Chemical process safety: learning from case histories
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Amsterdam
Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann
2015
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| Ausgabe: | 4. ed. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Klappentext Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | XX, 485 S. |
| ISBN: | 0128014253 9780128014257 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | CHEMICAL PROCESS SAFETY
FOURTH EDITION
ROY E. SANDERS
Gain awareness, identify and reduce risk in your plant - save lives and minimize loss!
New to this edition:
• Additional chapters covering safety culture, keeping a sense of vulnerability and additional learning
opportunities from recent incidents and near misses.
• Updated information from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics and the National Safety Council
• Concise summaries of some of the most important case histories of the 21st century, with significantly
extended content containing information from the US Chemical Safety Board, US OSHA, American
Institute of Chemical Engineers, and the UK s Health and Safety Executive HSE
Praise for the 3rd Edition:
The emphasis in this book is on accidents that have occurred as the result of the unforeseen effects of
changes to chemical plants. The descriptions are well written, easy to read and bring out the essentials of
each incident. Everyone who works in the process industries, from operator to operations director, should
read the book. -Trevor Kletz, ICI, IChemE
It is very welcome to see that Sanders has published this collection of cases, and he provides very valuable
lessons for the chemical process industry... This book should be essential reading for not just chemical
engineers but engineers and safety managers worldwide. - Dr Peter R. Lewis, Lecturer in Materials
Engineering at the Open University
Chemical Process Safety 4th Edition gives insight into eliminating specific classes of hazards, while providing
real case histories with valuable messages. There are practical sections on mechanical integrity, management
of change, and incident investigation programs, along with a list of helpful resources. The information
contained in this book will help you stay up to date on all the latest OSHA requirements, including the OSHA
required Management of Change, Mechanical Integrity and Incident Investigation regulations.
You will learn how to eliminate hazards in the design, operation, and maintenance of chemical process plants
and petroleum refineries. World-renowned expert in process safety, Roy Sanders, shows you how to reduce
risks in your plant. Sanders lists high profile disaster case histories, and provides advice on what lessons
should be taken to avoid this happening again. Following the principles outlined in this text will help save
lives and reduce loss.
About the author:
Roy E. Sanders, Chemical Engineer and freelance Process Safety Consultant
Sanders recently retired from PPG Industries in Lake Charles, LA. Sanders worked for PPG for 42 years
and specialized in Process Safety fundamentals since 1974. He is associated with the Mary Kay O Connor
Process Safety Center at Texas A M, McNeese State University, Lake Charles, and is a member of the
editorial boards of both the AlChE s Process Safety Progress and Putman s Chemical Processing. He has
taught brief process safety courses across the USA, as well as, Bahrain, Canada, India, the Netherlands Saudi
Arabia and Taiwan.
Contents
Preface xv
Acknowledgments xvii
1 Perspective, perspective, perspective 1
Introduction 1
The media rarely focuses on the benefits of the chemical industry 1
A glance at the history of chemical manufacturing before the industrial
revolution 2
The modern industrial chemical industry modifies our way of living 4
Risks are not necessarily how they are perceived 5
Natural pesticides 11
Plant employee safety versus life-style choices 12
The chemical industry’s excellent safety record 13
Who has the most dangerous jobs? 14
What events resulted in fatal occupational injuries in 2012? 18
Just how dangerous is it to work in a US chemical plant? 19
How are the chemical and refinery industries doing today when it comes
to major losses? And what should we do in the future? 19
Process safety culture 20
References 20
2 Good intentions 23
Modifications made with good intentions 23
A tank truck catastrophically fails 23
Siphoning destroys a tender tank 27
Tank roof splits from overfilling 31
A well-intended change yields a storage tank collapse 31
A water drain line is altered and a reactor explodes 37
An air system is improved and a vessel blows up 39
A new air system improved economics, but jeopardized safety 43
Another incident with nitrogen backup for a compressed air supply 43
The hazards of nitrogen asphyxiation 44
Concerns for safety on a refrigerated ethylene tank 46
