A European Union with 36 members?: perspectives and risks
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Center for EU Enlargement Studies
2014
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adam_text | Titel: A European Union with 36 members?
Autor: Balázs, Péter
Jahr: 2014
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction by Péter Balâzs..............................................................................................................................7
Part 1. Extending the Single Market from 27 to 36
Trade and Investment Opportunities in an Enlarged Economic Area by Tamâs Novak.....................13
Extending the Single Market - Investment and Trade by Mihajlo Babin and Milos Eric....................27
The Labour Market in an Enlarged Economic Area by Klâra Fóti..........................................................47
Part 2. Budget and Common Policies
The MFF and EU Enlargement: A Game on Two Levels by Christoph Schnellbach..........................63
Putting Rural at the Centre of the European Union s Cohesion and Enlargement Policy
by Andrew F. Fieldsend....................................................................................................................................81
EU Budget and Common Policies. Regional Policy: What s Next? by Entire Orbân.........................111
Part 3. Eurozone
The Eurozone and the Future of the EU by Dusan Sidjanski...............................................................139
Some Aspects of the Enlargement of the Eurozone by Julius Horvâth..............................................153
Turkey - A Potential Eurozone Candidate? by Andrâs Mâlnâssy..........................................................169
Part 4. New Foreign Policy Dimensions and Regional Cooperation
Convergence or Divergence: EU and Turkish Foreign Policy over the Last Decade
by Ahmet O. Evin and Emre Hatipoglu.....................................................................................................185
Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans by Oleg Levitin..............................................................199
Towards EU36: The Role of the Visegrad Group by Tomâs Strâzay...................................................213
Part 5. Institutions, Democracy and Identity with 36 Member States
EU36: The Impact of EU Enlargements on Institutions by Péter Balâzs...........................................227
The Referendum Experience and the EU36 Perspective by Frédéric Esposito..................................257
Enlargement: Between Vision of Europe and EU Machinery by François Saint-Ouen....................267
EU36 and the Need to Revise the European Federalist Agenda by Nicolas Levrat...........................281
Conclusion by Péter Balâzs...........................................................................................................................287
Notes on Contributors...................................................................................................................................295
Notes on Institutions.....................................................................................................................................299
Appendix..........................................................................................................................................................303
CONCLUSION
PÉTER BALÁZS
European integration does not start with formal membership of the European Union (EU).
The “four freedoms” constituting the fundaments of European unification offer abundant
opportunities to include the candidates in the earliest pre-accession period. Trade, invest-
ments, visa facilitations as well as the extension of transport, telecommunication, and energy
networks and infrastructure protecting the environment, do not necessitate EU membership,
but can be handled and regulated between candidates and the EU in the framework of as-
sociation agreements or other devices of neighbourhood relations. At this level, the achieve-
ments and techniques of European integration are easily extendable to the neighbours with-
out membership. EU accession perspectives can support and motivate this inclusion, but do
not constitute a formal precondition to it. For that reason, no sharp dividing lines appear be-
tween the “European neighbours” eligible for EU membership and the closest “neighbours
of Europe”. The new, mostly continental neighbourhood of the EU in Eastern Europe is an
appropriate area for the implementadon of such expansive pre-accession strategies.
This book has offered abundant new evidence to enlargement aspects on a larger scale
of EU36 in the specific fields of the internal market, the EU budget, the infrastructure net-
works, the single currency, neighbourhood relations and EU institutions. Some findings can
serve as a basis for further research in the theoretical and practical domains of EU enlarge-
ment. In a general approach, enlargement can be seen as a mirror of the EU, and the evolu-
tion of enlargement reflects the evolution of the EU itself (see chapter by Saint-Ouen).
