jonathan Matheson, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of North Florida, USA Basingstoke ; New York Palgrave Macmillan 2015 xii, 190 Seiten 23 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Palgrave innovations in philosophy Literaturverzeichnis Seite 178-187 Knowledge, Theory of Verbal self-defense Dogmatism Epistemics Meinungsverschiedenheit (DE-588)4114558-6 gnd rswk-swf Meinungsverschiedenheit (DE-588)4114558-6 s DE-604 Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=028365229&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Klappentext Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=028365229&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
spellingShingle | Matheson, Jonathan 1977- The epistemic significance of disagreement Knowledge, Theory of Verbal self-defense Dogmatism Epistemics Meinungsverschiedenheit (DE-588)4114558-6 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4114558-6 |
title | The epistemic significance of disagreement |
title_auth | The epistemic significance of disagreement |
title_exact_search | The epistemic significance of disagreement |
title_full | The epistemic significance of disagreement Jonathan Matheson, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of North Florida, USA |
title_fullStr | The epistemic significance of disagreement Jonathan Matheson, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of North Florida, USA |
title_full_unstemmed | The epistemic significance of disagreement Jonathan Matheson, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of North Florida, USA |
title_short | The epistemic significance of disagreement |
title_sort | the epistemic significance of disagreement |
topic | Knowledge, Theory of Verbal self-defense Dogmatism Epistemics Meinungsverschiedenheit (DE-588)4114558-6 gnd |
topic_facet | Knowledge, Theory of Verbal self-defense Dogmatism Epistemics Meinungsverschiedenheit |
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