Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Princeton, N.J.
Princeton University Press
2007
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | FAB01 FAW01 FCO01 FHA01 FKE01 FLA01 UBG01 UPA01 Volltext Volltext |
| Beschreibung: | Biographical note: TomzMichael: Michael Tomz is assistant professor of political science at Stanford University Main description: How does cooperation emerge in a condition of international anarchy? Michael Tomz sheds new light on this fundamental question through a study of international debt across three centuries. Tomz develops a reputational theory of cooperation between sovereign governments and foreign investors. He explains how governments acquire reputations in the eyes of investors, and argues that concerns about reputation sustain international lending and repayment. Tomz's theory generates novel predictions about the dynamics of cooperation: how investors treat first-time borrowers, how access to credit evolves as debtors become more seasoned, and how countries ascend and descend the reputational ladder by acting contrary to investors' expectations. Tomz systematically tests his theory and the leading alternatives across three centuries of financial history. His remarkable data, gathered from archives in nine countries, cover all sovereign borrowers. He deftly combines statistical methods, case studies, and content analysis to scrutinize theories from as many angles as possible. Tomz finds strong support for his reputational theory while challenging prevailing views about sovereign debt. His pathbreaking study shows that, across the centuries, reputations have guided lending and repayment in consistent ways. Moreover, Tomz uncovers surprisingly little evidence of punitive enforcement strategies. Creditors have not compelled borrowers to repay by threatening military retaliation, imposing trade sanctions, or colluding to deprive defaulters of future loans. He concludes by highlighting the implications of his reputational logic for areas beyond sovereign debt, further advancing our understanding of the puzzle of cooperation under anarchy |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (328 S.) |
| ISBN: | 9781400842926 |
| DOI: | 10.1515/9781400842926 |
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| indexdate | 2024-07-10T01:24:02Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781400842926 |
| language | English |
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| publisher | Princeton University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Tomz, Michael Verfasser aut Reputation and International Cooperation Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press 2007 1 Online-Ressource (328 S.) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Biographical note: TomzMichael: Michael Tomz is assistant professor of political science at Stanford University Main description: How does cooperation emerge in a condition of international anarchy? Michael Tomz sheds new light on this fundamental question through a study of international debt across three centuries. Tomz develops a reputational theory of cooperation between sovereign governments and foreign investors. He explains how governments acquire reputations in the eyes of investors, and argues that concerns about reputation sustain international lending and repayment. Tomz's theory generates novel predictions about the dynamics of cooperation: how investors treat first-time borrowers, how access to credit evolves as debtors become more seasoned, and how countries ascend and descend the reputational ladder by acting contrary to investors' expectations. Tomz systematically tests his theory and the leading alternatives across three centuries of financial history. His remarkable data, gathered from archives in nine countries, cover all sovereign borrowers. He deftly combines statistical methods, case studies, and content analysis to scrutinize theories from as many angles as possible. Tomz finds strong support for his reputational theory while challenging prevailing views about sovereign debt. His pathbreaking study shows that, across the centuries, reputations have guided lending and repayment in consistent ways. Moreover, Tomz uncovers surprisingly little evidence of punitive enforcement strategies. Creditors have not compelled borrowers to repay by threatening military retaliation, imposing trade sanctions, or colluding to deprive defaulters of future loans. He concludes by highlighting the implications of his reputational logic for areas beyond sovereign debt, further advancing our understanding of the puzzle of cooperation under anarchy Geschichte gnd rswk-swf Internationale Kooperation (DE-588)4120503-0 gnd rswk-swf Auslandsschulden (DE-588)4003783-6 gnd rswk-swf Gläubiger (DE-588)4021126-5 gnd rswk-swf Prestige (DE-588)4076334-1 gnd rswk-swf Schuldner (DE-588)4053466-2 gnd rswk-swf Schuldverhältnis (DE-588)4116425-8 gnd rswk-swf Öffentliche Schulden (DE-588)4043153-8 gnd rswk-swf Öffentliche Schulden (DE-588)4043153-8 s Schuldverhältnis (DE-588)4116425-8 s Prestige (DE-588)4076334-1 s Internationale Kooperation (DE-588)4120503-0 s Geschichte z 1\p DE-604 Schuldner (DE-588)4053466-2 s Gläubiger (DE-588)4021126-5 s 2\p DE-604 Auslandsschulden (DE-588)4003783-6 s 3\p DE-604 https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400842926 Verlag Volltext http://www.degruyter.com/search?f_0=isbnissn&q_0=9781400842926&searchTitles=true Verlag Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 3\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Tomz, Michael Reputation and International Cooperation Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries Internationale Kooperation (DE-588)4120503-0 gnd Auslandsschulden (DE-588)4003783-6 gnd Gläubiger (DE-588)4021126-5 gnd Prestige (DE-588)4076334-1 gnd Schuldner (DE-588)4053466-2 gnd Schuldverhältnis (DE-588)4116425-8 gnd Öffentliche Schulden (DE-588)4043153-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4120503-0 (DE-588)4003783-6 (DE-588)4021126-5 (DE-588)4076334-1 (DE-588)4053466-2 (DE-588)4116425-8 (DE-588)4043153-8 |
| title | Reputation and International Cooperation Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries |
| title_auth | Reputation and International Cooperation Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries |
| title_exact_search | Reputation and International Cooperation Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries |
| title_full | Reputation and International Cooperation Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries |
| title_fullStr | Reputation and International Cooperation Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries |
| title_full_unstemmed | Reputation and International Cooperation Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries |
| title_short | Reputation and International Cooperation |
| title_sort | reputation and international cooperation sovereign debt across three centuries |
| title_sub | Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries |
| topic | Internationale Kooperation (DE-588)4120503-0 gnd Auslandsschulden (DE-588)4003783-6 gnd Gläubiger (DE-588)4021126-5 gnd Prestige (DE-588)4076334-1 gnd Schuldner (DE-588)4053466-2 gnd Schuldverhältnis (DE-588)4116425-8 gnd Öffentliche Schulden (DE-588)4043153-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Internationale Kooperation Auslandsschulden Gläubiger Prestige Schuldner Schuldverhältnis Öffentliche Schulden |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400842926 http://www.degruyter.com/search?f_0=isbnissn&q_0=9781400842926&searchTitles=true |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT tomzmichael reputationandinternationalcooperationsovereigndebtacrossthreecenturies |