Equilibrium selection in similar repeated games: experimental evidence on the role of precedents
We report on an experiment examining behavior and equilibrium selection in two similar, infinitely repeated games, Stag Hunt and Prisoner's Dilemma under anonymous random matching. We are interested in the role that precedents may play for equilibrium selection between these two stage game form...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Berlin
WZB
2015
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Discussion paper
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| Online-Zugang: | Volltext http://hdl.handle.net/10419/107131 |
| Zusammenfassung: | We report on an experiment examining behavior and equilibrium selection in two similar, infinitely repeated games, Stag Hunt and Prisoner's Dilemma under anonymous random matching. We are interested in the role that precedents may play for equilibrium selection between these two stage game forms. We find that a precedent for efficient play in the repeated Stag Hunt game does not carry over to the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game despite the possibility of efficient play in the latter game. Similarly, a precedent of inefficient play in the Prisoner's Dilemma game does not extend to the repeated Stag Hunt game. We conclude that equilibrium selection between similar repeated games has little to do with historical precedents and is mainly determined by strategic considerations associated with the different payouts of these similar repeated games. |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (36 S.) graph. Darst. |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Equilibrium selection in similar repeated games |b experimental evidence on the role of precedents |c John Duffy ; Dietmar Fehr |
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| 490 | 0 | |a Discussion paper | |
| 520 | 1 | |a We report on an experiment examining behavior and equilibrium selection in two similar, infinitely repeated games, Stag Hunt and Prisoner's Dilemma under anonymous random matching. We are interested in the role that precedents may play for equilibrium selection between these two stage game forms. We find that a precedent for efficient play in the repeated Stag Hunt game does not carry over to the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game despite the possibility of efficient play in the latter game. Similarly, a precedent of inefficient play in the Prisoner's Dilemma game does not extend to the repeated Stag Hunt game. We conclude that equilibrium selection between similar repeated games has little to do with historical precedents and is mainly determined by strategic considerations associated with the different payouts of these similar repeated games. | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Fehr, Dietmar |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)124797237 |4 aut | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Duffy, John 1964- Fehr, Dietmar |
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| spelling | Duffy, John 1964- Verfasser (DE-588)170716465 aut Equilibrium selection in similar repeated games experimental evidence on the role of precedents John Duffy ; Dietmar Fehr Berlin WZB 2015 1 Online-Ressource (36 S.) graph. Darst. txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Discussion paper We report on an experiment examining behavior and equilibrium selection in two similar, infinitely repeated games, Stag Hunt and Prisoner's Dilemma under anonymous random matching. We are interested in the role that precedents may play for equilibrium selection between these two stage game forms. We find that a precedent for efficient play in the repeated Stag Hunt game does not carry over to the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game despite the possibility of efficient play in the latter game. Similarly, a precedent of inefficient play in the Prisoner's Dilemma game does not extend to the repeated Stag Hunt game. We conclude that equilibrium selection between similar repeated games has little to do with historical precedents and is mainly determined by strategic considerations associated with the different payouts of these similar repeated games. Fehr, Dietmar Verfasser (DE-588)124797237 aut http://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2015/ii15-202.pdf Verlag kostenfrei Volltext http://hdl.handle.net/10419/107131 Langzeitarchivierung |
| spellingShingle | Duffy, John 1964- Fehr, Dietmar Equilibrium selection in similar repeated games experimental evidence on the role of precedents |
| title | Equilibrium selection in similar repeated games experimental evidence on the role of precedents |
| title_auth | Equilibrium selection in similar repeated games experimental evidence on the role of precedents |
| title_exact_search | Equilibrium selection in similar repeated games experimental evidence on the role of precedents |
| title_full | Equilibrium selection in similar repeated games experimental evidence on the role of precedents John Duffy ; Dietmar Fehr |
| title_fullStr | Equilibrium selection in similar repeated games experimental evidence on the role of precedents John Duffy ; Dietmar Fehr |
| title_full_unstemmed | Equilibrium selection in similar repeated games experimental evidence on the role of precedents John Duffy ; Dietmar Fehr |
| title_short | Equilibrium selection in similar repeated games |
| title_sort | equilibrium selection in similar repeated games experimental evidence on the role of precedents |
| title_sub | experimental evidence on the role of precedents |
| url | http://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2015/ii15-202.pdf http://hdl.handle.net/10419/107131 |
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