Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Princeton, N.J.
Princeton University Press
2007
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| Schriftenreihe: | The Gorman Lectures in Economics
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext Volltext |
| Beschreibung: | Biographical note: DixitAvinash K.: Avinash K. Dixit is John J. F. Sherrerd ’52 University Professor of Economics at Princeton University. He is the author or coauthor of nine books, including "Investment under Uncertainty" (Princeton), "Thinking Strategically" (Norton), "Games of Strategy" (Norton), and "The Making of Economic Policy" (MIT) Main description: How can property rights be protected and contracts be enforced in countries where the rule of law is ineffective or absent? How can firms from advanced market economies do business in such circumstances? In Lawlessness and Economics, Avinash Dixit examines the theory of private institutions that transcend or supplement weak economic governance from the state. In much of the world and through much of history, private mechanisms--such as long-term relationships, arbitration, social networks to disseminate information and norms to impose sanctions, and for-profit enforcement services--have grown up in place of formal, state-governed institutions. Even in countries with strong legal systems, many of these mechanisms continue under the shadow of the law. Numerous case studies and empirical investigations have demonstrated the variety, importance, and merits, and drawbacks of such institutions. This book builds on these studies and constructs a toolkit of theoretical models to analyze them. The models shed new conceptual light on the different modes of governance, and deepen our understanding of the interaction of the alternative institutions with each other and with the government's law. For example, one model explains the limit on the size of social networks and illuminates problems in the transition to more formal legal systems as economies grow beyond this limit. Other models explain why for-profit enforcement is inefficient. The models also help us understand why state law dovetails with some non-state institutions and collides with others. This can help less-developed countries and transition economies devise better processes for the introduction or reform of their formal legal systems |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (184 S.) |
| ISBN: | 9781400841370 |
| DOI: | 10.1515/9781400841370 |
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| indexdate | 2024-07-10T01:24:02Z |
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| isbn | 9781400841370 |
| language | English |
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| record_format | marc |
| series2 | The Gorman Lectures in Economics |
| spelling | Dixit, Avinash K. Verfasser aut Lawlessness and Economics Alternative Modes of Governance Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press 2007 1 Online-Ressource (184 S.) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier The Gorman Lectures in Economics Biographical note: DixitAvinash K.: Avinash K. Dixit is John J. F. Sherrerd ’52 University Professor of Economics at Princeton University. He is the author or coauthor of nine books, including "Investment under Uncertainty" (Princeton), "Thinking Strategically" (Norton), "Games of Strategy" (Norton), and "The Making of Economic Policy" (MIT) Main description: How can property rights be protected and contracts be enforced in countries where the rule of law is ineffective or absent? How can firms from advanced market economies do business in such circumstances? In Lawlessness and Economics, Avinash Dixit examines the theory of private institutions that transcend or supplement weak economic governance from the state. In much of the world and through much of history, private mechanisms--such as long-term relationships, arbitration, social networks to disseminate information and norms to impose sanctions, and for-profit enforcement services--have grown up in place of formal, state-governed institutions. Even in countries with strong legal systems, many of these mechanisms continue under the shadow of the law. Numerous case studies and empirical investigations have demonstrated the variety, importance, and merits, and drawbacks of such institutions. This book builds on these studies and constructs a toolkit of theoretical models to analyze them. The models shed new conceptual light on the different modes of governance, and deepen our understanding of the interaction of the alternative institutions with each other and with the