An introduction to the theory of mechanism design:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford
Oxford University Press
2015
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | XV, 246 Seiten Diagramme |
| ISBN: | 9780199734023 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | Titel: An introduction to the theory of mechanism design
Autor: Börgers, Tilman
Jahr: 2015
CONTENTS Preface xi Acknowledgments xv 1. Introduction 1 2. Screening 6 2.1. Introduction 6 2.2. Pricing a Single Indivisible Good 6 2.3. Nonlinear Pricing 18 2.4. Bundling 27 2.5. Remarks on the Literature 29 2.6. Problems 29 3. Bayesian Mechanism Design: Examples 31 3.1. Introduction 31 3.2. Single Unit Auctions 31 3.2.1. Setup 31 3.2.2. Mechanisms, Direct Mechanisms, and the Revelation Principle 33 3.2.3. Characterizing Incentive Compatibility and Individual Rationality 36 3.2.4. Expected Revenue Maximization 39 3.2.5. Welfare Maximization 42 3.2.6. Numerical Examples 43 3.3. Public Goods 45 3.3.1. Setup 45 3.3.2. Incentive-Compatible and Individually Rational Direct Mechanisms 46 3.3.3. Ex Ante and Ex Post Budget Balance 47 3.3.4. Welfare Maximization 50 3.3.5. Profit Maximization 57 3.3.6. A Numerical Example 58 3.4. Bilateral Trade 63 3.4.1. Setup 63 3.4.2. Direct Mechanisms 63 3.4.3. Welfare Maximization 65 Vll
viii Contents 3.4.4. Profit Maximization 72 3.4.5. A Numerical Example 73 3.5. Remarks on the Literature 74 3.6. Problems 75 4. Dominant Strategy Mechanisms: Examples 76 4.1. Introduction 76 4.2. Single Unit Auctions 78 4.2.1. Setup 78 4.2.2. Mechanisms, Direct Mechanisms, and the Revelation Principle 79 4.2.3. Characterizing Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility and Ex Post Individual Rationality 80 4.2.4. Canonical Auctions 81 4.3. Public Goods 84 4.3.1. Setup 84 4.3.2. Direct Mechanisms 85 4.3.3. Characterizing Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility and Ex Post Individual Rationality 85 4.3.4. Canonical Mechanisms 87 4.3.5. Ex Post Exact Budget Balance 88 4.4. Bilateral Trade 90 4.4.1. Setup 90 4.4.2. Dominant Strategy Incentive-Compatible and Ex Post Individually Rational Direct Mechanisms 90 4.4.3. Canonical Mechanisms 92 4.4.4. Ex Post Exact Budget Balance 92 4.5. Remarks on the Literature 93 4.6. Problems 93 5. Incentive Compatibility 95 5.1. Introduction 95 5.2. Setup 95 5.3. Weak Monotonicity 96 5.4. Cyclical Monotonicity 99 5.5. Cyclical Monotonicity When Outcomes Are Lotteries 102 5.6. One-Dimensional Type Spaces 103 5.7. Rich Type Spaces 108 5.8. Revenue Equivalence 109 5.9. Individual Rationality 110 5.10. Remarks on the Literature 111 5.11.Problems 111
ix Contents 6. Bayesian Mechanism Design 113 6.1. Introduction 113 6.2. Setup 114 6.3. Independent Types 116 6.4. Correlated Types 119 6.4.1. Framework 119 6.4.2. Failure of Revenue Equivalence 119 6.4.3. Characterizing Bayesian Incentive Compatibility 120 6.4.4. A Numerical Example 124 6.4.5. Individual Rationality and Budget Balance 126 6.4.6. Discussion 127 6.5. Remarks on the Literature 128 6.6. Problems 128 7. Dominant Strategy Mechanisms 130 7.1. Introduction 130 7.2. Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility 130 7.3. Implementing Efficient Decision Rules 132 7.4. Positive Association of Differences 134 7.5. Individual Rationality and Budget Balance 137 7.6. Remarks on the Literature 140 7.7. Problems 140 8. Nontransferrable Utility 141 8.1. Introduction 141 8.2. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem 142 8.2.1. Setup 142 8.2.2. Statement ofthe Result and Outline of the Proof 143 8.2.3. Every Monotone Direct Mechanism Is Dictatorial 146 8.3. Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility on Restricted Domains 149 8.4. Bayesian Incentive Compatibility 151 8.5. Remarks on the Literature 152 8.6. Problems 153 9. Informational Interdependence 155 9.1. Introduction 155 9.2. An Example 156 9.3. Impossibility of Implementing Welfare-Maximizing Decision Rules 158 9.4. Characterizing All Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms 161 9.5. Remarks on the Literature 163 9.6. Problems 163
x Contents 10. Robust Mechanism Design 164 10.1. Introduction 164 10.2. An Example 166 10.3. Modeling Incomplete Information 169 10.3.1. Hierarchies of Beliefs 170 10.3.2. Type Spaces 172 10.3.3. Common Prior Type Spaces 173 10.4. The Mechanism Designer’s Uncertainty 176 10.5. Mechanisms 177 10.6. Bayesian Equilibria and the Revelation Principle 178 10.7. What Can Be Implemented? 182 10.7.1. Belief Revelation 182 10.7.2. Betting 185 10.7.3. Equilibrium Outcomes and Payoff Types 188 10.8. Robust Mechanism Design with a Common Prior 189 10.9. Robust Mechanism Design without a Common Prior 191 10.9.1. The Mechanism Designer’s Objectives 191 10.9.2. Undominated Mechanisms 192 10.10. Conceptual Problems in the Quasi-Linear Case 193 10.11. Voting Revisited 195 10.12. Remarks on the Literature 201 10.13. Problems 203 11. Dynamic Mechanism Design 204 11.1. Introduction 204 11.2. Dynamic Private Information 205 11.2.1. Sequential Screening 205 11.2.2. The Role of Private Information 219 11.2.3. Sequential Mechanism Design 224 11.3. Dynamic Allocations 228 11.4. Remarks on the Literature 231 11.5. Problems 233 Notes 235 Bibliography 239 Index 245
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| spelling | Börgers, Tilman Verfasser (DE-588)17028221X aut An introduction to the theory of mechanism design Tilman Börgers Oxford Oxford University Press 2015 XV, 246 Seiten Diagramme txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Mechanismus-Design-Theorie (DE-588)7643554-4 gnd rswk-swf Auktionstheorie (DE-588)4732699-2 gnd rswk-swf Auktion (DE-588)4125859-9 gnd rswk-swf Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4151278-9 Einführung gnd-content Mechanismus-Design-Theorie (DE-588)7643554-4 s Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s Auktionstheorie (DE-588)4732699-2 s Auktion (DE-588)4125859-9 s DE-188 HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=028132022&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Börgers, Tilman An introduction to the theory of mechanism design Mechanismus-Design-Theorie (DE-588)7643554-4 gnd Auktionstheorie (DE-588)4732699-2 gnd Auktion (DE-588)4125859-9 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
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| title | An introduction to the theory of mechanism design |
| title_auth | An introduction to the theory of mechanism design |
| title_exact_search | An introduction to the theory of mechanism design |
| title_full | An introduction to the theory of mechanism design Tilman Börgers |
| title_fullStr | An introduction to the theory of mechanism design Tilman Börgers |
| title_full_unstemmed | An introduction to the theory of mechanism design Tilman Börgers |
| title_short | An introduction to the theory of mechanism design |
| title_sort | an introduction to the theory of mechanism design |
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