Game Equilibrium Models I: Evolution and Game Dynamics
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Berlin, Heidelberg
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
1991
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Beschreibung: | There are two main approaches towards the phenotypic analysis of frequency dependent natural selection. First, there is the approach of evolutionary game theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not modeled explicitly. Instead, the selective forces acting within a population are represented by a fitness function, which is then analysed according to the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. Later on, the static approach of evolutionary game theory has been complemented by a dynamic stability analysis of the replicator equations. Introduced by Peter D. Taylor and Leo B. Jonker in 1978, these equations specify a class of dynamical systems, which provide a simple dynamic description of a selection process. Usually, the investigation of the replicator dynamics centers around a stability analysis of their stationary solutions. Although evolutionary stability and dynamic stability both intend to characterize the long-term outcome of frequency dependent selection, these concepts differ considerably in the 'philosophies' on which they are based. It is therefore not too surprising that they often lead to quite different evolutionary predictions (see, e. g. , Weissing 1983). The present paper intends to illustrate the incongruities between the two approaches towards a phenotypic theory of natural selection. A detailed game theoretical and dynamical analysis is given for a generic class of evolutionary normal form games |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (IX, 330 p) |
| ISBN: | 9783662026748 9783642081088 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-662-02674-8 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a2200000zc 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV042423208 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20160901 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 150317s1991 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 9783662026748 |c Online |9 978-3-662-02674-8 | ||
| 020 | |a 9783642081088 |c Print |9 978-3-642-08108-8 | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1007/978-3-662-02674-8 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)864082111 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV042423208 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e aacr | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-384 |a DE-703 |a DE-91 |a DE-634 | ||
| 082 | 0 | |a 519.2 |2 23 | |
| 084 | |a MAT 000 |2 stub | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Selten, Reinhard |d 1930-2016 |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)119479273 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Game Equilibrium Models I |b Evolution and Game Dynamics |c edited by Reinhard Selten |
| 264 | 1 | |a Berlin, Heidelberg |b Springer Berlin Heidelberg |c 1991 | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (IX, 330 p) | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a There are two main approaches towards the phenotypic analysis of frequency dependent natural selection. First, there is the approach of evolutionary game theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not modeled explicitly. Instead, the selective forces acting within a population are represented by a fitness function, which is then analysed according to the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. Later on, the static approach of evolutionary game theory has been complemented by a dynamic stability analysis of the replicator equations. Introduced by Peter D. Taylor and Leo B. Jonker in 1978, these equations specify a class of dynamical systems, which provide a simple dynamic description of a selection process. Usually, the investigation of the replicator dynamics centers around a stability analysis of their stationary solutions. Although evolutionary stability and dynamic stability both intend to characterize the long-term outcome of frequency dependent selection, these concepts differ considerably in the 'philosophies' on which they are based. It is therefore not too surprising that they often lead to quite different evolutionary predictions (see, e. g. , Weissing 1983). The present paper intends to illustrate the incongruities between the two approaches towards a phenotypic theory of natural selection. A detailed game theoretical and dynamical analysis is given for a generic class of evolutionary normal form games | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Mathematics | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Evolution (Biology) | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Distribution (Probability theory) | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Statistics | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Economics | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Probability Theory and Stochastic Processes | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Evolutionary Biology | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Economic Theory | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Mathematical and Computational Biology | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Statistics for Life Sciences, Medicine, Health Sciences | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Mathematik | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Statistik | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Wirtschaft | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-02674-8 |x Verlag |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-2-SMA |a ZDB-2-BAE | ||
| 940 | 1 | |q ZDB-2-SMA_Archive | |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-027858625 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804153098662313984 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Selten, Reinhard 1930-2016 |
| author_GND | (DE-588)119479273 |
| author_facet | Selten, Reinhard 1930-2016 |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Selten, Reinhard 1930-2016 |
| author_variant | r s rs |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV042423208 |
| classification_tum | MAT 000 |
| collection | ZDB-2-SMA ZDB-2-BAE |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)864082111 (DE-599)BVBBV042423208 |
| dewey-full | 519.2 |
| dewey-hundreds | 500 - Natural sciences and mathematics |
| dewey-ones | 519 - Probabilities and applied mathematics |
| dewey-raw | 519.2 |
| dewey-search | 519.2 |
| dewey-sort | 3519.2 |
| dewey-tens | 510 - Mathematics |
| discipline | Mathematik |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/978-3-662-02674-8 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>03217nmm a2200505zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV042423208</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20160901 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">150317s1991 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9783662026748</subfield><subfield code="c">Online</subfield><subfield code="9">978-3-662-02674-8</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9783642081088</subfield><subfield code="c">Print</subfield><subfield code="9">978-3-642-08108-8</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1007/978-3-662-02674-8</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)864082111</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV042423208</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">aacr</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-384</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-703</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-91</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-634</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">519.2</subfield><subfield code="2">23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">MAT 000</subfield><subfield code="2">stub</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Selten, Reinhard</subfield><subfield