government's law. For example, one model explains the limit on the size of social networks and illuminates problems in the transition to more formal legal systems as economies grow beyond this limit. Other models explain why for-profit enforcement is inefficient. The models also help us understand why state law dovetails with some non-state institutions and collides with others. This can help less-developed countries and transition economies devise better processes for the introduction or reform of their formal legal systems Rechtssystem (DE-588)4139924-9 gnd rswk-swf Wirtschaft (DE-588)4066399-1 gnd rswk-swf Wirtschaftssystem (DE-588)4117663-7 gnd rswk-swf Eigentumsschutz (DE-588)4013798-3 gnd rswk-swf Rechtsstaat (DE-588)4129195-5 gnd rswk-swf Property-Rights-Ansatz (DE-588)4047479-3 gnd rswk-swf Vertragsrecht (DE-588)4063283-0 gnd rswk-swf Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd rswk-swf Ökonomische Theorie der Politik (DE-588)4043214-2 gnd rswk-swf Unternehmensrecht (DE-588)4078611-0 gnd rswk-swf Ökonomische Theorie des Rechts (DE-588)4135492-8 gnd rswk-swf Governance (DE-588)4639012-1 gnd rswk-swf Entwicklungsländer (DE-588)4014954-7 gnd rswk-swf Entwicklungsländer (DE-588)4014954-7 g Eigentumsschutz (DE-588)4013798-3 s Vertragsrecht (DE-588)4063283-0 s Unternehmensrecht (DE-588)4078611-0 s Wirtschaft (DE-588)4066399-1 s Governance (DE-588)4639012-1 s 1\p DE-604 Wirtschaftssystem (DE-588)4117663-7 s Property-Rights-Ansatz (DE-588)4047479-3 s Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 s Rechtssystem (DE-588)4139924-9 s 2\p DE-604 Rechtsstaat (DE-588)4129195-5 s 3\p DE-604 Ökonomische Theorie des Rechts (DE-588)4135492-8 s 4\p DE-604 Ökonomische Theorie der Politik (DE-588)4043214-2 s 5\p DE-604 https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400841370 Verlag Volltext http://www.degruyter.com/search?f_0=isbnissn&q_0=9781400841370&searchTitles=true Verlag Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 3\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 4\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 5\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Dixit, Avinash K. Lawlessness and Economics Alternative Modes of Governance Rechtssystem (DE-588)4139924-9 gnd Wirtschaft (DE-588)4066399-1 gnd Wirtschaftssystem (DE-588)4117663-7 gnd Eigentumsschutz (DE-588)4013798-3 gnd Rechtsstaat (DE-588)4129195-5 gnd Property-Rights-Ansatz (DE-588)4047479-3 gnd Vertragsrecht (DE-588)4063283-0 gnd Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd Ökonomische Theorie der Politik (DE-588)4043214-2 gnd Unternehmensrecht (DE-588)4078611-0 gnd Ökonomische Theorie des Rechts (DE-588)4135492-8 gnd Governance (DE-588)4639012-1 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4139924-9 (DE-588)4066399-1 (DE-588)4117663-7 (DE-588)4013798-3 (DE-588)4129195-5 (DE-588)4047479-3 (DE-588)4063283-0 (DE-588)4126353-4 (DE-588)4043214-2 (DE-588)4078611-0 (DE-588)4135492-8 (DE-588)4639012-1 (DE-588)4014954-7 |
| title | Lawlessness and Economics Alternative Modes of Governance |
| title_auth | Lawlessness and Economics Alternative Modes of Governance |
| title_exact_search | Lawlessness and Economics Alternative Modes of Governance |
| title_full | Lawlessness and Economics Alternative Modes of Governance |
| title_fullStr | Lawlessness and Economics Alternative Modes of Governance |
| title_full_unstemmed | Lawlessness and Economics Alternative Modes of Governance |
| title_short | Lawlessness and Economics |
| title_sort | lawlessness and economics alternative modes of governance |
| title_sub | Alternative Modes of Governance |
| topic | Rechtssystem (DE-588)4139924-9 gnd Wirtschaft (DE-588)4066399-1 gnd Wirtschaftssystem (DE-588)4117663-7 gnd Eigentumsschutz (DE-588)4013798-3 gnd Rechtsstaat (DE-588)4129195-5 gnd Property-Rights-Ansatz (DE-588)4047479-3 gnd Vertragsrecht (DE-588)4063283-0 gnd Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd Ökonomische Theorie der Politik (DE-588)4043214-2 gnd Unternehmensrecht (DE-588)4078611-0 gnd Ökonomische Theorie des Rechts (DE-588)4135492-8 gnd Governance (DE-588)4639012-1 gnd |
| topic_facet | Rechtssystem Wirtschaft Wirtschaftssystem Eigentumsschutz Rechtsstaat Property-Rights-Ansatz Vertragsrecht Agency-Theorie Ökonomische Theorie der Politik Unternehmensrecht Ökonomische Theorie des Rechts Governance Entwicklungsländer |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400841370 http://www.degruyter.com/search?f_0=isbnissn&q_0=9781400841370&searchTitles=true |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT dixitavinashk lawlessnessandeconomicsalternativemodesofgovernance |