Beware of impurities, stabilizers, or substitute chemicals 48
Good intentions on certain new protection systems lead to troubles 49
A gas compressor is protected from dirt, but the plant catches fire 50
A replacement check valve installed — one detail overlooked 50
What was one of the immediate causes of the fire? 52
VI
Contents
What did investigators recommend? 52
Another good intentions project: new tanks are destroyed and the
neighborhood is disrupted 53
Another tragic incident involving hydrogen sulfide takes the lives of two
workers 58
Closing thoughts on sewers 59
Carbon absorption incidents show history repeats 59
The lighter side 60
A review of good intentions 60
References 61
3 Focusing on water and steam: the ever-present and sometimes
evil twins 63
Hydro-test goes awry 64
A flooded column collapses as water is being drained
from the system 68
Water reacting with strong chemicals 71
Easy-to-use steam heat can push equipment
beyond safe design limits 73
Heating water in a confined system 74
Steam condenses and a mega-vessel is destroyed
during commissioning 75
A tragedy develops when hot oil is pumped
upon a layer of water 79
Discussion and recommendations 83
References 85
4 Major US incidents in the twenty-first century 87
Unfortunately — there is often a certain sameness in process incidents 87
Delaware City, Delaware, incident 88
Rousevilte, Pennsylvania, incident 88
Buffalo, New York, incident 89
Learning opportunities from major incidents in the twenty-first century 89
President Obama signs an Executive Order relating to process safety
management 90
An explosion in a plastics manufacturing facility in Illinois results in five
deaths, plant closure and eventual tear down of the facility 91
A glimpse of the PVC plastic facility, the loss of life and property 93
PVC reactor layout and most likely incident scenario 94
Not learning from incidents 96
Key findings on the Illiopolis PVC plant incident 97
The CSB recommendations submitted to Formosa Plastics USA 98
The March 2005 Texas City, Texas, refinery incident - the most tragic
US refinery accident of the decade 99
Besides poor safety culture - what happened prior to the release? 100
Contents
vii
What happened immediately after the release? 104
Besides poor safety culture - what are some key technical findings of the
Chemical Safety Board? 105
Besides poor safety culture ֊ what are some key organizational
findings of the Chemical Safety Board? 107
BP shares their investigation findings on key issues 108
BP Texas City violations and settlement agreements 109
An independent blue ribbon panel investigates BP’s North American
operations 110
A foreword on the findings published by the Baker Panel - broadens
the impact 110
The summary of the Baker Panel findings 111
Corporate safety culture 111
Refinery tragedy in Anacortes, Washington 112
Introduction to the Anacortes refinery incident 112
Details on the Tesoro refinery incident 113
Why the catastrophic rupture? The technical focus 114
Other Chemical Safety Board findings 115
The CSB video “Tesoro Tragedy ֊ Behind the Curve” 116
CSB sweeping game changing recommendations for the
US environmental agency 117
CSB recommendations for the State of Washington 118
CSB recommendations for the American Petroleum Institute 118
The Washington Department of Labor and Industries issues citations 118
Ammonium nitrate catastrophe in West, Texas April 17, 2013 -
fifteen perish 119
Major incidents in the twenty-first century 121
References 121
5 Two highly destructive twenty-first century vapor cloud
explosions: one in the United Kingdom and the other in Venezuela 125
Buncefield UK fuel storage and transfer
depot explosion and fires 2005 125
Introduction to the Buncefield incident
and impact in the area 126
A look at some details prior to the explosion
and massive fire 127
The economic costs of the Buncefield incident 131
Fuel concerns after the explosion and fires 133
Instrumentation and control systems 134
Buncefield report recommendations 134
Recommendations for design and operation of fuel storage sites 135
Summary comments on the Buncefield incident 136
A catastrophic explosion at Amuay refinery in Venezuela 137
Immediate events leading up to the explosion 137
Contents
viii
A doser look a details at the Amuay refinery incident 138
Petroleos de Venezuela (or PDVSA) leak source study 139
RMG presented their view promptly after the incident 140
“The Economist” speaks to some underlying issues 140
The Manufacturing Center in Energy orientation (COENER) report 141
One strongly critical media report speaks about the Amuay refinery
operations 14 Î
The Amuay refinery based upon an insurance report 143
Blunt recommendations by the Manufacturing Center in Energy 144
Conclusions and recommendations for the Amuay disaster 145
Vapor cloud explosions — closing comments 145
When it comes to vapor clouds what can you do? 145
References 146
6 Preparation for maintenance 149
