Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Princeton, N.J.
Princeton University Press
[1992]
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | FAB01 FAW01 FCO01 FHA01 FKE01 FLA01 UBG01 UPA01 Volltext |
| Beschreibung: | If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod--Steve Weber argues that although nations employ many different types of strategies broadly consistent with game theory's "tit for tat," only strategies based on an ideal type of "enhanced contingent restraint" promoted cooperation in U.S.-Soviet arms control. As a theoretical analysis of the basic security behaviors of states, the book has implications that go beyond the three bilateral arms control cases Weber discusses--implications that remain important despite the end of superpower rivalry. "An important theoretical analysis of cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the area of arms control... An excellent work on a subject that has received very little attention."--ChoiceOriginally published in 1992.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905 |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (350p.) |
| ISBN: | 9781400862436 |
| DOI: | 10.1515/9781400862436 |
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| 500 | |a If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod--Steve Weber argues that although nations employ many different types of strategies broadly consistent with game theory's "tit for tat," only strategies based on an ideal type of "enhanced contingent restraint" promoted cooperation in U.S.-Soviet arms control. As a theoretical analysis of the basic security behaviors of states, the book has implications that go beyond the three bilateral arms control cases Weber discusses--implications that remain important despite the end of superpower rivalry. "An important theoretical analysis of cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the area of arms control... An excellent work on a subject that has received very little attention."--ChoiceOriginally published in 1992.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905 | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| dewey-search | 327.1/74 |
| dewey-sort | 3327.1 274 |
| dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
| discipline | Politologie |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1515/9781400862436 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| spelling | Weber, Steve Verfasser aut Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Steve Weber Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press [1992] 1 Online-Ressource (350p.) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod--Steve Weber argues that although nations employ many different types of strategies broadly consistent with game theory's "tit for tat," only strategies based on an ideal type of "enhanced contingent restraint" promoted cooperation in U.S.-Soviet arms control. As a theoretical analysis of the basic security behaviors of states, the book has implications that go beyond the three bilateral arms control cases Weber discusses--implications that remain important despite the end of superpower rivalry. "An important theoretical analysis of cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the area of arms control... An excellent work on a subject that has received very little attention."--ChoiceOriginally published in 1992.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905 In English Politik Nuclear arms control / United States Nuclear arms control / Soviet Union Strategic forces / United States Strategic forces / Soviet Union Game theory POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General bisacsh Nuclear arms control Strategic forces Internationaler Konflikt (DE-588)4162071-9 gnd rswk-swf Internationale Kooperation (DE-588)4120503-0 gnd rswk-swf Rüstungsbegrenzung (DE-588)4115804-0 gnd rswk-swf Sowjetunion USA USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf Sowjetunion (DE-588)4077548-3 gnd rswk-swf Sowjetunion (DE-588)4077548-3 g Rüstungsbegrenzung (DE-588)4115804-0 s USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g 1\p DE-604 Internationaler Konflikt (DE-588)4162071-9 s 2\p DE-604 Internationale Kooperation (DE-588)4120503-0 s 3\p DE-604 https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400862436 Verlag Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 3\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Weber, Steve Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Politik Nuclear arms control / United States Nuclear arms control / Soviet Union Strategic forces / United States Strategic forces / Soviet Union Game theory POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General bisacsh Nuclear arms control Strategic forces Internationaler Konflikt (DE-588)4162071-9 gnd Internationale Kooperation (DE-588)4120503-0 gnd Rüstungsbegrenzung (DE-588)4115804-0 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4162071-9 (DE-588)4120503-0 (DE-588)4115804-0 (DE-588)4078704-7 (DE-588)4077548-3 |
| title | Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control |
| title_auth | Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control |
| title_exact_search | Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control |
| title_full | Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Steve Weber |
| title_fullStr | Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Steve Weber |
| title_full_unstemmed | Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Steve Weber |
| title_short | Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control |
| title_sort | cooperation and discord in u s soviet arms control |
| topic | Politik Nuclear arms control / United States Nuclear arms control / Soviet Union Strategic forces / United States Strategic forces / Soviet Union Game theory POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General bisacsh Nuclear arms control Strategic forces Internationaler Konflikt (DE-588)4162071-9 gnd Internationale Kooperation (DE-588)4120503-0 gnd Rüstungsbegrenzung (DE-588)4115804-0 gnd |
| topic_facet | Politik Nuclear arms control / United States Nuclear arms control / Soviet Union Strategic forces / United States Strategic forces / Soviet Union Game theory POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General Nuclear arms control Strategic forces Internationaler Konflikt Internationale Kooperation Rüstungsbegrenzung Sowjetunion USA |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400862436 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT webersteve cooperationanddiscordinussovietarmscontrol |