In the next phase of EU enlargement, pre-accession periods tend to be longer than
before, on the outer peripheries of Europe the radiation of EU norms becomes weaker,
and the reverse effects coming from new members and candidates beyond the frontiers of
European culture determined by the Enlightenment and Reformation may also influence
the structure and the functioning of the original integration model. In this context, the main
questions concerning the future investigation of the EU’s next size are threefold:
What is the real content of the pre-accession period, apart from regular formal criti-
cism and assessment from the European Commission and, from the start of official
negotiations, the chapter-by-chapter adaptation process of the acquis communautaire.?
What is the effective impact of EU membership on the political, economic and social
development of countries situated on the outer peripheries of Europe with a heritage
differing, to a growing extent, from the traditions of the founding core members of
European integration?
What reverse effects reach the centre of Europe from the peripheries including the
new member states and their east and south-east European neighbours eligible, in
principle, for EU membership?
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A European Union with 36 Members? Perspectives and Risks
The perspective of EU membership is a source of long-term political inspiration, but short-
er-term advantages play an important role in parallel with it as well. In the pre-accession
period free trade (and beyond that, customs union with the EU, as in the specific case of
Turkey) offer a real and immediate gain for the neighbours. As the EU is the first and domi-
nant trading partner for all these countries, the abolition of classical barriers opens the way
for an increased exchange of goods. Naturally, the EU side, with its stronger competitiveness,
makes more benefit from free trade channels, but if the candidates manage well their eco-
nomic policy under the conditions of internal EU competition, they can obtain advantages,
too. The parallel opening of regional trade, following the successful example of the Central
European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) founded originally by the Visegrad countries (see
chapter by S tráz ay), can contribute to the stabilisation of transition economies.
Together with trade, visa facilitations are of great importance for EU neighbours. Ex-
panding business, growing tourism and, first of all, access to the vast EU labour market
need easy regulations for travelling. The bigger the distance from the industrialised centre of
Europe, the greater the revenue gap attracting labour force from candidate and other east
European neighbouring countries to the EU will be. The increased flow of cheap labour is
one of the supposed main threats inspiring core EU members to keep potential EU candi-
dates at a distance. However, experience proves that the centripetal movement of labour in
Europe is not direcdy attached to formal EU membership, not even to visa abolition or visa
facilitation measures. Economic motivation (revenue gap, unemployment etc.) is stronger
than any administrative liberalisation (see chapter by Fóti). For this reason, the flow of labour
force from the periphery (internal or external) usually precedes EU accession.
Another important phenomenon of European integration is the increased capital flow
into candidate countries. Here again, experience of the last two decades proves that foreign
investments in the newly opening markets, either in the form of greenfield factories or using
privatisation opportunities, do not wait for the opening of official accession negotiations.
The political perspective of EU membership alone can encourage long-term decisions. In
fact, the flow of capital was the first of the “four freedoms” that preceded largely formal
diplomatic steps (and has not been limited to EU members or candidates only). Investment
can serve as a tool of economic convergence with “old” member states. The extent and ef-
ficiency of foreign direct investments in an EU candidate country has direct consequences
on the availability and — later on — mobility of workforce. If sufficient employment op-
portunities are created by foreign capital, then workforce is needed on the home labour
market and is not motivated to emigrate. Investment leads not only to improvement of the
trade balance, but can bring about positive effects on the labour market, too (see chapter by
Babin-Eric).
The extension of EU infrastructure networks to the neighbourhood is not bound to for-
mal membership either. However, this segment of integration follows formal membership
with a considerable delay. The main reason is that transport and telecommunication networks
within the EU are still in progress, including the connections between and among the “old”
member states. Better results have been achieved in the field of electric energy interconnec-
tions, but from a general point of view, the EU energy network is deeply segmented with
special regard to the pipeline systems. The inclusion of late-comer “new” member states into
EU infrastructure networks is largely behind that schedule, not to speak about the attach-
ment of new land neighbours in Eastern Europe to core EU regions.
