The poverty of conceptual truth: Kant's analytic/synthetic distinction and the limits of metaphysics
The poverty of conceptual truth' is based on a simple idea. Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments underwrites a powerful argument against the metaphysical program of his Leibnizian-Wolffian predecessors-an argument from fundamental limits on its expressive power. In t...
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Format: | Buch |
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2015
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Zusammenfassung: | The poverty of conceptual truth' is based on a simple idea. Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments underwrites a powerful argument against the metaphysical program of his Leibnizian-Wolffian predecessors-an argument from fundamental limits on its expressive power. In that tradition, metaphysics promised to reveal the deep rational structure of the world through a systematic philosophy consisting of strictly conceptual truths, which flow from a logically perspicuous relation of 'containment' among concepts. That is, all truths would be 'analytic,' in Kant's sense. Kant's distinction shows to the contrary that far reaching and scientifically indispensable parts of our knowledge of the world (including mathematics, the foundations of natural science, all knowledge from experience, and the central principles of metaphysics itself) are essentially synthetic and could never be restated in analytic form. Thus, the metaphysics of Kant's predecessors is doomed, because knowledge crucial to any adequate theory of the world cannot even be expressed in the idiom to which it restricts itself (and which was the basis of its claim to provide a transparently rational account of things). Traditional metaphysics founders on the expressive poverty of conceptual truth. To establish these claims, R. Lanier Anderson shows how Kant's distinction can be given a clear basis within traditional logic, and traces Kant's long, difficult path to discovering it. Once analyticity is framed in clear logical terms, it is possible to reconstruct compelling arguments that elementary mathematics must be synthetic, and then to show how similar considerations about irreducible syntheticity animate Kant's famous arguments against traditional metaphysics in the Critique of Pure Reason |
Beschreibung: | XVIII, 408 S. Ill. |
ISBN: | 9780198724575 0198724578 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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Contents
System of Abbreviations and Short Titles xvii
Introduction
1. Containment Analyticity and Kant’s Problem of Synthetic Judgment 3
1.1 The Problem of Synthetic Judgment 3
1.2 Kant’s Official Account of Analyticity 6
1.2.1 How controversial is Kant’s distinction? 1
1.2.2 Three definitions of analyticity 12
1.2.3 The centrality of containment 16
1.3 Logic, Methodology, Epistemology: Three Conceptions
of Analyticity in Kant 22
1.3.1 The analytic and synthetic as methods 23
1.3.2 Analytic and synthetic as epistemological categories 26
1.3.3 Analyticity as a logical notion 31
1.4 Antecedents of Containment Analyticity 32
1.5 Plan of Work 39
Part I. The Traditional Logic of Concept Containment
and its (Alleged) Metaphysical Implications
2. Containment and the Traditional Logic of Concepts 45
2.1 Worries about Containment 45
2.2 Concept Containment in the Traditional Logic 49
2.3 Kant’s Theory of Concepts and the Division Account of Containment 54
2.4 Logical and Non-Logical Extensions in Kant’s Doctrine of the Concept 61
2.5 Skepticism about Containment, Revisited 71
3. The Wolffian Paradigm 75
3.1 The Logic of Containment in Wolff’s Metaphysical Picture 75 *
3.2 The Importance of Containment Truth: Three Key Features of
the Wolffian Paradigm 78
3.3 Empirical Concepts in Syllogistic Science 88
3.4 Conclusion 95
4. Narrowness and Trade-Offs: Conceptual Truth in the
“Leibnizian—Wolffian” Philosophy 97
4.1 The Narrowness of Containment 97
4.2 Problems Accounting for Logical Truth 99
XIV CONTENTS
4.3 The Five Universal: Some Limits of the Wolffian Paradigm 108
4.4 Leibniz on Characteristic and Definition: Containment without
Division? 114
4.5 Trade-Offs Facing Containment 122
4.5 A Trade-offs 122
4.5.2 Consequences 124
