Monkey see, monkey do: truth-telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of others
We test the effect of the amount of information on the strategies played by others in the theoretically strategy-proof Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism. We find that providing limited information on the strategies played by others has a negative and significant effect in truth-telling rates relati...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Berlin
WZB
2014
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Discussion paper
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| Online-Zugang: | Volltext Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | We test the effect of the amount of information on the strategies played by others in the theoretically strategy-proof Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism. We find that providing limited information on the strategies played by others has a negative and significant effect in truth-telling rates relative to full or no information about others' strategies. Subjects report truthfully more often when either full information or no information on the strategies played by others is available. Our results have potentially important implications for the design of markets based on strategy-proof matching algorithms. |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (24 S.) |
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| 520 | 8 | |a We test the effect of the amount of information on the strategies played by others in the theoretically strategy-proof Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism. We find that providing limited information on the strategies played by others has a negative and significant effect in truth-telling rates relative to full or no information about others' strategies. Subjects report truthfully more often when either full information or no information on the strategies played by others is available. Our results have potentially important implications for the design of markets based on strategy-proof matching algorithms. | |
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| spelling | Guillén, Pablo 1973- Verfasser (DE-588)1015871844 aut Monkey see, monkey do truth-telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of others Pablo Guillen ; Rustamdjan Hakimov Berlin WZB 2014 1 Online-Ressource (24 S.) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Discussion paper We test the effect of the amount of information on the strategies played by others in the theoretically strategy-proof Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism. We find that providing limited information on the strategies played by others has a negative and significant effect in truth-telling rates relative to full or no information about others' strategies. Subjects report truthfully more often when either full information or no information on the strategies played by others is available. Our results have potentially important implications for the design of markets based on strategy-proof matching algorithms. Hakimov, Rustamdjan Verfasser (DE-588)1167961366 aut http://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2014/ii14-202.pdf Verlag kostenfrei Volltext http://hdl.handle.net/10419/95868 Langzeitarchivierung kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Guillén, Pablo 1973- Hakimov, Rustamdjan Monkey see, monkey do truth-telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of others |
| title | Monkey see, monkey do truth-telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of others |
| title_auth | Monkey see, monkey do truth-telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of others |
| title_exact_search | Monkey see, monkey do truth-telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of others |
| title_full | Monkey see, monkey do truth-telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of others Pablo Guillen ; Rustamdjan Hakimov |
| title_fullStr | Monkey see, monkey do truth-telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of others Pablo Guillen ; Rustamdjan Hakimov |
| title_full_unstemmed | Monkey see, monkey do truth-telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of others Pablo Guillen ; Rustamdjan Hakimov |
| title_short | Monkey see, monkey do |
| title_sort | monkey see monkey do truth telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of others |
| title_sub | truth-telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of others |
| url | http://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2014/ii14-202.pdf http://hdl.handle.net/10419/95868 |
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