Peter Baiit/s: ( .occlusion
289
The pre-accession period is obviously the very phase where the “soft power” of the EU
exerts the strongest influence on its partners, first of all on the direct neighbourhood (see
chapter by Levitin). The process of adaptation to EU norms and regulation gets strong po֊
litical back-wind in this phase as the acceptance and implementation of EU rules and disci-
pline are motivated by the near perspectives of EU membership. This statement is naturally
focused on “European” states eligible for EU membership according to the dispositions of
the EU Treaty. Neighbours beyond the strict geographical eligibility line, without any political
perspective of becoming one day an EU member, cannot base their modernisation drive on
formal membership. Those “neighbours of Europe” are exposed, to an increasing extent,
to the influence of other poles of attraction. Post-Soviet Central Asia is squeezed between
four different poles, being under the multiple pressures of Russia, Turkey, Iran and China. In
the Mediterranean basin the contagious “Arab Spring” has opened an apparently long-lasting
struggle between westernisation and various forms of Islamic tradition, with the perspective
of immediate conflict situations in the Near East. Europe s long-term aim is to domesticate
its neighbouring areas within concentric circles (see chapter by Evin-Hatipoglu), but past
certain limits the attractiveness of the European model is fading away. EU enlargement is
already manoeuvring in this critical area.
In spite of the clear distinction of the EU Treaty in favour of “European” states eligible
for EU membership, the situation of the “European neighbours” on the outskirts of the
European peripheries is not very different from that of the closest “neighbours of Europe”.
The EU’s Eastern Partnership project proved that the remote and uncertain perspective of
EU membership combined with cautious rapprochement steps and limited aid were not
sufficient to gain the sympathy of Belarus, Armenia or Azerbaijan. All these countries are
“European states” and close neighbours of the EU but Russia (and in some cases Turkey)
can offer them a valuable alternative with less conditionality than the EU - at least at first
sight. In this respect, their situation and integration perspectives are not very different from
that of their further, “non-European” neighbours.
After a decisive turn in the Russian foreign policy doctrine, the controversial events in
Ukraine by the end of 2013 and the annexation of the Crimea in March 2014 showed clearly
that Moscow is ready to apply more aggressive methods for keeping the “near abroad” under
its influence. At the same rime, in the Balkans region Russia has lost its former strategic au-
thority for two main reasons: geographical isolation by the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO) and EU accession of Romania and Bulgaria, on the one hand, and concrete EU
membership perspectives for its two traditional friends, Serbia and Montenegro, on the other.
Simultaneously, the economic and cultural influence of Turkey is steadily growing in other
countries of the region with strong Ottoman memories, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo.
Central and east European members expected from EU accession the consolidation of mar-
ket economy, the stabilisation of pluralistic democracy and a notable welfare leap forward.
The “hidden dimension” of such expectations is the achievement of a century-long dream
about European modernisation. On the eastern peripheries of Europe, this strategic objec-
tive was coupled with frequent freedom fights for national independence in the 19th and
20th centuries. All those nations, squeezed between expansive empires during their history
(German, Russian, Habsburg, Ottoman), believed that national sovereignty was the key to
their modernisation upswing, following the examples of the British, French, German, Italian
290
A Kuropean Union with 36 Members? Perspectives arid Risks
and other modernisation drives. By the end of the 20th century this strategic objective was
attained through the collapse of the Soviet empire and, together with it, the historical decline
of the party-state (“Socialist”) modernisation model. In parallel with the systemic changes
and the transfiguration of Europe s political map inherited from the First and Second World
Wars, the Soviet model was replaced in a sudden historical turn by the archetype of Euro-
pean integration. The new, western modernisation tool was adequate and efficient, but in
the expanding structures of European governance the flavour of freshly regained national
sovereignty was rapidly lost for the new EU members.
EU accession has brought about a strong and sometimes brutal modernisation effect in
the legal-institutional system of the new members. The cultural and legal heritage of the his-
torical Hansa area around the Baltic Sea or the Habsburg Empire in central Europe proved
to be adaptable to the acquis communautaire՝, here the impact of Soviet times was almost neg-
ligible. However, beyond those - today mosdy invisible, but strongly dividing - frontiers the
applicability of EU law and the implantation of western institutions are faced with increasing
difficulties. Future members of the EU from this region would pay a higher price for their
membership in adaptation costs than their predecessors from central and eastern Europe.