4.6 Conclusion 130
Part II. A Difficult Birth: The Emergence of Kant’s
Analytic/Synthetic Distinction
5. Three Versions of Analyticity 135
5.1 The Difficult Birth 135
5.2 Brief Outline of the Story 136
5.3 Three Versions of Analyticity: A Reprise via Adickes and Beck 139
5.3. t The Adickes account of Kant's development 139
5.3.2 Lewis White Beck on making synthetic judgments analytic 141
5.3.3 Three versions of analyticity: methodological, epistemological, logical 143
5.4 An Alternative Story 146
6. Methodological Beginnings: Analysis and Synthesis in the Published
Pre-Critical Works 149
6.1 Introduction: General Skepticism about the Wolffian Paradigm 149
6.2 Methodological Criticism in the System of 1762/3: The Inquiry 152
6.3 The Real/Logical Distinction in 1762/3: The Only Possible
Argument and Negative Magnitudes 157
6.4 After the System of 1762/3: Conceptual Truth in the Inaugural
Dissertation 168
6.5 Conclusion 178
7. Making Synthetic Judgments Analytic: Kant’s Long Road Towards
Logical Analyticity in the Reflexionen 179
7.1 Locating the Origin of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction 179
7.2 The Epistemological Conception in the Late 1760s 183
7.2.1 The analytic as objective cognition 183
7.2.2 Analytic and synthetic as rational and empirical 186
7.2.3 Turning synthetic judgments analytic: the Beck objection
reconsidered 190
7.3 Birth of the Critical Insight: The Herz Letter and Logical
Analyticity in the Silent Decade 195
7.4 Conclusion: A Two-Step Route to the Critique 202
CONTENTS XV
Part III. Ineliminable Synthetic Truth in Elementary
Mathematics
8. The Logic of Concepts and a “Two-Step” Syntheticity Argument 209
8.1 Philosophy of Mathematics in the Context of Kant’s Critique
of Metaphysics 209
8.2 Logical and Phenomenological Interpretations of the Role of Intuition 214
8.3 Conceptual Truth and Mathematical Knowledge 226
9. Kant on the Syntheticity of Elementary Mathematics 232
9.1 Kant’s Philosophy of Geometry and the Failure of Wolff’s
Reconstruction Program 233
9.2 Kant’s Philosophy of Arithmetic 244
9.2. 1 Two bases of syntheticity: equivalence of non-identicals
and non-reciprocity of content and extension 247
9.2.2 Leibniz’s proof strategy and the nature of mathematical definition 256
9.2.3 The role of intuition in arithmetic 259
9.3 Conclusion 261
Part IV. The Poverty of Conceptual Truth and the Master
Argument of the “Transcendental Dialectic”
10. The Master Argument 269
10.1 Irreducible Syntheticity in Mathematics and in Metaphysics ’ 269
10.2 Framing the Master Argument 271
10.3 The Master Argument in the “Dialectic” 277
11. The Soul and the World: The Master Argument in Kant’s “Paralogisms”
and “Antinomy” 287
11.1 On the “Paralogisms of Pure Reason”: The Critique of Rational
Psychology 287
11.2 On the “Antinomy of Pure Reason”: The Critique of Rational
Cosmology 297
12. The Master Argument in the Critique of Rational Theology 306
12.1 Kant’s Critique of the ens realissimum Concept 307
12.2 Kant’s Critique of the Ontological Argument 316
12.3 Conclusion to Part IV 326
Epilogue
13. Empirical Concept Formation and the Systematic Role of
Logical Division 333
13.1 Problems and Puzzles: Constraints on a Kantian Theory of Empirical
Concept Formation 336
13.1.1 Circularity 336
13.1.2 Generality 342
13.1.3 Corrigibility 348
13.1.4 Concept identity, hierarchies, and analyticity 350
XVI CONTENTS
13.2 Kant’s Theory of Empirical Concept Formation—Sketch of an
interpretation 351
Í3.2.Í Conceptualism in the “Transcendental Deduction” 352
13.2.2 Conceptualism and circularity 356
13.2.3 Kant on the logical system of concepts 361
13.2.4 Outline sketch of a theory 366
13.3 Conclusion: Systematicity and Analyticity 369
Appendix 1: Kant’s Criticisms of the Ontological Argument in 1763 373
Appendix 2: Four Strands of Reflexionen on the Emerging
Analytic/Synthetic Distinction 379
Appendix 3: Friedman and the Phenomenological Reading 387
References 391
Index 403 |
