Whatever happened to the Russian opposition?:
The eruption of popular protest in 2011 reflected the broader permanent clash between the legality, procedures and institutions associated with the constitutional state and the neopatrimonial features of the administrative regime. The popular movement sought to strengthen the constitutional state an...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
London
Chatham House
2014
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | The eruption of popular protest in 2011 reflected the broader permanent clash between the legality, procedures and institutions associated with the constitutional state and the neopatrimonial features of the administrative regime. The popular movement sought to strengthen the constitutional state and reduce the administrative interference of the regime, but with a fundamental division of views about the capacity of the Russian constitutional order for reform and renewal. The regime response balanced repression with concession. On the one side, a range of repressive legislation was adopted and the 'Bolotnaya' protesters faced prosecution and defamation in the media. On the other side, registration of political parties and the procedure to get onto the ballot paper were made easier. This stimulated a great deal of grassroots activity and there were clear incentives to participate in elections, especially at the municipal level. The Ukrainian crisis has intensified regime insecurities and the hard-liners have intensified vigilance to interdict what they see as Western-supported 'democracy promotion' measures designed to achieve regime change. In this context, hard-line opposition will only encourage the hard-liners within the regime, whereas an alliance of regime soft-liners and the 'constructive' opposition offers Russia a unique opportunity for evolutionary change |
| Beschreibung: | "May 2014"--Cover Includes bibliographical references |
| Beschreibung: | 19 S. |
Internformat
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| 500 | |a Includes bibliographical references | ||
| 520 | |a The eruption of popular protest in 2011 reflected the broader permanent clash between the legality, procedures and institutions associated with the constitutional state and the neopatrimonial features of the administrative regime. The popular movement sought to strengthen the constitutional state and reduce the administrative interference of the regime, but with a fundamental division of views about the capacity of the Russian constitutional order for reform and renewal. The regime response balanced repression with concession. On the one side, a range of repressive legislation was adopted and the 'Bolotnaya' protesters faced prosecution and defamation in the media. On the other side, registration of political parties and the procedure to get onto the ballot paper were made easier. This stimulated a great deal of grassroots activity and there were clear incentives to participate in elections, especially at the municipal level. The Ukrainian crisis has intensified regime insecurities and the hard-liners have intensified vigilance to interdict what they see as Western-supported 'democracy promotion' measures designed to achieve regime change. In this context, hard-line opposition will only encourage the hard-liners within the regime, whereas an alliance of regime soft-liners and the 'constructive' opposition offers Russia a unique opportunity for evolutionary change | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Sakwa, Richard 1953- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)13407565X |
| author_facet | Sakwa, Richard 1953- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Sakwa, Richard 1953- |
| author_variant | r s rs |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV042606957 |
| collection | ebook |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)912073868 (DE-599)BVBBV042606957 |
| format | Book |
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| geographic | Russia (Federation) / Politics and government / 21st century |
| geographic_facet | Russia (Federation) / Politics and government / 21st century |
| id | DE-604.BV042606957 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:05:46Z |
| institution | BVB |
| institution_GND | (DE-588)35736-4 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-028039911 |
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| physical | 19 S. |
| psigel | ebook |
| publishDate | 2014 |
| publishDateSearch | 2014 |
| publishDateSort | 2014 |
| publisher | Chatham House |
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| spelling | Sakwa, Richard 1953- Verfasser (DE-588)13407565X aut Whatever happened to the Russian opposition? Richard Sakwa London Chatham House 2014 19 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier "May 2014"--Cover Includes bibliographical references The eruption of popular protest in 2011 reflected the broader permanent clash between the legality, procedures and institutions associated with the constitutional state and the neopatrimonial features of the administrative regime. The popular movement sought to strengthen the constitutional state and reduce the administrative interference of the regime, but with a fundamental division of views about the capacity of the Russian constitutional order for reform and renewal. The regime response balanced repression with concession. On the one side, a range of repressive legislation was adopted and the 'Bolotnaya' protesters faced prosecution and defamation in the media. On the other side, registration of political parties and the procedure to get onto the ballot paper were made easier. This stimulated a great deal of grassroots activity and there were clear incentives to participate in elections, especially at the municipal level. The Ukrainian crisis has intensified regime insecurities and the hard-liners have intensified vigilance to interdict what they see as Western-supported 'democracy promotion' measures designed to achieve regime change. In this context, hard-line opposition will only encourage the hard-liners within the regime, whereas an alliance of regime soft-liners and the 'constructive' opposition offers Russia a unique opportunity for evolutionary change Opposition (Political science) / Russia (Federation) Protest movements / Russia (Federation) Politik Russia (Federation) / Politics and government / 21st century Royal Institute of International Affairs Sonstige (DE-588)35736-4 oth http://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/whatever-happened-russian-opposition Verlag kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Sakwa, Richard 1953- Whatever happened to the Russian opposition? Opposition (Political science) / Russia (Federation) Protest movements / Russia (Federation) Politik |
| title | Whatever happened to the Russian opposition? |
| title_auth | Whatever happened to the Russian opposition? |
| title_exact_search | Whatever happened to the Russian opposition? |
| title_full | Whatever happened to the Russian opposition? Richard Sakwa |
| title_fullStr | Whatever happened to the Russian opposition? Richard Sakwa |
| title_full_unstemmed | Whatever happened to the Russian opposition? Richard Sakwa |
| title_short | Whatever happened to the Russian opposition? |
| title_sort | whatever happened to the russian opposition |
| topic | Opposition (Political science) / Russia (Federation) Protest movements / Russia (Federation) Politik |
| topic_facet | Opposition (Political science) / Russia (Federation) Protest movements / Russia (Federation) Politik Russia (Federation) / Politics and government / 21st century |
| url | http://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/whatever-happened-russian-opposition |
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