The question is whether the overall gains of European integration will compensate them for
the unavoidable decrease in national self-determination in economic policy and legislation as
well as for excluding other alliance alternatives situated closer to their culture and traditions.
The example of the last “big” enlargement shows that new members have progressed
xn their state administrations with the help of the EU model. Collective action of joint EU
governance contributes to the expansion of experience and “best practice” from the Eu-
ropean centre to the peripheries. New member states are also net beneficiaries of the EU
budget through agricultural subsidies and EU funds thanks to the solidarity of wealthier
EU countries. However, the obvious advantages do not prevent them from using the EU in
crisis times as a cheap target of populist attacks. Remote and sophisticated EU institutions
are not prepared to give reactions to daily verbal aggressions in the political batdes of all
the member states. Behind the façade of political rhetoric some real problems can also be
detected. Low performance of EU integration in some areas has become more visible under
the extreme pressure of the world economic crisis. The question is whether political parties
in the member states opt for a constructive critical analysis and continuous strengthening of
the EU by reforms or choose a different strategic approach in contesting the usefulness of
the European integration model.
Central and east European EU candidates in the pre-accession phase are usually “convinced
Europeans”. This is a rational choice on their part as EU accession is obviously the last
chance for them to catch up with the historical delay in the modernisation process. The EU
- together with its central member states - represents the modernisation model for Europe
and the large periphery. EU members of the 2004 enlargement (and after) followed the same
path in the pre-accession period and praised the benefits of EU law and institutions as well
as the helpful effects of EU funds. However, a few years after EU accession, most of them
took a U-turn and have elected anti-EU political parties to govern over the years. The general
attitude to European integration in the new member states will certainly influence the speed
and scope of further enlargements.
Negative opinions about the EU in states joining the organisation by 2004 and 2007 may
be explained by three main reasons. The first is their disappointment in realising that the
291
Pčrer Halá/s: Condition
various benefits of EU membership could not essentially reduce the inherited East֊West gap,
even if some of their regions got closer to the average development level of the Union. Join-
ing the EU did not lead to a substantial increase in living standards (see chapter by Horváth).
The second element is the impact of the wo rid-wide economic crisis, intervening a few years
after the EU’s “big enlargement”, which partly eroded the advantages of the Single Market
that was supposed to deliver higher growth rates in order to keep the pace with other fast-
growing regions (see chapter by Novák). The third source of criticism is the accumulated
internal problems of the EU: the failure of the first competitiveness plan from the year 2000,
the refusal of the draft Constitutional Treaty in 2007 and the difficult birth of the Lisbon
Treaty with an important delay, the weaknesses of the single currency and the slowness in
agreeing on a common rescue plan after 2008, various acute deficiencies of the democratic,
transparent and accountable functioning of EU institutions etc.
Emerging anti-EU rhetoric takes on different accents in old and new member states. In
core EU countries’ anti-EU speech is not against Europe as such, it is usually directed against
immigrants, i.e. “non-Europeans”, or not “real” Europeans. In new member states political
parties positioning themselves against the EU (mainly the radical right) combine criticisms
about the EU with claims of the “decline of the West”. Anti-EU parties in old member
states want to dominate Europe (among others by targeting strong positions in the European
Parliament), contesters of the EU in new member countries suggest their country step out
of the Union in order to regain “national sovereignty”. At the same time, some new member
states try to approach alternative regional allies (first of all Russia).
