Abused Rebels and Winning Coalitions: Regime Change under the Pressure of Rebellions
We hypothesize that, in certain regime types, winning coalitions have an incentive for helping a deprived population solving the collective action problem that may otherwise restrain them in revolting against an incumbent. Recent selectorate literature holds that members of a winning coalition may f...
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
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Münster
CIW
2015
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| Schriftenreihe: | Diskussionspapier / Centrum für Interdisziplinäre Wirtschaftsforschung
2015,1 |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | We hypothesize that, in certain regime types, winning coalitions have an incentive for helping a deprived population solving the collective action problem that may otherwise restrain them in revolting against an incumbent. Recent selectorate literature holds that members of a winning coalition may find themselves in a loyalty trap after having realized a bad character of an incumbent. According to our hypothesis, the winning coalition's members can find a way out of the loyalty trap by influencing expectations within the population in a way as to spark a public rebellion. A thus induced rebellion raises the chance of each of the winning coalition's members for preserving their position in a newly formed winning coalition following a regime change. Hence, the very regime structure that makes a loyalty trap more probably is identical to a regime structure under which we should expect a higher vulnerability to public rebellions. |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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| spelling | Apolte, Thomas 1960- Verfasser (DE-588)120912236 aut Abused Rebels and Winning Coalitions Regime Change under the Pressure of Rebellions Thomas Apolte Münster CIW 2015 1 Online-Ressource txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Diskussionspapier / Centrum für Interdisziplinäre Wirtschaftsforschung 2015,1 We hypothesize that, in certain regime types, winning coalitions have an incentive for helping a deprived population solving the collective action problem that may otherwise restrain them in revolting against an incumbent. Recent selectorate literature holds that members of a winning coalition may find themselves in a loyalty trap after having realized a bad character of an incumbent. According to our hypothesis, the winning coalition's members can find a way out of the loyalty trap by influencing expectations within the population in a way as to spark a public rebellion. A thus induced rebellion raises the chance of each of the winning coalition's members for preserving their position in a newly formed winning coalition following a regime change. Hence, the very regime structure that makes a loyalty trap more probably is identical to a regime structure under which we should expect a higher vulnerability to public rebellions. Centrum für Interdisziplinäre Wirtschaftsforschung Diskussionspapier 2015,1 (DE-604)BV037441536 2015,1 https://www.wiwi.uni-muenster.de/ciw/sites/ciw/files/dp-ciw_01_2015n.pdf Verlag kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Apolte, Thomas 1960- Abused Rebels and Winning Coalitions Regime Change under the Pressure of Rebellions |
| title | Abused Rebels and Winning Coalitions Regime Change under the Pressure of Rebellions |
| title_auth | Abused Rebels and Winning Coalitions Regime Change under the Pressure of Rebellions |
| title_exact_search | Abused Rebels and Winning Coalitions Regime Change under the Pressure of Rebellions |
| title_full | Abused Rebels and Winning Coalitions Regime Change under the Pressure of Rebellions Thomas Apolte |
| title_fullStr | Abused Rebels and Winning Coalitions Regime Change under the Pressure of Rebellions Thomas Apolte |
| title_full_unstemmed | Abused Rebels and Winning Coalitions Regime Change under the Pressure of Rebellions Thomas Apolte |
| title_short | Abused Rebels and Winning Coalitions |
| title_sort | abused rebels and winning coalitions regime change under the pressure of rebellions |
| title_sub | Regime Change under the Pressure of Rebellions |
| url | https://www.wiwi.uni-muenster.de/ciw/sites/ciw/files/dp-ciw_01_2015n.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV037441536 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT apoltethomas abusedrebelsandwinningcoalitionsregimechangeunderthepressureofrebellions |