Minority shareholder monitoring and German corporate governance: empirical evidence and value effects
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Frankfurt am Main
Peter Lang GmbH
[2013]
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| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references This book comprises three studies on minority shareholder monitoring in Germany. Mandatory disclosure requirements have increased transparency. An analysis of the information that is publicly available is presented, regardless of the size of the target corporation. The second essay in the form of an event study pays special attention to the German supervisory board and its appointment for a fixed term. Capital markets perceive an activist effort as being more credible under certain circumstances. The study as a whole is empirical evidence for increased minority shareholder activity in Germany Cover; Preface; Acknowledgements; Table of Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; List of Abbreviations; List of Symbols; I. Introduction; I.1. Preface; I.2. Definition of Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance; I.3. Theoretical Framework; I.4. Research on Shareholder Activism in Germany; I.5. Research on Shareholder Activism in the U.S.; I.6. Development of Hypotheses; I.7. Remarks on the Collection of Data; I.8. Presentation of Studies and Contribution to Literature; I.8.1. First study: Shareholder Activism in Germany -- An Empirical Review I.8.2. Second Study: Activist Shareholders, Abnormal Returns, and the German AufsichtsratI. 8.3. Third Study: Weak Shareholder Rights? -- A Case Study of Cevian Capital's Investment in Demag Cranes AG; II. Shareholder Activism in Germany -- An Empirical Review; Abstract; II. 1. Introduction; II. 2. Literature Overview; II. 3. Data Collection; II. 4. Descriptive Statistics: Target Firm, Stake Size and Activist Shareholders; II. 5. Shareholder Activism and its Effects; II. 6. Summary of Results; III. Activist Shareholders, Abnormal Returns, and the German Aufsichtsrat; Abstract; III. 1. Introduction III. 2. Three Cases of Shareholder ActivismIII. 3. Literature Background, Corporate Governance Framework and Research Hypotheses; III. 4. Data and Methodology; III. 5. Results; III. 5.1. Announcement Effects; III. 5.2. NewBET Analysis; III. 5.3. Determinants of Abnormal Returns; III. 6. Conclusion; IV. Weak Shareholder Rights? -- A Case Study of Cevian Capital's Investment in Demag Cranes AG; Abstract; IV. 1. Introduction; IV. 2. German Supervisory Board and U.S. Board of Directors; IV. 3. Transaction Partners; IV. 4. Investment by Cevian Capital and Takeover by Terex Corporation IV. 4.1. Investment by Cevian CapitalIV. 4.2. Supervisory Board Representation; IV. 4.3. Takeover by Terex Corporation; IV. 4.4. Lessons Learned From the Demag Case; IV. 5. Cevian Capital's Follow-up Investment in Bilfinger Berger SE; IV. 6. Shareholder Activists on German Supervisory Boards; IV. 7. Conclusion; V. Summary of Key Research Findings; References |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (pages cm) |
| ISBN: | 3653026245 9783653026245 9783631640869 3631640862 |
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| 500 | |a This book comprises three studies on minority shareholder monitoring in Germany. Mandatory disclosure requirements have increased transparency. An analysis of the information that is publicly available is presented, regardless of the size of the target corporation. The second essay in the form of an event study pays special attention to the German supervisory board and its appointment for a fixed term. Capital markets perceive an activist effort as being more credible under certain circumstances. The study as a whole is empirical evidence for increased minority shareholder activity in Germany | ||
| 500 | |a Cover; Preface; Acknowledgements; Table of Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; List of Abbreviations; List of Symbols; I. Introduction; I.1. Preface; I.2. Definition of Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance; I.3. Theoretical Framework; I.4. Research on Shareholder Activism in Germany; I.5. Research on Shareholder Activism in the U.S.; I.6. Development of Hypotheses; I.7. Remarks on the Collection of Data; I.8. Presentation of Studies and Contribution to Literature; I.8.1. First study: Shareholder Activism in Germany -- An Empirical Review | ||
| 500 | |a I.8.2. Second Study: Activist Shareholders, Abnormal Returns, and the German AufsichtsratI. 8.3. Third Study: Weak Shareholder Rights? -- A Case Study of Cevian Capital's Investment in Demag Cranes AG; II. Shareholder Activism in Germany -- An Empirical Review; Abstract; II. 1. Introduction; II. 2. Literature Overview; II. 3. Data Collection; II. 4. Descriptive Statistics: Target Firm, Stake Size and Activist Shareholders; II. 5. Shareholder Activism and its Effects; II. 6. Summary of Results; III. Activist Shareholders, Abnormal Returns, and the German Aufsichtsrat; Abstract; III. 1. Introduction | ||
| 500 | |a III. 2. Three Cases of Shareholder ActivismIII. 3. Literature Background, Corporate Governance Framework and Research Hypotheses; III. 4. Data and Methodology; III. 5. Results; III. 5.1. Announcement Effects; III. 5.2. NewBET Analysis; III. 5.3. Determinants of Abnormal Returns; III. 6. Conclusion; IV. Weak Shareholder Rights? -- A Case Study of Cevian Capital's Investment in Demag Cranes AG; Abstract; IV. 1. Introduction; IV. 2. German Supervisory Board and U.S. Board of Directors; IV. 3. Transaction Partners; IV. 4. Investment by Cevian Capital and Takeover by Terex Corporation | ||