Some problems when preparing for maintenance 149
A tank vent is routed to a water-filled drum to “Avoid” problems 151
Preparing to paint large tanks 152
Preparing a brine sludge dissolving system for maintenance 153
What happened in the brine system? 153
A violent eruption from a tank being prepared for maintenance 155
An explosion while preparing to replace a valve
in an ice cream plant 156
A chemical cleaning operation kills sparrows,
but improves procedures 159
Other cleaning, washing, steaming, and purging operations 160
A tragedy when preparing for valve maintenance 161
A review of changes made to prepare for maintenance 163
References 164
7 Maintenance-induced accidents and process piping problems 165
Planning and communication 167
Repaired reboiler passes the hydro-test and later creates a fire 168
A tank explodes during welding repairs after passing a flammable gas test 169
A phenol tank’s roof lifts as repairs are made 170
Catastrophic failures of storage tanks as reported by the Environmental
Protection Agency 171
Hot work on tank catwalk results in a contractor’s death, injuries,
and a costly off-site environmental insult 172
Sulfuric acid tank background basics 174
Unsafe condition report and hot work permit shortcomings 175
The management of change shortcomings in sulfuric acid tank incident 175
Root causes as defined by the CSB 177
Similar tragic incidents involving hot work to tanks provided within the
CSB full report Delaware City 177
Contents ix
The Chemical Safety Board offers safety advice on Hot Work within
a 14 min video 178
Another tank explosion during maintenance hot work 179
Repair activity to a piping spool results in a massive leak from a sphere 179
The Phillips 66 incident: tragedy in Pasadena, Texas 182
A massive fire, BLEVEs, and $5 million damages after a mechanic
improperly removes a valve actuator 185
Misdirected precautions on a reactor system isolation plug valve result
in a vapor cloud explosion 189
A hidden blind surprises the operators 191
Poor judgment by mechanics allowed a bad steam leak to result in a
minor explosion 194
The Flixborough disaster and the lessons we should never forget 196
Do piping systems contribute to major accidents? 199
Beware of other piping issues 201
Specific piping system problems reported as major incidents 202
Four case histories of catastrophic pipe failures 202
An 8-in. pipeline ruptures and an explosion occurs — December 24, 1989 203
Piping problems review 204
Concluding thoughts on maintenance - induced accidents and process
piping problems 205
References 206
8 One-minute modifications: small, quick changes in a plant can
create bad memories 209
Explosion occurs after an analyzer is repaired 209
When cooling methods were changed, a tragedy occurred 209
Instrument air backup is disconnected 210
A furnace temperature safeguard is altered 210
It appeared to be icicles hanging in a small plant 215
Another costly gasket error 218
While compressed asbestos gaskets are phased out, other leaks will occur 218
Other piping gasket substitution problems 219
New stud bolts fail unexpectedly 220
A “Repaired” hose fails triggering a major fire 222
Hurricane procedures are improperly applied to a tank conservation vent lid 223
Painters create troubles 225
Pipefitters can create troubles when reinstalling relief valves 226
Another pipefitter’s error 227
Lack of respect for an open vent as a vacuum-relief device results in
a partial tank collapse 228
Just a bucket of water destroys a tank 229
Lack of respect for an open vent as a pressure-relief device costs two lives 231
One-minute modifications review 232
References 233
X
Contents
9 Accidents involving compressors, hoses, and pumps 235
Reciprocating compressors 235
A piece of compressor water jacket is launched 235
The misuse of hoses can quickly create problems 240
The Chemical Safety Board investigates a chlorine unloading hose failure 241
The Chemical Safety Board investigated a phosgene hose failure with
a fatality 242
Fatality from a ruptured hose in HF service 243
Hose mishaps frequently lead to loss of containment ֊ maybe more
than we think 244
The water hose at the Flixborough disaster 245
Hoses used to warm equipment 246
Three-Mile Island Incident involved a hose 246
The Bhopal Tragedy was initiated by use of a hose 247
Improper purge hose set up for maintenance creates major problems 247
High-pressure hydrogen inadvertently backs into the nitrogen system
and an explosion occurs 251
A nitric acid delivery to the wrong tank makes front-page news 252
How do you prevent such an incident? 252
Other truck delivery incidents 253
An operator averts a sulfuric acid unloading tragedy 253
Hoses cannot take excessive abuse 254
What is the advice from practitioners? 254
Centrifugal pumps 256
River water pump piping explodes 256
Severe pump explosions surprise employees 262
A large condensate pump explodes 264
Closing thoughts on pump explosions.
