Advances in Mathematical Economics:
Gespeichert in:
| Weitere Verfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Tokyo
Springer Japan
2000
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Advances in Mathematical Economics
2 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Beschreibung: | Einzelaufnahme eines Zeitschriftenhefts The role of asymmetric information in allocation of resources, together with the associated information-revelation process, has long been a central focus of economic research. While the bulk of the literature addresses these issues within the framework of principal-agent relationship, which essentially reduces the problem to the sole principal's (the sole Stackelberg leader's) optimization problem subject to the agents' (the Stackelberg followers') responses, there are recent attempts to extend analysis to other economic setups characterized by different relationships among decision-makers. A notable strand of such attempts is the core analysis of incomplete information. Here, there is no Stackelberg-type relationship, and more importantly the players can talk to each other for coordinated choice of strategies. See, e.g., Wilson (1978) for a pioneering work; Yannelis (1991) for formulation of feasibility of a strategy as its measurability; Ichiishi and Idzik (1996) for introduction of Bayesian incentive-compatibility to this strand; Ichiishi, Idzik and Zhao (1994) for information revelation (that is, endogenous determination of updated information structures); Ichiishi and Radner (1997) and Ichiishi and Sertel (1998) for studies of a specific model of Chandler's firm in multidivisional form for sharper results; and Vohra (1999) for a recent work. It is a common postulate in these works that every player takes part in design of a mechanism and also in execution of the signed contract |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (V, 164 p) |
| ISBN: | 9784431679097 9784431659334 |
| ISSN: | 1866-2226 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-4-431-67909-7 |
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| 500 | |a Einzelaufnahme eines Zeitschriftenhefts | ||
| 500 | |a The role of asymmetric information in allocation of resources, together with the associated information-revelation process, has long been a central focus of economic research. While the bulk of the literature addresses these issues within the framework of principal-agent relationship, which essentially reduces the problem to the sole principal's (the sole Stackelberg leader's) optimization problem subject to the agents' (the Stackelberg followers') responses, there are recent attempts to extend analysis to other economic setups characterized by different relationships among decision-makers. A notable strand of such attempts is the core analysis of incomplete information. Here, there is no Stackelberg-type relationship, and more importantly the players can talk to each other for coordinated choice of strategies. See, e.g., Wilson (1978) for a pioneering work; Yannelis (1991) for formulation of feasibility of a strategy as its measurability; Ichiishi and Idzik (1996) for introduction of Bayesian incentive-compatibility to this strand; Ichiishi, Idzik and Zhao (1994) for information revelation (that is, endogenous determination of updated information structures); Ichiishi and Radner (1997) and Ichiishi and Sertel (1998) for studies of a specific model of Chandler's firm in multidivisional form for sharper results; and Vohra (1999) for a recent work. It is a common postulate in these works that every player takes part in design of a mechanism and also in execution of the signed contract | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| dewey-full | 330.1 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 330 - Economics |
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| dewey-search | 330.1 |
| dewey-sort | 3330.1 |
| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Mathematik Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/978-4-431-67909-7 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| id | DE-604.BV042423599 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T01:21:13Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9784431679097 9784431659334 |
| issn | 1866-2226 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-027859016 |
| oclc_num | 864101493 |
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| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (V, 164 p) |
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| publishDate | 2000 |
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| publisher | Springer Japan |
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| series2 | Advances in Mathematical Economics |
| spelling | Advances in Mathematical Economics edited by Shigeo Kusuoka, Toru Maruyama Tokyo Springer Japan 2000 1 Online-Ressource (V, 164 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Advances in Mathematical Economics 2 1866-2226 Einzelaufnahme eines Zeitschriftenhefts The role of asymmetric information in allocation of resources, together with the associated information-revelation process, has long been a central focus of economic research. While the bulk of the literature addresses these issues within the framework of principal-agent relationship, which essentially reduces the problem to the sole principal's (the sole Stackelberg leader's) optimization problem subject to the agents' (the Stackelberg followers') responses, there are recent attempts to extend analysis to other economic setups characterized by different relationships among decision-makers. A notable strand of such attempts is the core analysis of incomplete information. Here, there is no Stackelberg-type relationship, and more importantly the players can talk to each other for coordinated choice of strategies. See, e.g., Wilson (1978) for a pioneering work; Yannelis (1991) for formulation of feasibility of a strategy as its measurability; Ichiishi and Idzik (1996) for introduction of Bayesian incentive-compatibility to this strand; Ichiishi, Idzik and Zhao (1994) for information revelation (that is, endogenous determination of updated information structures); Ichiishi and Radner (1997) and Ichiishi and Sertel (1998) for studies of a specific model of Chandler's firm in multidivisional form for sharper results; and Vohra (1999) for a recent work. It is a common postulate in these works that every player takes part in design of a mechanism and also in execution of the signed contract Economics Finance Economics/Management Science Economic Theory Quantitative Finance Management Wirtschaft Kusuoka, Shigeo edt Maruyama, Toru edt https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-67909-7 Verlag Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Advances in Mathematical Economics Economics Finance Economics/Management Science Economic Theory Quantitative Finance Management Wirtschaft |
| title | Advances in Mathematical Economics |
| title_auth | Advances in Mathematical Economics |
| title_exact_search | Advances in Mathematical Economics |
| title_full | Advances in Mathematical Economics edited by Shigeo Kusuoka, Toru Maruyama |
| title_fullStr | Advances in Mathematical Economics edited by Shigeo Kusuoka, Toru Maruyama |
| title_full_unstemmed | Advances in Mathematical Economics edited by Shigeo Kusuoka, Toru Maruyama |
| title_short | Advances in Mathematical Economics |
| title_sort | advances in mathematical economics |
| topic | Economics Finance Economics/Management Science Economic Theory Quantitative Finance Management Wirtschaft |
| topic_facet | Economics Finance Economics/Management Science Economic Theory Quantitative Finance Management Wirtschaft |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-67909-7 |
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