Veto players: how political institutions work
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Princeton
Princeton University Press
2003
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | DE-1043 DE-1046 DE-858 DE-Aug4 DE-859 DE-860 DE-473 DE-19 DE-739 Volltext |
| Beschreibung: | Erschien als E-Book 2011 Political scientists have long classified systems of government as parliamentary or presidential, two-party or multiparty, and so on. But such distinctions often fail to provide useful insights. For example, how are we to compare the United States, a presidential bicameral regime with two weak parties, to Denmark, a parliamentary unicameral regime with many strong parties? Veto Players advances an important, new understanding of how governments are structured. The real distinctions between political systems, contends George Tsebelis, are to be found in the extent to which they afford politica |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (XVII, 317 S.) graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 9781400831456 |
| DOI: | 10.1515/9781400831456 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1820137745550409728 |
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| author | Tsebelis, George 1952- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)17138685X |
| author_facet | Tsebelis, George 1952- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Tsebelis, George 1952- |
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| building | Verbundindex |
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| dewey-full | 320.3 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
| dewey-raw | 320.3 |
| dewey-search | 320.3 |
| dewey-sort | 3320.3 |
| dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
| discipline | Politologie |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1515/9781400831456 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| id | DE-604.BV042693181 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2025-01-02T11:50:18Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781400831456 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-028124800 |
| oclc_num | 769927128 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-859 DE-860 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-188 DE-Aug4 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-739 DE-1046 DE-1043 DE-858 |
| owner_facet | DE-859 DE-860 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-188 DE-Aug4 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-739 DE-1046 DE-1043 DE-858 |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (XVII, 317 S.) graph. Darst. |
| psigel | ZDB-23-DGG ZDB-23-DGG FAW_PDA_DGG ZDB-23-DGG FCO_PDA_DGG ZDB-23-DGG FHA_PDA_DGG ZDB-23-DGG FKE_PDA_DGG ZDB-23-DGG FLA_PDA_DGG ZDB-23-DGG UBG_PDA_DGG_Kauf17 ZDB-23-DGG UBM_PDA_DGG_Kauf21 ZDB-23-DGG UPA_PDA_DGG_Kauf |
| publishDate | 2003 |
| publishDateSearch | 2003 |
| publishDateSort | 2003 |
| publisher | Princeton University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Tsebelis, George 1952- Verfasser (DE-588)17138685X aut Veto players how political institutions work George Tsebelis Princeton Princeton University Press 2003 © 2003 1 Online-Ressource (XVII, 317 S.) graph. Darst. txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Erschien als E-Book 2011 Political scientists have long classified systems of government as parliamentary or presidential, two-party or multiparty, and so on. But such distinctions often fail to provide useful insights. For example, how are we to compare the United States, a presidential bicameral regime with two weak parties, to Denmark, a parliamentary unicameral regime with many strong parties? Veto Players advances an important, new understanding of how governments are structured. The real distinctions between political systems, contends George Tsebelis, are to be found in the extent to which they afford politica Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd rswk-swf Mitgliedsstaaten (DE-588)4170174-4 gnd rswk-swf Gesetzgebung (DE-588)4020682-8 gnd rswk-swf Politisches System (DE-588)4046584-6 gnd rswk-swf Regierung (DE-588)4049012-9 gnd rswk-swf Veto (DE-588)4342676-1 gnd rswk-swf Politische Institution (DE-588)4132693-3 gnd rswk-swf Institutionenökonomie (DE-588)4027208-4 gnd rswk-swf Entscheidungstheorie (DE-588)4138606-1 gnd rswk-swf Politische Entscheidung (DE-588)4046531-7 gnd rswk-swf Politische Institution (DE-588)4132693-3 s Entscheidungstheorie (DE-588)4138606-1 s DE-604 Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 b Mitgliedsstaaten (DE-588)4170174-4 s Regierung (DE-588)4049012-9 s Politische Entscheidung (DE-588)4046531-7 s 1\p DE-604 Veto (DE-588)4342676-1 s 2\p DE-604 Politisches System (DE-588)4046584-6 s 3\p DE-604 Institutionenökonomie (DE-588)4027208-4 s 4\p DE-604 Gesetzgebung (DE-588)4020682-8 s 5\p DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 978-0-691-09989-7 https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400831456 Verlag Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 3\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 4\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 5\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Tsebelis, George 1952- Veto players how political institutions work Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd Mitgliedsstaaten (DE-588)4170174-4 gnd Gesetzgebung (DE-588)4020682-8 gnd Politisches System (DE-588)4046584-6 gnd Regierung (DE-588)4049012-9 gnd Veto (DE-588)4342676-1 gnd Politische Institution (DE-588)4132693-3 gnd Institutionenökonomie (DE-588)4027208-4 gnd Entscheidungstheorie (DE-588)4138606-1 gnd Politische Entscheidung (DE-588)4046531-7 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)5098525-5 (DE-588)4170174-4 (DE-588)4020682-8 (DE-588)4046584-6 (DE-588)4049012-9 (DE-588)4342676-1 (DE-588)4132693-3 (DE-588)4027208-4 (DE-588)4138606-1 (DE-588)4046531-7 |
| title | Veto players how political institutions work |
| title_auth | Veto players how political institutions work |
| title_exact_search | Veto players how political institutions work |
| title_full | Veto players how political institutions work George Tsebelis |
| title_fullStr | Veto players how political institutions work George Tsebelis |
| title_full_unstemmed | Veto players how political institutions work George Tsebelis |
| title_short | Veto players |
| title_sort | veto players how political institutions work |
| title_sub | how political institutions work |
| topic | Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd Mitgliedsstaaten (DE-588)4170174-4 gnd Gesetzgebung (DE-588)4020682-8 gnd Politisches System (DE-588)4046584-6 gnd Regierung (DE-588)4049012-9 gnd Veto (DE-588)4342676-1 gnd Politische Institution (DE-588)4132693-3 gnd Institutionenökonomie (DE-588)4027208-4 gnd Entscheidungstheorie (DE-588)4138606-1 gnd Politische Entscheidung (DE-588)4046531-7 gnd |
| topic_facet | Europäische Union Mitgliedsstaaten Gesetzgebung Politisches System Regierung Veto Politische Institution Institutionenökonomie Entscheidungstheorie Politische Entscheidung |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400831456 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT tsebelisgeorge vetoplayershowpoliticalinstitutionswork |