Short and medium-term problems of integration may lead to a questioning of longer-
term objectives, too, raising doubts about the validity and attractiveness of the European
model. The attempt at mastering globalisation with the help of regional integration is based
on the values and achievements of European modernisation. From the outset, European
integration projected the concept of a Uberal market economy, pluraUstic democracy, human
rights and the rule of law from national to the expanding regional dimensions. In contrast
with this picture, poUtical parties infected with extreme right ideologies, which occasionally
occupy government positions in the new՜ member states, have taken an increasingly anti-EU
course. Behind their short-term popuUst calculations, a deeper anti-modernisation reflex is
also detectable which is well-known on the peripheries of the industrialised centre of Eu-
rope. From this angle, any form of “imperial” unification dominated by core European states
is contrary and detrimental to the national sovereignty of others.
Under the pressure of the recent economic crisis, nationalism has gained momentum in
several European countries in both the poUtical and the economic sense. In the new member
states, this tendency may contest the advantages of EU integration and the necessity to com-
ply with its rules. The governments of Poland, Hungary and the Czech RepubUc expressed
deep scepticism concerning their decision to join the single European currency and may stay
permanently outside the Eurozone. In fact, the recent sovereign debt crisis sent a signal to
these countries that being a member of the Eurozone is not a guarantee for avoiding deep
domestic crisis (see chapter by Horváth). The external effects of this attitude might push
potential EU candidates towards other poles of attraction, in particular if the EU gives slow
and uncertain reactions to new challenges. Considering the actual poUtical tendencies in Rus-
sia and Turkey, their increasing attraction on the European peripheries could contribute to
the erosion of classical values of European modernisation, first of aU pluraHsm and equal
chances in politics and on the market.
292
A Burof?eím Union with 3h Members? Perspectives and Risks
The impact of future enlargements on the EU, increasing the number of member states
from the actual 28 to a maximum of 36, would bring mixed results. In theory, the growing
size would favour the effects of “economies of scale” and strengthen the advantages of the
bigger market, larger networks etc However, conclusions drawn from previous enlargements
can have only a limited relevance in predicting the impact of future enlargement rounds on
trade, investment and other processes (see chapter by Novák). The extension of the field of
applicability of EU norms and rules could contribute to the stability of the enlarging region.
Supposedly, with more member states Europe will get more chances for managing the ef-
fects of globalisation on a larger scale. However, on the Western Balkans the strong and vast
European centre will be completed with a relatively small and weak periphery with limited
purchasing power. In this sub-region the pattern of the 2004-2007 “big enlargement” will
continue: a modest increase of the gross domestic product (GDP) (see chapter by Orbán)
combined with a more important growth of population (see chapter by Fóti) and a sharp
escalation of the number of states (see chapter by Balázs).
Turkey’s accession would represent a fundamentally different model: one single new
player in the EU with a huge economy and abundant population. Turkey’s rapid growth
and development over the last decade can be interpreted as one of the success stories of
the global economy, but the country faces significant economic risks (low domestic savings,
dependence on external financing) (see chapter by Málnássy). In the case of Turkey the scale
of potential migration flows cannot be compared with previous enlargements either (see
chapter by Fóti). However, in both cases, the Western Balkans and Turkey, the EU could
handle the new situation in the areas of the internal market, networks and other segments of
integration without major difficulties.
The problems encountered during the intra-institutional negotiations about the EU’s
long-term budget showed that the Multiannual Financial Framework needs to be restruc-
tured (see chapter by Schnellbach). This is not a special requirement of future enlargements,
but a precondition for the smooth functioning of the EU, including rural development (see
chapter by Fieldsend). The Western Balkans countries would have only a slight impact on
the EU’s average per capita GDP, but Turkey would change some basic patterns of regional
policy, perturbing the interest coalitions, and re-enforce the division between net contribu-
tors and net recipients. However, regarding its growth rates, Turkey is probably the most
promising candidate country (see chapter by Orbán).
The precarious point is the strength and cohesion of the political community. Already the
actual, pre-accession size of the EU has reached a critical mass with the high number of state
players of very different size and economic development level accompanied by increased mo-
tivations for equality and sovereignty. Under such circumstances EU institutions are exposed
to growing political pressure for more transparency, accountability and, first of all, efficiency.
