Second-best incentive compatible allocation rules for multiple type indivisible objects:
We consider the problem of allocating several types of indivisible goods when preferences are separable and monetary transfers are not allowed. Our finding is that the coordinatewise application of strategy-proof and non-wasteful rules yields a strategy-proof rule with the following efficiency prope...
Gespeichert in:
Hauptverfasser: | , |
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Berlin
WZB
2014
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Schriftenreihe: | Discussion paper
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | We consider the problem of allocating several types of indivisible goods when preferences are separable and monetary transfers are not allowed. Our finding is that the coordinatewise application of strategy-proof and non-wasteful rules yields a strategy-proof rule with the following efficiency property: no strategy-proof rule Pareto-dominates the rule. Such rules are abundant as they include the coordinate-wise use of the two well-known priority-based rules of the top trading cycles (TTC) and the deferred acceptance (DA). Moreover, our result supports the current practice in Market Design that separately treats each type of market for its design. |
Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (33 S.) |
Internformat
MARC
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520 | 8 | |a We consider the problem of allocating several types of indivisible goods when preferences are separable and monetary transfers are not allowed. Our finding is that the coordinatewise application of strategy-proof and non-wasteful rules yields a strategy-proof rule with the following efficiency property: no strategy-proof rule Pareto-dominates the rule. Such rules are abundant as they include the coordinate-wise use of the two well-known priority-based rules of the top trading cycles (TTC) and the deferred acceptance (DA). Moreover, our result supports the current practice in Market Design that separately treats each type of market for its design. | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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author | Anno, Hidekazu Kurino, Morimitsu |
author_facet | Anno, Hidekazu Kurino, Morimitsu |
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spelling | Anno, Hidekazu Verfasser aut Second-best incentive compatible allocation rules for multiple type indivisible objects Hidekazu Anno ; Morimitsu Kurino Berlin WZB 2014 1 Online-Ressource (33 S.) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Discussion paper We consider the problem of allocating several types of indivisible goods when preferences are separable and monetary transfers are not allowed. Our finding is that the coordinatewise application of strategy-proof and non-wasteful rules yields a strategy-proof rule with the following efficiency property: no strategy-proof rule Pareto-dominates the rule. Such rules are abundant as they include the coordinate-wise use of the two well-known priority-based rules of the top trading cycles (TTC) and the deferred acceptance (DA). Moreover, our result supports the current practice in Market Design that separately treats each type of market for its design. Kurino, Morimitsu Verfasser aut http://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2014/ii14-201.pdf Verlag kostenfrei Volltext http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93379 Langzeitarchivierung kostenfrei Volltext |
spellingShingle | Anno, Hidekazu Kurino, Morimitsu Second-best incentive compatible allocation rules for multiple type indivisible objects |
title | Second-best incentive compatible allocation rules for multiple type indivisible objects |
title_auth | Second-best incentive compatible allocation rules for multiple type indivisible objects |
title_exact_search | Second-best incentive compatible allocation rules for multiple type indivisible objects |
title_full | Second-best incentive compatible allocation rules for multiple type indivisible objects Hidekazu Anno ; Morimitsu Kurino |
title_fullStr | Second-best incentive compatible allocation rules for multiple type indivisible objects Hidekazu Anno ; Morimitsu Kurino |
title_full_unstemmed | Second-best incentive compatible allocation rules for multiple type indivisible objects Hidekazu Anno ; Morimitsu Kurino |
title_short | Second-best incentive compatible allocation rules for multiple type indivisible objects |
title_sort | second best incentive compatible allocation rules for multiple type indivisible objects |
url | http://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2014/ii14-201.pdf http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93379 |
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