Courtesy of the “Beacon” 264
Afterthoughts 266
References 266
10 Failure to use, consult, or understand specifications 269
Lack of well-defined, rigid operating instructions cost $100,000 in
property damages 269
Other thoughts on fired heaters 272
Low-pressure tank fabrication specifications were not followed 273
Explosion relief for low-pressure tanks 274
Tinkering with pressured vessel-closure bolts ends with a harmless bang 275
Piping specifications were not utilized 278
Pump repairs potentially endanger the plant, but are corrected in
time to prevent newspaper headlines 284
Plastic pumps installed to pump flammable liquids 286
Weak walls wanted - but alternate attachments contributed to the damage 286
References 288
Contents xi
11 “Imagine IF’ modifications and practical problem solving 289
“Imagine If’ modifications ֊ let us not exaggerate the dangers as
we perform safety studies 289
New fire-fighting agent meets opposition - “Could Kill Men
as Well as Fires” 289
A process safety management quiz 290
New fiber production methods questioned 293
Practical problem solving 294
The physics student and his mischievous methods 295
References 296
12 The role of mechanical integrity in chemical process safety 297
Mechanical integrity in a chemical plant 297
A regulatory view of mechanical integrity 298
Mechanical integrity programs must be tailored to the specific site 299
Mechanical integrity in design and installation 300
Equipment covered by mechanical integrity 300
Regulatory enforcement of mechanical integrity 302
What is all this about RAGAGEP? 303
Struggling with mechanical integrity 304
Written procedures and training 304
Classification of equipment by hazard potential 305
Mechanical integrity programs for pumps/compressors 306
Mechanical integrity programs for piping, pressure vessels, storage
tanks, and process piping 312
Inspecting pressure vessels, storage tanks, and piping 316
Inspection of pressure vessels and storage tanks 316
Mechanical programs for safety-critical instruments and safety
relief valves 329
The critical role of safety relief valves 329
“In-house” testing safety relief valves 331
Mechanical integrity program for process safety interlocks and alarms 339
Protective process safety interlocks at a DuPont plant 340
Another company - a different emphasis on safety critical instrument
systems 341
Another approach - prooftesting at a Louisiana plant 342
Additional information on mechanical integrity 350
References 351
13 Effectively managing change within the chemical industry 353
Introduction 353
Preliminary thoughts on managing change 353
Are management of change systems like snowflakes? 354
A reality check provided by previous chapters 355
Keeping MOC systems simple 357
Contents
xii
Losing tribal knowledge 357
Some historical approaches to plant changes 358
The US OSHA PSM Standard addresses “management of change” 358
Principles of an effective management of change system that prevents
uncontrolled change and satisfies OSHA 360
An overall process description to create or improve a management of
change system 361
Clear definitions are imperative 362
Key steps for an effective management of change system for a medium
or large organization 364
Key steps for an effective management of change system for a small
company 370
Multidisciplined committee can provide an in֊depth look when
identifying hazards 372
Operational variances for maintenance need
a close examination too 374
Variances, exceptions, and special cases
of change 375
Should the MOC system be paperless? 377
Over two dozen plants share their MOC practices 378
Management of change approvals, documentation, and auditing 381
Closing thoughts on management of change policy 382
The Center for Chemical Process Safety 385
Recommendations and regulations after 1988 385
References 388
14 Investigating and sharing near misses and unfortunate accidents 391
Introduction 391
What does the regulation say about incident investigations? 391
Plant cultures can affect investigations 393
More guidelines on the culture of incident reporting 395
An OSHA program coordinator’s view 395
Layers of incident causes 396
A furnace tube failure case history is revisited 396
Process safety incident investigation techniques 398
Applying root cause analysis 399
Some chemical manufacturers’ approaches to incident investigation 400
What is a root cause? 401
STAMP - a new accident causality model 404
Some thoughts on process safety incident investigation techniques 406
Complying with the OSHA element on incident investigation 406
Report approval, report distribution, sharing the findings,
corrective action tracking, and report retention 410
Conclusions 411
References 412
Contents
xiii
15 Keep a sense of vulnerability for safety sake: seven recommendations
for keeping a sense of vulnerability at your chemical processing
or refining site 415
Opening thoughts on unease and who should it impact 415
How do you create a sense of unease or vulnerability? 416