A fundamental revision of the integration model is due in the medium term. The objective
is not solely of pushing for stronger EU institutions, but of strengthening local, regional and
national identities (see chapter by Levrat). Institutions inside the EU should be capable of
handling financial, economic and social crises, opening the way for creating a dynamic fed-
erative core based on a political union (see chapter by Sidjanski). A consultative referendum
introduced at the EU level would be of great political use, too (see chapter by Esposito). The
role of national parliaments in EU affairs should be increased in parallel with shortening the
mandate of members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and of Commissioners, in order
to bring them closer to the pulse of domestic political life (see chapter by Balázs).
Peter Br-ilaxs: Conclusion
293
The perspectives of the next EU enlargements are partly predictable. Serbia and Mon-
tenegro are well prepared for achieving the ongoing accession negotiations within the
duration of the current Multiannual Financial Framework (2014-2020), probably during
the mandate of the next European Parliament and European Commission (2014-2019).
Political preconditions are given on both sides, in the two applicant countries and the EU
member states, to ensure the unanimity of all governments concerned and the necessary
public support. The increase in the number of EU member states from 28 to 30 would not
result in major changes compared to the actual structure, objectives, problems and financ-
ing of the Union.
The direct consequence of the enlargement of the EU to Serbia and Montenegro
would be the substantial shrinking of the Western Balkans region. If the majority of the
successor states of ex-Yugoslavia join the EU (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro),
the remaining countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo) will have better
chances for finding solutions to their specific — and in each case different — problems
which are all connected with the concept of their “statehood”. Albania also belongs to
this narrowing EU enclave. The four countries will need more collective or coordinated
action in implementing EU rules, in parallel with individually complying with the EU entry
conditions, if they want to speed up the integration process (see chapter by Levitin). This
would be a rational choice in view of their geopolitical situation, but let us not forget the
strong presence of Turkey in this region.
The future scenario of Turkey’s European integration is definitely less predictable than
that of the neighbouring Western Balkans region. In the case of a strong and united po-
litical will on the EU side, Turkey would not refuse the speeding up and conclusion of
accession talks before 2020 as EU accession is still a main priority for the country (see
chapter Malnassy). The remaining technical aspects - discussing all the negotiation chap-
ters, proceeding to the necessary referenda and, finally, to the ratification process — seem
to be feasible. Turkey’s EU accession would need powerful support from the renewing EU
institutions mandated for the 2014-2019 period, but above all from the member states.
Building the necessary unanimity for accepting Turkey’s membership in the EU should be-
gin with a turn in the foreign policy attitude of Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria
and several other influential EU governments backed by strong majorities in their national
parliaments.
Turkey is not only a candidate, but a pole of attraction competing with the EU on its
outer peripheries: on the Balkans, the Southern Caucasus and post-Soviet Central Asia (see
chapter by Evin-Hatipoglu). An important and unique aspect of the accession talks should
be the harmonisation of strategies concerning the “joint neighbourhood” of the EU and
Turkey. Expansionist ambitions on the part of Russia create a similarly polarised situation
with the EU, mainly in post-Soviet areas. However, the chances for a strategic alliance are def-
initely more promising with Turkey than with Russia. The reasons are multiple, just to men-
tion a few of them: Turkey is a candidate for EU accession, Russia is not; Turkey is a NATO
member, Russia perceives NATO as a threat; Turkey is a full-fledged market economy, Russia
is at the lower edge of this category etc. Bearing all that in mind, the EU should also con-
sider initiatives to examine questions of common interest in the EU-Turkey-Russia triangle.
There are abundant issues in this category, but the motivations for a tripartite approach are
very weak from any side, including the striking lack of unity and imagination within the EU.