| 500 | |a IV. 4.1. Investment by Cevian CapitalIV. 4.2. Supervisory Board Representation; IV. 4.3. Takeover by Terex Corporation; IV. 4.4. Lessons Learned From the Demag Case; IV. 5. Cevian Capital's Follow-up Investment in Bilfinger Berger SE; IV. 6. Shareholder Activists on German Supervisory Boards; IV. 7. Conclusion; V. Summary of Key Research Findings; References | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| spelling | Thamm, Christian Verfasser aut Minority shareholder monitoring and German corporate governance empirical evidence and value effects Christian Thamm Frankfurt am Main Peter Lang GmbH [2013] 1 Online-Ressource (pages cm) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Includes bibliographical references This book comprises three studies on minority shareholder monitoring in Germany. Mandatory disclosure requirements have increased transparency. An analysis of the information that is publicly available is presented, regardless of the size of the target corporation. The second essay in the form of an event study pays special attention to the German supervisory board and its appointment for a fixed term. Capital markets perceive an activist effort as being more credible under certain circumstances. The study as a whole is empirical evidence for increased minority shareholder activity in Germany Cover; Preface; Acknowledgements; Table of Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; List of Abbreviations; List of Symbols; I. Introduction; I.1. Preface; I.2. Definition of Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance; I.3. Theoretical Framework; I.4. Research on Shareholder Activism in Germany; I.5. Research on Shareholder Activism in the U.S.; I.6. Development of Hypotheses; I.7. Remarks on the Collection of Data; I.8. Presentation of Studies and Contribution to Literature; I.8.1. First study: Shareholder Activism in Germany -- An Empirical Review I.8.2. Second Study: Activist Shareholders, Abnormal Returns, and the German AufsichtsratI. 8.3. Third Study: Weak Shareholder Rights? -- A Case Study of Cevian Capital's Investment in Demag Cranes AG; II. Shareholder Activism in Germany -- An Empirical Review; Abstract; II. 1. Introduction; II. 2. Literature Overview; II. 3. Data Collection; II. 4. Descriptive Statistics: Target Firm, Stake Size and Activist Shareholders; II. 5. Shareholder Activism and its Effects; II. 6. Summary of Results; III. Activist Shareholders, Abnormal Returns, and the German Aufsichtsrat; Abstract; III. 1. Introduction III. 2. Three Cases of Shareholder ActivismIII. 3. Literature Background, Corporate Governance Framework and Research Hypotheses; III. 4. Data and Methodology; III. 5. Results; III. 5.1. Announcement Effects; III. 5.2. NewBET Analysis; III. 5.3. Determinants of Abnormal Returns; III. 6. Conclusion; IV. Weak Shareholder Rights? -- A Case Study of Cevian Capital's Investment in Demag Cranes AG; Abstract; IV. 1. Introduction; IV. 2. German Supervisory Board and U.S. Board of Directors; IV. 3. Transaction Partners; IV. 4. Investment by Cevian Capital and Takeover by Terex Corporation IV. 4.1. Investment by Cevian CapitalIV. 4.2. Supervisory Board Representation; IV. 4.3. Takeover by Terex Corporation; IV. 4.4. Lessons Learned From the Demag Case; IV. 5. Cevian Capital's Follow-up Investment in Bilfinger Berger SE; IV. 6. Shareholder Activists on German Supervisory Boards; IV. 7. Conclusion; V. Summary of Key Research Findings; References BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Industries / General bisacsh Corporate governance fast Corporations / Valuation fast Minority stockholders fast Industrie Wirtschaft Minority stockholders Germany Corporate governance Germany Corporations Valuation Germany Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 gnd rswk-swf Minderheitsaktionär (DE-588)4443989-1 gnd rswk-swf Deutschland Deutschland (DE-588)4011882-4 gnd rswk-swf 1\p (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Deutschland (DE-588)4011882-4 g Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 s Minderheitsaktionär (DE-588)4443989-1 s 2\p DE-604 http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=573742 Aggregator Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Thamm, Christian Minority shareholder monitoring and German corporate governance empirical evidence and value effects BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Industries / General bisacsh Corporate governance fast Corporations / Valuation fast Minority stockholders fast Industrie Wirtschaft Minority stockholders Germany Corporate governance Germany Corporations Valuation Germany Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 gnd Minderheitsaktionär (DE-588)4443989-1 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4419850-4 (DE-588)4443989-1 (DE-588)4011882-4 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
| title | Minority shareholder monitoring and German corporate governance empirical evidence and value effects |
| title_auth | Minority shareholder monitoring and German corporate governance empirical evidence and value effects |
| title_exact_search | Minority shareholder monitoring and German corporate governance empirical evidence and value effects |
| title_full | Minority shareholder monitoring and German corporate governance empirical evidence and value effects Christian Thamm |
| title_fullStr | Minority shareholder monitoring and German corporate governance empirical evidence and value effects Christian Thamm |
| title_full_unstemmed | Minority shareholder monitoring and German corporate governance empirical evidence and value effects Christian Thamm |
| title_short | Minority shareholder monitoring and German corporate governance |
| title_sort | minority shareholder monitoring and german corporate governance empirical evidence and value effects |
| title_sub | empirical evidence and value effects |
| topic | BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Industries / General bisacsh Corporate governance fast Corporations / Valuation fast Minority stockholders fast Industrie Wirtschaft Minority stockholders Germany Corporate governance Germany Corporations Valuation Germany Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 gnd Minderheitsaktionär (DE-588)4443989-1 gnd |
| topic_facet | BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Industries / General Corporate governance Corporations / Valuation Minority stockholders Industrie Wirtschaft Minority stockholders Germany Corporate governance Germany Corporations Valuation Germany Corporate Governance Minderheitsaktionär Deutschland Hochschulschrift |
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