code="d">1930-2016</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)119479273</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Game Equilibrium Models I</subfield><subfield code="b">Evolution and Game Dynamics</subfield><subfield code="c">edited by Reinhard Selten</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Berlin, Heidelberg</subfield><subfield code="b">Springer Berlin Heidelberg</subfield><subfield code="c">1991</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (IX, 330 p)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">There are two main approaches towards the phenotypic analysis of frequency dependent natural selection. First, there is the approach of evolutionary game theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not modeled explicitly. Instead, the selective forces acting within a population are represented by a fitness function, which is then analysed according to the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. Later on, the static approach of evolutionary game theory has been complemented by a dynamic stability analysis of the replicator equations. Introduced by Peter D. Taylor and Leo B. Jonker in 1978, these equations specify a class of dynamical systems, which provide a simple dynamic description of a selection process. Usually, the investigation of the replicator dynamics centers around a stability analysis of their stationary solutions. Although evolutionary stability and dynamic stability both intend to characterize the long-term outcome of frequency dependent selection, these concepts differ considerably in the 'philosophies' on which they are based. It is therefore not too surprising that they often lead to quite different evolutionary predictions (see, e. g. , Weissing 1983). The present paper intends to illustrate the incongruities between the two approaches towards a phenotypic theory of natural selection. A detailed game theoretical and dynamical analysis is given for a generic class of evolutionary normal form games</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Mathematics</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Evolution (Biology)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Distribution (Probability theory)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Statistics</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Economics</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Probability Theory and Stochastic Processes</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Evolutionary Biology</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Economic Theory</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Mathematical and Computational Biology</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Statistics for Life Sciences, Medicine, Health Sciences</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Mathematik</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Statistik</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Wirtschaft</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-02674-8</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-2-SMA</subfield><subfield code="a">ZDB-2-BAE</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="940" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="q">ZDB-2-SMA_Archive</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-027858625</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV042423208 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T01:21:13Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9783662026748 9783642081088 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-027858625 |
| oclc_num | 864082111 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-384 DE-703 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-634 |
| owner_facet | DE-384 DE-703 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-634 |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (IX, 330 p) |
| psigel | ZDB-2-SMA ZDB-2-BAE ZDB-2-SMA_Archive |
| publishDate | 1991 |
| publishDateSearch | 1991 |
| publishDateSort | 1991 |
| publisher | Springer Berlin Heidelberg |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Selten, Reinhard 1930-2016 Verfasser (DE-588)119479273 aut Game Equilibrium Models I Evolution and Game Dynamics edited by Reinhard Selten Berlin, Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 1991 1 Online-Ressource (IX, 330 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier There are two main approaches towards the phenotypic analysis of frequency dependent natural selection. First, there is the approach of evolutionary game theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not modeled explicitly. Instead, the selective forces acting within a population are represented by a fitness function, which is then analysed according to the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. Later on, the static approach of evolutionary game theory has been complemented by a dynamic stability analysis of the replicator equations. Introduced by Peter D. Taylor and Leo B. Jonker in 1978, these equations specify a class of dynamical systems, which provide a simple dynamic description of a selection process. Usually, the investigation of the replicator dynamics centers around a stability analysis of their stationary solutions. Although evolutionary stability and dynamic stability both intend to characterize the long-term outcome of frequency dependent selection, these concepts differ considerably in the 'philosophies' on which they are based. It is therefore not too surprising that they often lead to quite different evolutionary predictions (see, e. g. , Weissing 1983). The present paper intends to illustrate the incongruities between the two approaches towards a phenotypic theory of natural selection. A detailed game theoretical and dynamical analysis is given for a generic class of evolutionary normal form games Mathematics Evolution (Biology) Distribution (Probability theory) Statistics Economics Probability Theory and Stochastic Processes Evolutionary Biology Economic Theory Mathematical and Computational Biology Statistics for Life Sciences, Medicine, Health Sciences Mathematik Statistik Wirtschaft https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-02674-8 Verlag Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Selten, Reinhard 1930-2016 Game Equilibrium Models I Evolution and Game Dynamics Mathematics Evolution (Biology) Distribution (Probability theory) Statistics Economics Probability Theory and Stochastic Processes Evolutionary Biology Economic Theory Mathematical and Computational Biology Statistics for Life Sciences, Medicine, Health Sciences Mathematik Statistik Wirtschaft |
| title | Game Equilibrium Models I Evolution and Game Dynamics |
| title_auth | Game Equilibrium Models I Evolution and Game Dynamics |
| title_exact_search | Game Equilibrium Models I Evolution and Game Dynamics |
| title_full | Game Equilibrium Models I Evolution and Game Dynamics edited by Reinhard Selten |
| title_fullStr | Game Equilibrium Models I Evolution and Game Dynamics edited by Reinhard Selten |
| title_full_unstemmed | Game Equilibrium Models I Evolution and Game Dynamics edited by Reinhard Selten |
| title_short | Game Equilibrium Models I |
| title_sort | game equilibrium models i evolution and game dynamics |
| title_sub | Evolution and Game Dynamics |
| topic | Mathematics Evolution (Biology) Distribution (Probability theory) Statistics Economics Probability Theory and Stochastic Processes Evolutionary Biology Economic Theory Mathematical and Computational Biology Statistics for Life Sciences, Medicine, Health Sciences Mathematik Statistik Wirtschaft |
| topic_facet | Mathematics Evolution (Biology) Distribution (Probability theory) Statistics Economics Probability Theory and Stochastic Processes Evolutionary Biology Economic Theory Mathematical and Computational Biology Statistics for Life Sciences, Medicine, Health Sciences Mathematik Statistik Wirtschaft |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-02674-8 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT seltenreinhard gameequilibriummodelsievolutionandgamedynamics |