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spelling | Lanier Anderson, R. Verfasser (DE-588)1067614346 aut The poverty of conceptual truth Kant's analytic/synthetic distinction and the limits of metaphysics R. Lanier Anderson 1. ed. Oxford Univ. Press 2015 XVIII, 408 S. Ill. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier The poverty of conceptual truth' is based on a simple idea. Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments underwrites a powerful argument against the metaphysical program of his Leibnizian-Wolffian predecessors-an argument from fundamental limits on its expressive power. In that tradition, metaphysics promised to reveal the deep rational structure of the world through a systematic philosophy consisting of strictly conceptual truths, which flow from a logically perspicuous relation of 'containment' among concepts. That is, all truths would be 'analytic,' in Kant's sense. Kant's distinction shows to the contrary that far reaching and scientifically indispensable parts of our knowledge of the world (including mathematics, the foundations of natural science, all knowledge from experience, and the central principles of metaphysics itself) are essentially synthetic and could never be restated in analytic form. Thus, the metaphysics of Kant's predecessors is doomed, because knowledge crucial to any adequate theory of the world cannot even be expressed in the idiom to which it restricts itself (and which was the basis of its claim to provide a transparently rational account of things). Traditional metaphysics founders on the expressive poverty of conceptual truth. To establish these claims, R. Lanier Anderson shows how Kant's distinction can be given a clear basis within traditional logic, and traces Kant's long, difficult path to discovering it. Once analyticity is framed in clear logical terms, it is possible to reconstruct compelling arguments that elementary mathematics must be synthetic, and then to show how similar considerations about irreducible syntheticity animate Kant's famous arguments against traditional metaphysics in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant, Immanuel 1724-1804 (DE-588)118559796 gnd rswk-swf Urteilskraft (DE-588)4187267-8 gnd rswk-swf Metaphysik (DE-588)4038936-4 gnd rswk-swf Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd rswk-swf Kant, Immanuel 1724-1804 (DE-588)118559796 p Metaphysik (DE-588)4038936-4 s Urteilskraft (DE-588)4187267-8 s Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 s DE-604 Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027707189&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027707189&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Klappentext |
spellingShingle | Lanier Anderson, R. The poverty of conceptual truth Kant's analytic/synthetic distinction and the limits of metaphysics Kant, Immanuel 1724-1804 (DE-588)118559796 gnd Urteilskraft (DE-588)4187267-8 gnd Metaphysik (DE-588)4038936-4 gnd Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)118559796 (DE-588)4187267-8 (DE-588)4038936-4 (DE-588)4070914-0 |
title | The poverty of conceptual truth Kant's analytic/synthetic distinction and the limits of metaphysics |
title_auth | The poverty of conceptual truth Kant's analytic/synthetic distinction and the limits of metaphysics |
title_exact_search | The poverty of conceptual truth Kant's analytic/synthetic distinction and the limits of metaphysics |
title_full | The poverty of conceptual truth Kant's analytic/synthetic distinction and the limits of metaphysics R. Lanier Anderson |
title_fullStr | The poverty of conceptual truth Kant's analytic/synthetic distinction and the limits of metaphysics R. Lanier Anderson |
title_full_unstemmed | The poverty of conceptual truth Kant's analytic/synthetic distinction and the limits of metaphysics R. Lanier Anderson |
title_short | The poverty of conceptual truth |
title_sort | the poverty of conceptual truth kant s analytic synthetic distinction and the limits of metaphysics |
title_sub | Kant's analytic/synthetic distinction and the limits of metaphysics |
topic | Kant, Immanuel 1724-1804 (DE-588)118559796 gnd Urteilskraft (DE-588)4187267-8 gnd Metaphysik (DE-588)4038936-4 gnd Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd |
topic_facet | Kant, Immanuel 1724-1804 Urteilskraft Metaphysik Erkenntnistheorie |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027707189&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=027707189&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
work_keys_str_mv | AT lanierandersonr thepovertyofconceptualtruthkantsanalyticsyntheticdistinctionandthelimitsofmetaphysics |