However, new and alarming tendencies in both Russian and Turkish foreign policies should
294
A. Kuropean Union with 36 Members? Perspectives and Risks
inspire the EU to insert its traditional and self-confident enlargement strategy into a wider
regional context, taking into consideration the interests and influence of other regional play-
ers with special regard to G20 members such as Turkey and Russia. The declining idea of
regional integration originating from Europe in the 20th century has a slight chance to survive
in the 21st century and to master the challenges of globalisation if it is also harmonised with
the emerging multipolar power structures in the world.
|
any_adam_object | 1 |
author2 | Balázs, Péter 1941- |
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author_GND | (DE-588)13309751X |
author_facet | Balázs, Péter 1941- |
building | Verbundindex |
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era | Geschichte 2000-2013 gnd |
era_facet | Geschichte 2000-2013 |
format | Book |
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genre | (DE-588)4143413-4 Aufsatzsammlung gnd-content |
genre_facet | Aufsatzsammlung |
geographic | Osteuropa (DE-588)4075739-0 gnd |
geographic_facet | Osteuropa |
id | DE-604.BV042406691 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-07-10T01:20:41Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9789633860311 |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-027842289 |
oclc_num | 899748824 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-12 |
owner_facet | DE-12 |
physical | 301 Seiten Diagramme |
publishDate | 2014 |
publishDateSearch | 2014 |
publishDateSort | 2014 |
publisher | Center for EU Enlargement Studies |
record_format | marc |
spelling | A European Union with 36 members? perspectives and risks edited by Péter Balázs Budapest [u.a.] Center for EU Enlargement Studies 2014 301 Seiten Diagramme txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd rswk-swf Geschichte 2000-2013 gnd rswk-swf Politik (DE-588)4046514-7 gnd rswk-swf Erweiterung (DE-588)4128080-5 gnd rswk-swf Europäische Integration (DE-588)4071013-0 gnd rswk-swf Osteuropa (DE-588)4075739-0 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4143413-4 Aufsatzsammlung gnd-content Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 b Osteuropa (DE-588)4075739-0 g Erweiterung (DE-588)4128080-5 s Politik (DE-588)4046514-7 s Europäische Integration (DE-588)4071013-0 s Geschichte 2000-2013 z DE-604 Balázs, Péter 1941- (DE-588)13309751X edt http://digitool.hbz-nrw.de:1801/webclient/DeliveryManager?pid=5892992&custom%5Fatt%5F2=simple%5Fviewer HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027842289&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 19 - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027842289&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
spellingShingle | A European Union with 36 members? perspectives and risks Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd Politik (DE-588)4046514-7 gnd Erweiterung (DE-588)4128080-5 gnd Europäische Integration (DE-588)4071013-0 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)5098525-5 (DE-588)4046514-7 (DE-588)4128080-5 (DE-588)4071013-0 (DE-588)4075739-0 (DE-588)4143413-4 |
title | A European Union with 36 members? perspectives and risks |
title_auth | A European Union with 36 members? perspectives and risks |
title_exact_search | A European Union with 36 members? perspectives and risks |
title_full | A European Union with 36 members? perspectives and risks edited by Péter Balázs |
title_fullStr | A European Union with 36 members? perspectives and risks edited by Péter Balázs |
title_full_unstemmed | A European Union with 36 members? perspectives and risks edited by Péter Balázs |
title_short | A European Union with 36 members? |
title_sort | a european union with 36 members perspectives and risks |
title_sub | perspectives and risks |
topic | Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd Politik (DE-588)4046514-7 gnd Erweiterung (DE-588)4128080-5 gnd Europäische Integration (DE-588)4071013-0 gnd |
topic_facet | Europäische Union Politik Erweiterung Europäische Integration Osteuropa Aufsatzsammlung |
url | http://digitool.hbz-nrw.de:1801/webclient/DeliveryManager?pid=5892992&custom%5Fatt%5F2=simple%5Fviewer http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027842289&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027842289&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
work_keys_str_mv | AT balazspeter aeuropeanunionwith36membersperspectivesandrisks |