A focused effort is essential 417
Success can blind us of reality 418
Seven recommendations to reduce your vulnerability 418
Why not step back in time? 424
References 425
16 A strong safety culture is essential: it is essential to develop a strong
safety culture 427
Process safety culture has been recognized and accepted in recent years 427
Foundation for development of safety culture 428
About 65 companies shared to shape the earlier definition of
“Safety Culture” in 2003 429
What is process safety culture? Perhaps - it is the root cause
of the decade! 429
A dozen features essential to developing a durable safety
culture within PSM 432
API RP 754 describes the “Purpose of Indicators” as [17] 441
Is safety culture really important? 442
References 443
17 Sources of helpful information for practicing chemical process safety 445
Key cost free process safety resources at your finger tips 445
Process safety resources via consultants, professional associations and
trade associations via the web 451
Excellent books addressing chemical process safety - from a process
engineer’s viewpoint 460
Two of the best process safety videos which focus on learning from case
histories 463
References 464
Index 465
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| genre | (DE-588)4153616-2 Fallsammlung gnd-content |
| genre_facet | Fallsammlung |
| id | DE-604.BV042721213 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:08:10Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0128014253 9780128014257 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-028152399 |
| oclc_num | 957237157 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-703 |
| owner_facet | DE-703 |
| physical | XX, 485 S. |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| publishDateSearch | 2015 |
| publishDateSort | 2015 |
| publisher | Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Sanders, Roy E. Verfasser aut Chemical process safety learning from case histories Roy E. Sanders 4. ed. Amsterdam Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann 2015 XX, 485 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Chemischer Prozess (DE-588)4147636-0 gnd rswk-swf Technische Sicherheit (DE-588)4059233-9 gnd rswk-swf Reaktionstechnik (DE-588)4136173-8 gnd rswk-swf Sicherheit (DE-588)4054790-5 gnd rswk-swf Chemieunfall (DE-588)4210039-2 gnd rswk-swf Chemieanlage (DE-588)4121084-0 gnd rswk-swf Chemische Verfahrenstechnik (DE-588)4069941-9 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4153616-2 Fallsammlung gnd-content Chemische Verfahrenstechnik (DE-588)4069941-9 s Reaktionstechnik (DE-588)4136173-8 s Sicherheit (DE-588)4054790-5 s DE-604 Chemieanlage (DE-588)4121084-0 s Chemieunfall (DE-588)4210039-2 s Chemischer Prozess (DE-588)4147636-0 s Technische Sicherheit (DE-588)4059233-9 s 1\p DE-604 Digitalisierung UB Bayreuth - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=028152399&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Klappentext Digitalisierung UB Bayreuth - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=028152399&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Sanders, Roy E. Chemical process safety learning from case histories Chemischer Prozess (DE-588)4147636-0 gnd Technische Sicherheit (DE-588)4059233-9 gnd Reaktionstechnik (DE-588)4136173-8 gnd Sicherheit (DE-588)4054790-5 gnd Chemieunfall (DE-588)4210039-2 gnd Chemieanlage (DE-588)4121084-0 gnd Chemische Verfahrenstechnik (DE-588)4069941-9 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4147636-0 (DE-588)4059233-9 (DE-588)4136173-8 (DE-588)4054790-5 (DE-588)4210039-2 (DE-588)4121084-0 (DE-588)4069941-9 (DE-588)4153616-2 |
| title | Chemical process safety learning from case histories |
| title_auth | Chemical process safety learning from case histories |
| title_exact_search | Chemical process safety learning from case histories |
| title_full | Chemical process safety learning from case histories Roy E. Sanders |
| title_fullStr | Chemical process safety learning from case histories Roy E. Sanders |
| title_full_unstemmed | Chemical process safety learning from case histories Roy E. Sanders |
| title_short | Chemical process safety |
| title_sort | chemical process safety learning from case histories |
| title_sub | learning from case histories |
| topic | Chemischer Prozess (DE-588)4147636-0 gnd Technische Sicherheit (DE-588)4059233-9 gnd Reaktionstechnik (DE-588)4136173-8 gnd Sicherheit (DE-588)4054790-5 gnd Chemieunfall (DE-588)4210039-2 gnd Chemieanlage (DE-588)4121084-0 gnd Chemische Verfahrenstechnik (DE-588)4069941-9 gnd |
| topic_facet | Chemischer Prozess Technische Sicherheit Reaktionstechnik Sicherheit Chemieunfall Chemieanlage Chemische Verfahrenstechnik Fallsammlung |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=028152399&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=028152399&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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